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This work examines the involvement of various groups and individuals in the 
technological development of sericulture in Sichuan between 1901 and 1945. 
Sericulture in modern Sichuan presents a unique case for the study of technological 
development in an underdeveloped region. As an agrarian-based industry, sericulture 
allows for observations on both agricultural and industrial development to be made. 
The modernization of sericulture in Sichuan proceeded slowly, which makes possible 
the scrutiny of both indigenous technology that remained in use and 
foreign-originated modern innovations. Central to this analysis are the roles of a 
variety of groups and individuals who cooperated and competed among themselves 
in the control and dissemination of sericulture knowledge and techniques in Sichuan 
during this half century. 
This work argues that sericulture technological development evolved from 
multifaceted paths into a single trajectory of the modernization of sericulture 
controlled by the government and their professional sericulturists. In the beginning, 
there was no single-minded commitment towards the adoption of foreign 
technologies. Different groups and individuals hailing from different socioeconomic, 
political, and ideological backgrounds took divergent strategies towards the 
technological development of sericulture. It was only in the 1930s that the provincial 
authorities and the Nationalist government took over the leadership of the reforms 
and emphasized on a centralized modernization program.  
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In examining the technological development of modern Sichuan sericulture, this 
work addresses two topics related to technology. First, it suggests that technological 
development was both disruptive and incremental during the early period when the 
pre-modern regions were exposed to modernizing forces. The foreign technology 
introduced was creative and revolutionary while indigenous one was more suitable 
to Sichuan’s socioeconomic conditions and developed concomitantly. Second, it 
reveals that technological development did not simply cause the deskilling of rural 
producers by rendering their traditional skills and techniques obsolete, but also 
required them to be re-skilled in the new forms of knowledge and techniques. 
The work is arranged chronologically. Chapter 1 presents the historical, 
geographical, and socio-economic contexts of Sichuan. Chapter 2 studies the 
interwoven relationship between rural sericulture and peasant economy. Chapters 3 
and 4 concentrate on the last decade of the Qing dynasty. Despite their different 
approaches, the Imperial Court, the provincial government, and the local elites 
collaborated in the pursuit of sericulture reform. Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the 
technological situation in the 1910s and 1920s, when civil wars were rampant but silk 
production was also prosperous. Chapter 5 measures the impact on sericulture of 
taxation imposed by the military authorities, various reforms carried out in individual 
counties, and the introduction of Japanese style factories. Chapter 6 explains why 
there was a wide range of technological levels within the silk reeling industry. 
Chapter 7 reveals how the provincial government took over the leadership from the 
local elites, after the world economic depression in the 1930s, and aimed at 
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modernizing sericulture. Chapter 8 focuses on the involvement of the Nationalist 
government in the technological development of sericulture during the Second 
Sino-Japanese War, and the resultant impact. Specifically, it examines an unusual 
case of economic cooperation in southern Sichuan that involved the Chinese 
Communist Party, reformist intellectuals, and the Nationalist government. Last, the 
epilogue briefly introduces the sericulture reforms of the Communist government 
after 1949, and shows that these reforms have continued the trends that took shape 
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This work studies the participation of various groups, from different 
socioeconomic, political, and ideological backgrounds, in technological diffusion 
within the sericulture industry in modern Sichuan province, in the first half of the 
twentieth century. These different groups offered and pursued a diverse range of 
ideas and approaches towards the technological development of the sericulture 
industry in Sichuan between 1901 and 1945. This pluralism eventually evolved into a 
single trajectory of preference for Western technology, which became the foundation 
and model for the transformation of the industry after the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China. 
Sericulture is an agrarian-industry. It involves both an agricultural stage of 
growing mulberry trees and raising silkworms for cocoons, and a non-agricultural 
stage of producing raw silk (shengsi) through cocoons. The ordinary raw silk is made 
from the fiber produced by domesticated silkworm, Bombyx mori, which includes a 
wide range of breeds. Mulberry leaves are the only staple food of domesticated 
silkworms nowadays, but there were also some other supplementary food supply for 
silkworms during the period under study in this dissertation. Mulberry cultivation 
and silkworm rearing are primarily carried out by the rural households. For reeling 
silk, cocoons built by silkworms are boiled in hot water to remove the sericin that 
gums the fiber together. Threads of several cocoons are then combined together to 
be reeled off as raw silk, the raw materials of shiny luxurious silk fabric. The stage of 
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reeling silk is not related to agrarian farming and could be detached from rural 
economic activity. Sericulture, hence, allows for observations on both agricultural 
and industrial development to be made.  
China was the earliest country to discover the secret of silk production. Its 
techniques did not spread to Korea until the second century B.C. And people in Japan 
mastered sericulture techniques in the third century. Silkworms, and the related 
techniques of rearing and cultivating them, were only successfully introduced into 
Byzantium as late as in the sixth century.1  In the following centuries, China 
continued to be the largest supplier of the best silk goods. Myriad traders had to 
travel on the overland and maritime silk roads to seek this luxurious Chinese fabric.  
However, in the mid-nineteenth century, the primacy of Chinese sericulture 
diminished and China had to become an importer of sericulture technology. Set up in 
Shanghai in 1861, the Ewo Filature of Jardine, Matheson & Co. was first mechanized 
raw silk producing factory in China, as well as one of her first modern 
establishments.2 Although it was closed down in 1870, it began the process of 
modeling Chinese raw silk production on foreign techniques. There were 10 filatures 
in 1894 in Shanghai and 29 in 1898.3 By the turn of the twentieth century, filature 
                                                             
1 Dieter Kuhn, “Textile Technology: Spinning and Reeling”, in Science and Civilisation 
in China, ed. Joseph Needham, volume 5, Part IX (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), pp. 418-419.  
2 Shannon R. Brown, “The Ewo Filature: A Study in the Transfer of Technology to 
China in 19th Century”, Technology and Culture 20, 3 (July 1979), pp. 552, 567.  
3 Tomoko Shiroyama, China during the Great Depression, Market, State, and the 
World Economy, 1929 – 1937 (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 
Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 54.  
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raw silk was the major type of exported raw silk in China. The agricultural sector of 
sericulture started absorbing foreign knowledge at the closing years of the century. 
Jiang Shengjin was the first Chinese to study sericulture overseas. He went to France 
to study modern techniques of rearing silkworm and examining silkworm eggs in 
1892.4 Later, more and more Chinese went overseas, especially to Japan, to study 
sericulture in the early twentieth century. After returned, many of them joined in 
modern Chinese sericultural institutes to spread foreign knowledge and to train more 
specialists. The new knowledge they learned and spread was based on scientific 
principles that aimed at give rigorous, testable, unbiased explanation to the nature of 
sericulture. Both this new knowledge and mechanized production of silk were of 
foreign origin that was different from the indigenous Chinese ones. Despite their 
foreign origin, their spread and further development did not always depend on direct 
foreign involvement. In this work, I sometimes refer to the foreign-originated 
knowledge and technology as modern knowledge and technology.  
In the process of absorbing foreign sericulture in China, Sichuan was a late 
comer. It did not get the access to foreign sericulture knowledge and technology until 
the beginning of the twentieth century. Moreover, it was slower in adopting foreign 
knowledge and technology than was the case in the coastal China. By 1949, 
sericulture in Sichuan was still dominated by domestic-bred silkworm varieties called 
native silkworm (tuzhong) and non-mechanized reeling technologies. What was the 
                                                             
4 Li Pingsheng, “Lun wanqing cansiye gailiang” (Discussion on sericultural reform in 
the late Qing), Wenshizhe 3 (1994), p. 91.  
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pattern of sericulture transformation in Sichuan? Why was foreign sericulture 
technology diffused into Sichuan so slowly?  
To answer these questions, this work concentrates on the role of human 
participants in technological diffusion. Technological diffusion is about the 
acquisition, adoption, and incorporation of innovational technology and skills into 
production. It requires four critical elements, the innovations such as ideas, practices, 
and objects, the innovators who invent or introduce the innovations, the receivers 
who receive and adopt the innovations following innovators, and the communication 
channels in which innovations spread from innovators to receivers.5 Although the 
study of technological diffusion can only focus on technological elements, after all, it 
is human agents who apply, implement and adjust the innovations. Instead of 
focusing on the set of production techniques and knowledge available at that time, 
therefore, this study examines the interaction of people that affected and influenced 
the acquisition, adoption and incorporation of sericulture innovations in the 
socioeconomic contexts and circumstances particular to Sichuan.  
Unearthing the pattern of sericulture technological diffusion in Sichuan, and the 
underpinning factors, provide a case study in the modern experience of the 
agrarian-based handicraft industry.  
Chapters 1 and 2 set out the historical processes and geographical contexts that 
                                                             
5 Everett M. Roger with F. Floyd Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations: A 
Cross-Cultural Approach (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 18-40, 174-196.  
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underpinned the socio-economic transformation of Sichuan society alongside the 
growth of its sericulture. From a vastly under-populated land at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century, Sichuan became increasingly overpopulated from the 
eighteenth century onwards, and a highly stratified rural society gradually took shape. 
Natural advantages and agricultural commercialization stimulated sericulture in the 
Basin of Sichuan, especially in the hilly regions. Peasants too possessed all the 
traditional skills required for producing raw silk, where the whole process of 
sericulture production could be finished within a single rural household. Their 
techniques contributed to the subsidiary status of sericulture in rural economy. And 
the subsidiary nature of sericulture production, in turn, restricted the improvement 
of sericulture techniques in countryside.  
The benefits of improving technology and techniques of both agricultural and 
industrial stages of sericulture surfaced at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Chapter 3 documents the governmental efforts towards encouraging sericulture 
technological diffusion during the New Policy (Xinzheng) reforms in the closing years 
of the Manchu regime. The central court legalized the equal status of agriculture, 
industry, and commerce. It encouraged technological improvement by modeling after 
the West and Japan. Although it did not specially stress the adoption of foreign 
technology, the loyal and powerful provincial government enthusiastically promoted 
sericulture education, enacted supportive and protective economic policies, and 
developed infrastructure for the improvement of sericulture at the local level.  
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Chapter 4 profiled the leading local figures in the first wave of technological 
diffusion. These local Confucian gentry conservatively sought to maintain traditional 
values even as they were open-minded about accepting foreign knowledge. They 
advocated both indigenous and foreign technologies, as long as they were suitable 
for the development of local sericulture. For these local leaders, promoting the 
diffusion of sericulture technology was primarily for the immediate benefit of the 
local populace and the province, rather than China as a whole.  
However, the province-wide reform efforts were soon terminated with the 
collapse of the Manchu regime in the 1911 revolution. Sichuan was politically 
separated from the control of the central government soon after the founding of the 
Republic of China, and was not reintegrated into the Chinese national politics by 
Jiang Jieshi until 1935. In the interim, the province was afflicted by rampant wars 
among various warlords. Chapter 5 measures the impact several major actors had on 
technological diffusion during the era of warlordism, especially between 1912 and 
1931. The military authorities had no interest in local developments beyond the 
extraction of taxes, but taxation did not significantly obstruct sericulture. The local 
semi-official elites were the leading force of technological diffusion, but had no 
ability to carry out large-scale or efficient improvements. During this phase, Japanese 
factories brought the most significant technological innovation. In fact, unlike the 
usual assumption that warlordism had impeded the economy, sericulture remained 
prosperous in warlord controlled Sichuan.  
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Underpinning the prosperity of the raw silk industry was a variety of silk reeling 
technologies that ranged from the most primitive devices to the latest Japanese 
mechanized factory, with the non-mechanized techniques in predominance. Chapter 
6 explores the explanation for the stagnation in adopting mechanization in silk 
reeling.  I argue that the process of technological adoption was largely determined 
by cost-benefit calculations. The non-mechanized workshops were advantageous to 
filatures because of lower cocoon cost, wage cost, and higher productivity. They 
profited well if market conditions were favorable. The filatures allowed the 
businesses to realize economies of scale and to standardize product quality, but 
required heavy investment and consequently large interest burdens. Other lucrative 
businesses such as speculation and land investment further prevented the native 
investors from investing in industry.  
The prosperity of Sichuan sericulture ended in the 1930s, due to the serious 
damage wrought by the world economic depression. Under these circumstances, the 
first systematic endeavor to modernize sericulture took place in Sichuan. Chapter 7 
demonstrates this transformation. Both the private and public sectors started 
investigating the problems of sericulture. They began to see Chinese indigenous 
techniques and technologies as backward and proposed to replace them with foreign 
ones. Foreign and indigenous technologies were now dichotomized as incompatible, 
with the latter regarded as clearly inferior and undesirable. As a result, the Liu Xiang 
government who united the province for the first time in two decades in 1933 took 
over the leadership of developing sericulture technology from the local elites.  
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The most intensive efforts in fighting against indigenous sericulture technology 
were conducted during the Second Sino-Japanese War. While the provincial 
government continued introducing modern sericulture technology, the Nationalist 
government also directly intervened with sericulture in Sichuan. Chapter 8 
concentrates on the involvement and impact of the Nationalist government on 
sericulture technological development. Specifically, it examines an unusual case of 
economic cooperation in southern Sichuan. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the 
Nationalist government, and the reformist intellectuals collaborated in the project of 
Leshan Sericulture Experimental Area (Leshan cansi shiyanqu) between 1938 and 
1945. By the end of the war, despite the universal acknowledgment of the 
advantages of modern technology over indigenous ones, these reforms achieved 
limited success.  
In many aspects, the process of sericulture technology diffusion in Sichuan was 
unique in modern China. First, as an inland province, it was the only major 
sericulture region in China without an outlet to the sea. Foreign influence was much 
weaker in the province than in the lower Yangzi or Pearl River deltas, the other two 
leading and more well-known raw silk producing regions. Interregional and domestic 
trade of silk goods was more prevalent than the international silk trade in modern 
Sichuan. Unlike the coastal China where technological spread significantly through 
cross-border means, domestic diffusion was the dominant mode in Sichuan right 
from the beginning.  
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Second, the province alternated between being the core or the periphery in 
accordance with rapidly changing national and regional political situations from 1901 
to 1949. The involvement of the various central governments created more political 
and economic uncertainty in Sichuan than in the relatively stable coastal region, and 
complicated the process of technological diffusion. In particular, the phase during 
the Second Sino-Japanese War with the participation of the Nationalist government 
became the most significant era of technological transformation in Sichuan. This is in 
sharp contrast to the prevailing view of many Western and Chinese researchers on 
the history of Chinese silk and sericulture. Lillian M. Li, Lynda S. Bell, Alvin Y. So, 
Wang Xiang, and Liu Yonglian, for example, all held the idea that the war created a 
rupture in Chinese sericulture.6  
Last but most importantly, remarkably diverse groups were actively involved in 
sericulture development during this period. They held divergent motivations, 
created different strategies, and expected different outcomes. The Imperial Court 
and its loyal provincial governments hoped to reverse the dynasty’s collapsing 
fortunes through a last resort to reforms. Local Confucian gentry pursued economic 
                                                             
6 For instance, Lillian M. Li, China’s Silk Trade: Traditional Industry in the Modern 
World, 1842 – 1937 (Cambridge and London: Published by Council on East Asian 
Studies, Harvard University, Distributed by Harvard University Press, 1981); Lynda S. 
Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas, Silk Filatures and Peasant-Family Production in Wuxi 
County, 1865-1937 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); Alvin Y. So, The South 
China Silk District: Local Historical Transformation and World-System Theory (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1986); Wang Xiang, Jingdai zhongguo chuantong 
sichouye zhuanxing yanjiu (Study on the transformation of traditional silk industry in 
modern China) (Tianjin: Nankai daxue chubanshe, 2005); and Liu Yonglian, Jindai 
Guangdong duiwai sichou maoyi yanjiu (Study on foreign trade of silk in modern 
Guangdong) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2006).  
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profit while following Confucian teaching to share the benefit with people in the 
whole province. Foreign investors exploited the cheap raw materials and labors for 
high profit. After the world economic depression, the Republican provincial 
government planned to monopolize the province’s economic value, at the expense 
of the power and interest of the local elites in sericulture. During the Second 
Sino-Japanese War, the Nationalist government sought to utilize silk production for 
its wartime economy. The CCP mobilized the masses to produce for the war and 
ultimately to create a new China they anticipated. The intellectual rural reformers 
from the lower Yangzi delta, who were deeply concerned about rural livelihoods, 
actively spread modern technology. In addition, the peasants as the innovation 
receivers and real producers were lowly-placed but significant and rational agents in 
the use of these technologies.  
Thus, there was never a single-minded commitment towards the adoption of 
foreign technology at the beginning. Rather, Chinese indigenous technologies were 
persisted with, and their replacement by foreign innovations was strongly resisted. It 
was only during the later phases of the first half century that the indigenous 
technology was considered completely backward and necessary of replacement by 
foreign technology.  
Leap Forward and Continuity of Technology  
The pattern of technological development in Sichuan sericulture is helpful in 
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understanding the nature of technological transformation 7 : does technological 
development proceed through revolutionary and iconoclastic innovations or gradual 
and accumulative progress? Joseph Schumpeter, who pioneered the innovation 
theory, argues the innovations are creative and destructive factors that replaced the 
established order of doing things. In looking at the origin and development of 
capitalism, he argues, “The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist 
engine in motion comes from the next consumers’ goods, the new methods of 
production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial 
organization that capitalist enterprise creates.”8 The innovations, particularly, the 
introduction of new products and the application of new technology for production, 
are creative and destructive factors that replaced the established order of doing 
things. He approaches economic progress through the perspective of discontinuous 
technological leaps. Arnold Heertje notices, “In Schumpeter’s conception of 
innovation, the continuous stream of minor improvement in equipment and 
products, sometimes called continuous technical development, is completely 
lacking.”9 
Disagreeing with Schumpeter’s leap forward model, Nathan Rosenberg suggests 
                                                             
7 Technology is a set of techniques for producing goods. It includes both hardware 
that are physical objects and the software such as information and organizational 
service for the application of objects. Technology might be equipment, goods, ideas, 
events, services, and unwritten knowledge, as well as the management processes 
that combine all inputs. In many cases, new technology is regarded interchangeably 
with innovation. This work follows this practice. 
8 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper, 
1975), pp. 82-83. 
9 Arnold Heertje, Schumpeter on the Economics of Innovation and the Development 
of Capitalism (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2006), p. 91.  
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that innovation proceeds incrementally.10 The first introduction of innovation cannot 
cause dramatic impact on production and trade. Technological development is a 
continuous progress that is not finished after the first introduction of innovation. 
Historians have the tendency of demarcating the “new” and the “old,” by ignoring 
the persistence of old technologies. “[I]t is a very general practice among historians 
to fix their attention upon the story of the new method as soon as its technical 
feasibility has been established and to terminate all interest in the old.”11 In reality, 
even though new technology has been introduced, it does not cause the existing 
technology to be obsolete immediately. The existing technology continues to be 
improved alongside the new technology introduced. 
The case of sericulture in modern Sichuan in fact reveals both the drastic leap 
forward and incremental models of innovations. In encountering the modern world, 
indigenous technology was not spontaneously abandoned and immediately replaced 
by the innovative technology from the foreign countries. Instead, local people 
continued to improve traditional techniques through incremental innovations, in 
responding to the new market demand. The improved indigenous technology, for a 
certain period of time, was more advantageous than foreign technology because of 
its suitability for the local environment. It could bring about more optimal usage of 
available resources than the alien technologies, and therefore persisted for a period 
                                                             
10 Nathan Rosenberg, “Factors Affecting the Diffusion of Technology”, Explorations in 
Economic History, 10, 1 (Fall 1972), pp. 3-33; and Exploring the Black Box: Technology, 
Economics, and History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
11 Nathan Rosenberg, “Factors Affecting the Diffusion of Technology”, p. 23.  
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of time, until the equilibrium of factors that framed the optimal arrangement of 
resources was disturbed and consequently dismantled. In the first decade that this 
work studies, there was significant emergence of indigenous technological 
improvements in Sichuan. In the following two decades, indigenously developed 
technology dominated sericulture production. It was only till later that the innovators 
regarded foreign modern technology as superior and stopped improving and 
spreading indigenous technology. They tried hard to replace the indigenous 
technology with the foreign one. Even so, indigenous technology persisted in Sichuan 
due to its appropriateness. 
However, for the underdeveloped region that had not formerly been exposed to 
any modern influence, the pursuit of industrialization and modernization implied the 
necessity of acquiring foreign knowledge and skills. The indigenously improved 
technology will not ultimately stimulate economic progress, since these 
improvements are only small amendments implemented without accompanying 
fundamental transformations. The evolution of the modern world suggests that the 
breakthrough depended on the knowledge and skills that were based on the 
application of modern Western scientific principles.  
The appearance and introduction of foreign innovations represented a leap 
forward in itself. It created a new trajectory of technological development that was 
completely different from the traditional techniques. Despite the resistance and 
obstruction of the existing social system, the new trajectory revealed a much 
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stronger dynamic for speeding up the process of economic progress in a relatively 
shorter time than the previous dependence on existing traditional technology 
permitted. In modern Sichuan, through the introduction of mechanized filatures, the 
non-agricultural stage of sericulture was separated from rural handicraft industry and 
became unprecedentedly industrialized. In particular, the central and provincial 
governments in the 1930s and 1940s held strong commitment towards sericulture 
modernization. They clearly identified themselves with the modern technologies and 
pursued the drastic transformation in production. It was ultimately the 
industrialization of silk reeling, the spread of new varieties, and the adoption of new 
treatment of mulberry and silkworm, that led to the drastic increased output and 
quality of sericulture in Sichuan. The commitment was finally achieved in the 1950s 
through firm and intensive Communist government programs.  
Industrialization and modernization in developing countries was characterized 
by both revolutionary transformations and incremental reforms. The modernization 
of the sericulture industry thus presents an excellent case study that provides 
insights on the nature of technological progress. This, in turn, facilitates the 
examination of the factors underpinning the slow adoption of modern technology, 
and the consequent slow economic growth in sericulture.  
Deskilling and Re-skilling  
In Eating Rice from Bamboo Roots, the Social History of a Community of 
Handicraft Papermakers in Rural Sichuan, 1920-2000, Jacob Eyferth concentrates his 
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discussion on “skill” that was both physically embodied in the rural papermakers and 
embedded in the historical and social conditions. He argues there was a deskilling 
process in the papermaking industry in Jiajiang county, Sichuan, which started in the 
1920s and climaxed in the 1950s and 1960s. The papermakers were deprived of their 
skill through two processes. First, the state’s industrialization efforts aimed at 
increasing economic efficiency through the division of labor and the alienation of the 
producer from his product. The result was the simplification of job complexity. At the 
same time, papermaking artisans were not the sole holders of skills any more, when 
the educated elites and governmental agents achieved the access to the secrets of 
papermaking that was tacitly possessed by the artisans. The educated elites obtained 
and redistributed the traditional knowledge and skill, and hoped to remove 
inefficiency and irrationality. Although Eyferth suggests that the deskilling was far 
from complete and new skills in other forms of rural production emerged at the end 
of the studied period, he favors the idea that papermaking industry itself 
experienced deskilling in the twentieth century.12  
My work on sericulture shares much resemblance to Eyferth’s study on the 
papermaking industry. Both works focus on the technological transformation in 
Sichuan Province in the twentieth century. The papermaking Jiajiang county was also 
one of the chief raw silk producing countries in Sichuan, and a region where the 
                                                             
12 Jacob Eyferth, Eating Rice from Bamboo Roots, the Social History of a Community 
of Handicraft Papermakers in Rural Sichuan, 1920-2000 (Cambridge and London: 
Published by the Harvard University Asia Center, Distributed by Harvard University 
Press, 2009).  
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national sericulture reform agents intervened in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Both 
papermaking and silk production were agrarian-based, fundamentally dependent on 
the yield from land, but ended in non-agricultural sector. They were primarily 
handicraft industry conducted within the rural households, and tightly integrated 
with the rural economy. The end products of paper and raw silk were commodities 
that went to markets rather than for household subsistence consumption.  
While Eyferth emphasizes skill degradation within the rural handicraft industry, 
this thesis extends his approach by arguing that both deskilling and re-skilling 
processes occurred in the development of sericulture technology. First, the type of 
deskilling where the educated elites and governmental agents extracted knowledge 
from papermaking artisans never took place in sericulture in modern Sichuan. 
Sericultural manuals have traditionally been in the reservoir of Chinese commonly 
shared knowledge. Second, whether the simplification of a job constitutes a form of 
deskilling needs reevaluation. Harry Braverman first formulated the thesis of 
deskilling of work under capitalism through his reading of Karl Marx. This thesis was 
widely accepted but also critiqued by social scientists. Theoretically, Paul S. Adler 
suggests Braverman has misinterpreted Marx, arguing that the evolution towards a 
capitalist system was characterized not by skill degradation as Braverman suggests, 
but skill upgrading.13 Other researchers demonstrate empirically that different work 
profiles created different skill requirement. While the complexity of some jobs was 
                                                             
13 Paul S. Adler, “Marx, Machines, and Skill”, Technology and Culture 31, 4 (October 
1990), pp. 780-812. 
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reduced, other jobs exacted high skill requirements. 14  At the time that old 
technology became obsolete, new technology was created. The workers responded 
to the new technology by acquiring new skills.  
As in the advanced manufacturing industry, the transformation of sericulture in 
modern Sichuan reflected both decreasing and increasing complexity of job. Peasants 
traditionally held the skills that allowed overall control of raw silk production within 
rural households. They knew how to preserve and treat silkworm eggs, to cultivate 
and transplant mulberry seedlings, to rear silkworms, and to reel raw silk from 
cocoons. They could produce nearly all required raw materials for producing raw silk. 
Although the reeling devices required carpenters to build them, these carpenters 
were often fellow villagers who were easily approached. The maintenance of reeling 
devices required no special skills and knowledge. In the pre-modern rural society in 
Sichuan, peasants held the complete set of skills of sericulture.  
The efforts of introducing new technology in the early phases did not deprive 
peasants from utilizing their skills. Before the 1930s, the reformers largely integrated 
the new knowledge with the traditional ones. Peasants were encouraged to increase 
their knowledge and skill and kept overall control, from silkworm eggs production to 
cocoons production. The process of deskilling was only significantly reflected in 
individual household popularly withdrawing from reeling raw silk. With the 
                                                             
14  For instance, Toby D. Wall, et al, “Manufacturing Technology and Work 
Simplification: An Empirical Study”, Journal of Occupational Behaviour 8, 3 (July 
1987), pp. 233-250.  
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emergence of specialized factories and workshops, many peasants chose to sell 
cocoons rather than reeling by themselves.  
More rapid simplification of the rural sericultural skills ensued following the 
governmental sericulture reforms from the 1930s. To some extent, peasants were 
deskilled in the process of modernizing sericulture due to the obsolescence and 
abandonment of their traditional techniques. The modernization reforms promoted 
improved silkworm and fine mulberry varieties. For yielding cocoons of higher 
quantity and quality, peasants had to give up breeding native silkworms and 
nurturing native mulberry saplings domestically. They had to rely on official or 
private institutions for the supply of essential raw materials.  
Nevertheless, the governmental reforms in the 1930s and 1940s, as well as 
those in post-1949, went beyond providing new varieties and deskilling peasants. 
The governmental reforms actively infused peasants with new knowledge and skills 
that helped to achieve the ideal performance of the new varieties. Activities such as 
disease prevention and control, disinfection of equipment, accurate management on 
temperature and ventilation, efficient feeding and cleaning of cocoons, identifying, 
preventing, and curing diseases, all suggest an upgrading of skills in rural sericulture. 
The training on rural silkworm raisers is therefore, not a tendency of deskilling, but 




The tradition of compiling local gazetteers preserved a considerable number of 
valuable source materials for students of the history of China. For the time period 
covered by this study, the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth 
century there was an abundance of gazetteers produced. Many gazetteers note that 
silkworms, mulberry trees, and silk were their local products, and list the local 
cocoon markets and silk markets. Some gazetteers record rituals related to 
sericulture and silk production. However, the majority of gazetteers provide little 
information beyond that sericulture existed in the region and was important to the 
local economy. In 1983, the National Supervising Team of Gazetteer Compiling 
(Zhongguo difangzhi zhidao xiaozu) was established in Beijing, inaugurating another 
tide of compiling local gazetteers. These new gazetteers offer more statistical data, 
but focus on the post-1949 period.  
The People’s Republic of China created a tradition of recording local history 
similar to the local gazetteer – the compiling of “Materials of literature and history” 
(Wenshi ziliao). Wenshi ziliao contains more detailed and more vivid information 
than local gazetteers. Governments from the provincial level down to the county 
level all set up special offices in charge of the periodic editing of Wenshi ziliao. The 
silk industry and silk trade was the most important industry in modern Sichuan, and 
continued to play a significant role in the economy of many counties till the end of 
the twentieth century. It is not surprised that local and provincial Wenshi ziliao 
records present abundant material on the silk industry. Although many articles bear 
strong ideological bias due to the historical context of their production, the writers 
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were primarily people of high rank in the industry who were familiar with the 
industry and knew a lot of inside stories, which makes the materials highly reliable. 
Wenshi ziliao thus serves the study by offering substantial data unavailable in other 
academic analyses and statistic records.  
The Westerners and Japanese made painstaking investigations of modern 
Sichuan, which provide the earliest detailed accounts on the silk industry of the 
province. The first British Consul-General in Sichuan, Alexander Hosie, detailed the 
various means of silkworm raising, silk reeling, and silk weaving in the province at the 
turn of the twentieth century.15 The Japanese reports made by Uehara Shigemi are 
the most reliable materials on Sichuan silk in the 1920s. It was firstly published as 
monograph called Shina Shisen shō no sanshigyō (Sericulture in Sichuan), then was 
compiled into Shina sanshigyō taikan (A general survey of sericulture in China). The 
latter work makes possible the comparative study of the silk industry in different 
region during the same period. Other foreign studies provide various data about 
Sichuan’s social economy. For example, H. D. Brown from the West China University 
surveyed the peasant economy in Sichuan in the middle 1920s. His works are 
important sources for the research on Sichuan before 1930. In 1936, Kanda Masao 
                                                             
15 Alexander Hosie, Report by Consul-general Hosie on the Province of Ssuch’uan: 
Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty (London: 
H.M.S.O., 1904); and Szechwan, Its products, Industries and Resources (Shanghai: 
Kelly & Walsh, Limited, 1922). At the same time, other works composed by Hosie are 
also informative for understanding Sichuan at the turn of the twentieth century, such 
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Kuei-chow, and Yun-nan (London: Philip, 1890); and On the Trail of the Opium Poppy: 




published a work on Sichuan, Shisen shō sōran (Overview of Sichuan), with an entry 
on Sichuan’s principal exports.  
Professional Chinese investigations and surveys in Sichuan did not appear in 
large numbers until the 1930s, and were the most prevalent during the Second 
Sino-Japanese War. A variety of economic, political, and educational institutions 
published detailed reports on the rural economy, financial matters, and society in 
Sichuan during the war. There are also specialized investigations and research on the 
silk industry and sericulture. These accounts study both Sichuan province as a whole, 
and leading sericulture regions such as Santai, Nanchong, and Leshan individually.  
Contemporary journals, newspapers, and unpublished archival documents 
further support this work. Among all the journals referred to, the Sichuan yuebao 
(Sichuan monthly), the Jianshe zhouxun (Reconstruction weekly), and the Funü 
xinyun (Women’s new life movement) are the most informative. The Baxian archives 
preserve files on the Manchu governmental policies on sericutlure and social 
responses during the last years of the Qing, on which the chapter on the New Policy 
reforms heavily relies. The documents from the Archives of Leshan provide insights 
into the local silk industry between 1938 and 1945. In addition, two individuals have 
been interviewed in the process of completing this study – Chen Gangzu, the 
grandson of a silk tycoon in Republican Sichuan, and Zhang Maolin, the current chief 
and also the descendant of workers of the provincial Silkworm Breeding Station in 




Background: the Shaping of a Modern Rural Sichuan 
Sichuan is an inland province located at the upper Yangzi River in southwest 
China. Ecologically, its eastern part had fertile lands that could support a large 
population agriculturally, and provide abundant resources for its handicraft industry. 
Its geographical location and topographical features helped create a region that was 
hard to penetrate from the outside, but permitted easy internal transportation. 
Historical developments during the Qing dynasty, accompanied by these natural 
circumstances, led to a highly stratified society with a developed local commercial 
system and prosperous trade in agricultural products.  
Agricultural Geography 
Sichuan is topographically divided into a western mountainous region and an 
eastern basin. The western section of the province is constituted of a mountainous 
plateau at the southeastern edge of the Tibetan Plateau. The average temperature is 
low and winter is long due to its high altitude. There are few agrarian lands. Animal 
husbandry is the main rural economic activity. In the eyes of foreign visitors in the 
early twentieth century, the area was “almost uncultivated, inhabited by aboriginal 
tribes, and sparsely populated.”1  During 1939 and 1955, this section became 
                                                             
1 Robert J. Davidson and Isaac Mason, with Timothy Richard, Life in West China, 
Described by Two Residents in the Province of Sz-chuwan (London: Headley Brothers, 
1905), p 32. 
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independent from Sichuan and was known as Xikang Province.  
This work primarily focuses on the eastern section of Sichuan Province, 
including Chongqing, which was a part of Sichuan historically but was separated from 
it in 1997. This section is known as the Sichuan Basin, or often also called “Red Basin” 
because of the color of its soil. Framed by high mountains, the Sichuan Basin is made 
up of rolling country, low mountains, and alluvial plains, of which the Chengdu plain 
is the largest and the most fertile. Its agriculture, culture, and social structures were 
very different from the western mountainous part. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, it was “fertile, swarming with life and industry, and forms one of the most 
productive regions in the whole of China”.2  
Overall, the combination of climatic and geographic conditions favored 
agriculture in the Sichuan Basin. Its arable land and output of foodstuff and 
economic crops accounted for over 90 percent of those of the province.3 The 
Sichuan Basin was gifted with warm and moist subtropical monsoon climate, fertile 
lands, and an abundant variety of vegetation, due to the protection of the mountains 
surrounding it on all sides and the wind currents from both the Pacific and the Indian 
Oceans. Precipitation is abundant in summer, which allows for a high yield of 
summer crops. It is also warm and frost-free for long spells during winter which is 
favorable for crops surviving through winter. It is even warmer in winter, and spring 
                                                             
2 Robert J. Davidson and Isaac Mason, with Timothy Richard, Life in West China, p. 
32. 
3 Zhongguo kexueyuan Chengdu dili yanjiusuo, ed., Sichuan nongye dili (Agricultural 
geology of Sichuan) (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1981), p. 5. 
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comes earlier than in the fertile lower Yangzi delta. It was well-known as the “country 
of treasures” (tianfu zhiguo).  
However, the climate and geography within the Sichuan Basin are not 
homogenous throughout its mountainous edges, low hills, and alluvial plains. The 
distinct climate and topographical conditions had significant impact on the peasants’ 
choice of crops, as I will show. The mountainous region enveloping the Sichuan Basin 
is of high humidity and low sun radiation. It is less densely populated, and colder 
than the other two regions.4 The economy in this region largely depended on 
mountain products. In mountainous northern Sichuan, for instance, forestry, mineral 
mining, and paper production which was in turn reliant on bamboo cultivation, were 
predominant in the modern era.5  
The hilly area is within a range of 200 to 700 meters above sea level. The 
frost-free season range between 280 and 350 days. The percentage of paddy fields is 
only slightly higher than that of dry lands. The terrain is primarily made up of the 
purple-brown soil that is of relatively high fertility, but not as fertile as that in the 
alluvial plains. The hills are often terraced for agricultural farming. Some are not 
suitable for agricultural farming, are however populated by trees of economic value, 
                                                             
4 Sichuansheng difangzhi bianzhuan weiyuanhui ed., Sichuan shengzhi, nongyezhi 
(Sichuan province gazetteer, agriculture) (Chengdu: Sichuan cishu chubanshe, 1996), 
pp. 43-44.  
5 C.-Y. Hsiang, “Mountain Economy in Szechuan”, in Key Papers on Chinese Economic 




such as mulberry, wood oil, and fruit trees.6 
The richest and fertile region is the alluvial plain which centered on Chengdu, 
the provincial capital, at the western side the Sichuan Basin. The annual average 
temperature there is over 16 degrees Celsius, and it is almost frostless in the winter.7 
Annual precipitation is abundant and soil is high in fertility in this region. It is one of 
the most fertile and densely populated regions in China. According to an 
investigation in the 1920s, there were about 800 occupants to a square mile, and this 
ratio only shows the agricultural land excluding the towns or cities. This figure was in 
sharp contrast to the general population density of the province, at 286 per square 
mile.8 The area of the Chengdu plain accounted for only 4.2 percent of the total land 
area of the province, but cultivable land accounted for 12.5 percent of that of the 
province, according to the survey made in 1979. Despite the high population density, 
per capita output of foodstuff crops was still the highest in the province.9  
“Access to Sichuan was Hard, Harder than Reaching the Sky.” 
As a basin framed by high mountain ranges, transportation in Sichuan was 
characterized by difficult connections with the outside world but convenient 
                                                             
6 Sichuansheng difangzhi bianzhuan weiyuanhui ed., Sichuan shengzhi, nongyezhi, 
pp. 41-43. 
7 John Lossing Buck, Land Utilization in China, A Study of 16,786 farms in 168 
localities, and 38, 256 farm families in twenty-two provinces in China, 1929 – 1933 
(New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1968), p. 79. 
8 H. D. Brown and Li Minliang, “A Survey of 50 farms in the Chengdu Plain, Szechwan”, 
Chinese Economic Journal 2, 1 (January 1928), p. 49.  




intra-provincial access. The lack of accessibility to the outside made Sichuan a 
relatively isolated region from the rest of China, but it boasted of a developed 
transportation system that facilitated economic and cultural connections within the 
province.  
The Yangzi River was the chief channel connecting Sichuan and eastern China. It 
runs from west to east, cuts through the southern edge of the basin, and forces its 
way through the mountains that sever Sichuan from the rest of the world. The swift 
rapids, precipitous gorges, and dangerous rocks, however, made this waterway not 
an easy route for leaving or entering Sichuan. A Western traveler recalled his first 
journey to Chongqing by water in 1909,  
“[O]n one’s arrival at the Ichang the totally different character that the river 
assumed in the next stage of the voyage at once made itself manifest. A 
mountain wall towered ahead, seemingly forming a total barrier to further 
progress by the river and making evident the difficulties that were to be 
encountered. No more of the dead level paddy plains, but precipitous gorges; 
no more of the gentle current, but instead fierce rapids; no more mud- and 
sandbanks, but a river strewn with jagged rocks, so that many years of efforts 
were needed before the problem of its navigation by steamers was solved.”10 
Navigating the rapid and complicated upper Yangzi River was extremely difficult. 
                                                             
10 W. Stark Toller, “Old Days up the Yangtze”, Eastern World 2, 8-9(August -September, 
1949), p. 36. 
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Ships were steered by hundreds of thousand junk trackers in the Yangzi River 
between Chongqing and Wanxian. Junk tracking was arduous and painstaking 
labor-intensive work. The towing path was often no more than a goat track and even 
more hazardous when it rained. “An hour might be spent in working the boat round 
one point and then, with the snapping of a towline, the boat would be caught in the 
current and swept away. If one were lucky, a day’s work would be lost, but the 
misfortune might extend to the total loss of the boat.”11  
Junks were the traditional vehicle of waterway transportation, even though the 
first steamer arrived in Chongqing in 1898. The steamers of the Minsheng Company 
established by Lu Zuofu in 1925 gradually monopolized the steamer traffic on the 
upper Yangzi River, but junks were still in dominance during the first half of the 
twentieth century. In the early 1940s, there were about 6,400 junks on the Jialing 
River and the Chongqing section of the Yangzi River.12  
Another waterway that provided transportation between Sichuan and other 
provinces was the Qian River. It was the major route to Guizhou Province. But this 
route was not much better than the Yangzi River in terms of dangers. During the 
flood seasons, junks and boats all ceased operation.13  
In comparison to the waterways, there were more overland routes connecting 
                                                             
11 Ibid., p. 37. 
12 Zheng Ziyue, Sichuan xin dizhi (New topographic study of Sichuan) (Shanghai: 
Zhengzhong shuju, 1947), p. 277. 
13 Ibid., p. 266.  
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Sichuan and the outside, but traversing these was fraught with even more difficulties. 
The Tang poet Li Bai (701 – 762) lamented that “Access to Sichuan was hard, harder 
than reaching the sky.” The route to the Tibetan Plateau to the west of the province 
rose up from 500 meters to 4,000 meters in altitude. To Yunnan Province to the south, 
the roads crossed mountains and rivers. The several major journeys to Shanxi and 
Gansu Provinces in the north had to pass through the mountainous ranges of 
Qingling. Some parts of the route crossed wild areas or even narrow alley carved on 
the cliffs. To Hubei Province to the east, the land journey went alongside the 
Qingjiang River valley. Before arriving into the region of Hubei province, travelers had 
to take the road cut halfway up the mountains with deep gorges underneath.14  
The lack of accessibility between Sichuan and the rest of China made it difficult 
for outside threats to conquer Sichuan. The region of Sichuan historically often 
assumed autonomy by claiming independence from the central government when 
the latter was weak, and it was never easy for the central government to recover 
political, economic, and military control over Sichuan. In the 1910s and 1920s, 
Sichuan again became a de facto independent region controlled by warlords. It was 
also partly because of this difficulty of penetration that the nationalist government 
retreated to Chongqing in 1938 after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War 
and successive losses of major Chinese cities to the Japanese troops. In addition, the 
Western influence in culture, technology, and economy permeated into Sichuan with 
slow speed and great difficulty due to the distance between the province and coastal 
                                                             
14 Ibid., p. 290-294. 
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regions and the inconvenient lack of easy communication and transportation.  
Within the mountain perimeter however, the bottom of the basin had a rather 
well developed transportation network. Rivers and tributaries runs through the basin, 
mostly from north to south, and eventually converge on the Yangzi River that passes 
the basin from west to east. Many rivers, which run down from the mountains, are 
navigable at the bottom of the basin. The major waterways include the Min, Tuo, 
Jialing, Fu, and Qu rivers. Including the Yangzi and Qian rivers, over 10,294 kilometers 
of rivers were navigable within Sichuan.15 A variety of agricultural and industrial 
commodities were transported through these rivers by junks and later, steamers.  
At the same time, “the whole of the province is supplied with main roads 
between the chief centers, and smaller ones to all the towns, villages, and 
markets.”16 These roads were often stone-paved, ranged from 7 meters to 0.3 
meters in width, depending on importance. There were stone inscriptions indicating 
direction and distance at the junction of roads. Sedan chairs could travel 50 
kilometers daily, while porters could proceed 30 kilometers per day. Contemporary 
accounts argue that its transportation system was the most convenient and 
developed among all the Chinese provinces in terms of pre-modern Chinese road.17 
The construction of modern roads started in the early twentieth century in Sichuan, 
                                                             
15 Ibid., p. 276. This included a short distance of the Yangzi River from the border of 
Sichuan to Yibing in Hubei Province that is commonly considered as an essential part 
of “Chuanjiang” (lit. the river of Sichuan), the Sichuan section of the Yangzi River.  
16 Robert J. Davidson and Isaac Mason, with Timothy Richard, Life in West China, p. 
34.  
17 Zheng Ziyue, Sichuan xin dizhi, p. 283. 
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and developed particularly during the Second Sino-Japanese War. With the 
subsequent introduction of automobiles, these modern roads began to provide for 
faster transportation.  
The well-connected intra-provincial transportation system facilitated the 
shaping of sophisticated marketing networks in Sichuan. Hosie observed the 
pervasiveness of markets in Sichuan in the 1880s that “[s]mall market-towns are 
thickly dotted over the whole province, and at each place a market is held every five 
days.”18 William G. Skinner further drew a systematic analysis of the marketing 
hierarchical system, primarily based on his research on Sichuan. The Skinnerian 
market system comprised standard market towns, intermediate market towns, 
central market towns, local cities, greater cities, regional cities, regional metropolises, 
and central metropolises. The three kinds of market towns were among the lower 
levels of the hierarchy. County seats were intermediate or central market towns, and 
often belonged to the latter category.19 Skinner identified a total of 408 central 
places characterized by economic and commercial functions of urban places in the 
upper Yangzi macroregion that was equivalent to Sichuan Province in 1893, including 
2 metropolises, 6 regional cities, 21 greater cities, 87 local cities, and 292 central 
market towns. According to Skinner, the transportation system available largely 
determined the sitting of these central places in Sichuan.20 
                                                             
18 Hosie, Three Years in Western China, 1890, p. 21. 
19 G. William Skinner, “Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China: Part I”, Journal 
of Asian Studies 24, 1 (November 1964), p. 9.  
20 G. William Skinner, “Introduction, Urban and Rural in Chinese Society”, in The City 
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Shaping of Rural Structure in the Qing  
Not only natural and environmental conditions, but also social structure was 
responsible for the economic condition and production choices in Sichuan. In Sichuan, 
the expansion of the population created a highly stratified society during two 
centuries of the Manchu governance.  
The social structure of Sichuan during the Qing dynasty was founded on the 
disorder during the Ming-Qing transition. What the dynastic transition left was a 
deserted Sichuan with a small population and substantial waste lands. The wars 
wiped out the large landlord economy present during the Ming dynasty. From the 
late Ming to 1680 when the Manchu government completely controlled the province, 
Sichuan was the fighting field between various local rebels and the Ming suppressors, 
between rebellious Zhang Xianzhong’s troops and the Southern Ming’s troops, 
between Zhang’s troops and the Manchu armies, between the Southern Ming and 
the Manchu troops, and between the armies of feudal lord Wu Sangui and the 
Manchu armies.21 According to the official records, there were only 18,509 male 
adults in 1685.22  However, many historians suspect that the number was an 
exaggeration and estimate that the population was about 500,000 to 600,000 during 
the early Qing.23 Nevertheless, even this number is much less than that in the Ming 
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21 Sun Xiaofen, ed., Qingdai qianqi de yimin tian Sichuan (Immigration to Sichuan in 
the early Qing) (Chengdu: Sichuan daxue chubanshe, 1997), pp.2, 8. 
22 Qingchao wenxian tongkao (General study of literary records in the Qing), juan 19, 
(Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 2000), p. 5025. 
23 Sun Xiaofen, Qingdai qianqi de yimin tian Sichuan, p. 14; Li Shiping, Sichuan 
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when the recorded population was 3,102,073 in 1578.24 Cultivated land registered at 
the government was 1,188,350 mu in 166125, in sharp contrast to the figure of 
13,482,767 mu in 1578.26  
The Manchu government carried out a series of policies to encourage land 
cultivation and population growth from the early Qing, especially during the Kangxi 
Reign (1662 – 1722). At the beginning of the Qing, people reclaimed land according 
to their physical ability. Reclaimed land was marked by tree stumps.27 It was easy for 
peasants to register reclaimed lands and if they wanted to purchase lands, the price 
was low.28 The Manchu government further implemented a series of supportive tax 
policies. It exempted all reclaimed land taxes for the first three years after the land 
was claimed. The policy was revised in 1671 by extending the untaxed period to four 
years for other provinces, and five years for Sichuan. In 1672, the policy was further 
revised to allow for a six-year tax-free duration for the newly reclaimed lands; and in 
1673, ten-year duration.29 Meanwhile, the head tax was frozen and integrated with 
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26 Liang Fangzhong ed., Zhongguo lidai hukou, tiandi, tianfu tongji, p. 335. 
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“Immigration and relocation” and economic development in Sichuan in the early 
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the land tax across the entire country in 1711, which relieved the population from 
the burden of tax collection and subsequently released the pressure on population 
growth. In the region where arable land was plentiful to support large population 
such as Sichuan, population increased rapidly.  
At the same time, the government encouraged immigration. People from other 
provinces who immigrated into Sichuan were registered as legal residents in Sichuan, 
and their offspring could enter the imperial examinations as Sichuan residents.30 In 
1690, the Court granted immigrants with permanent ownership of the land they 
reclaimed.31 The Court and provincial government also encouraged governmental 
officials to recruit wanderers to settle down by tying the promotion of officials with 
their ability to recruit settlers.32 In 1673, the governor of Sichuan alone recruited a 
significant number of 1,428 households, which brought the issue of his promotion to 
the throne.33 The local governments responded to this policy by renting cattle and 
seeds to the settlers at low prices, such as in Anxian and Pujiang, or organizing adults 
to farm, and taking care of children as in Xinjin.34 Immigrants came from many parts 
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of China, including Guangdong, Fujian, Shaanxi, Jiangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, etc. Hunan 
and Hubei supplied the majority of immigrants.  
Large number of owner-cultivators appeared in the early Qing. Guo Songyi 
suggests that Sichuan’s special situation made it the most significant province of 
owner-cultivators among China. There was vast amount of available land vis-à-vis a 
limited population. The wars suppressed the power of the powerful local landlords in 
the Ming dynasty. The Qing government implemented favorable political and 
economic government policies. All these factors combined to create an 
owner-cultivator society dominated by immigrants.35  
However, the population increased rapidly. A decree was made to restrict the 
land occupation in 1728. Each household could reclaim up to 30 mu of paddy field or 
50 mu of dry land.36 Local gazetteers and contemporary genealogies reveal that 
social stratification started as late as the early eighteenth century as a result. At that 
time, quite a few immigrants became tenants because of the lack of land to reclaim, 
and they had to rent lands to farm. On the other hand, some became large landlords 
by occupying large area of lands. For example, Li Maoliang migrated to Yunyang 
county from Hunan in 1705. He purchased lands and rented them out.37 In the same 
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county, immigrant Zeng Yulian made a living as tenant at the end of the Kangxi Reign 
(1662 - 1722).38 Guo Songyi found more cases in Baxian, Mianzhou, and Jianyang 
from local gazetteers in the Yongzheng Reign (1723 - 1735).39 According to Shifang 
gazetteer, 180 out of 6080 households in Shifang in 1746 were tenants.40 Despite the 
low percentage of tenants, the appearance and rise of social stratification was an 
irreversible trend.  
Population growth contrasted sharply with the slowdown in land reclamation 
after the eighteenth century. The estimated population expanded to 8,142,487 in 
1782, 20,755,770 in 1812, and 48,129,596 in 1912.41 Similarly, local gazetteers 
report high rates of population growth. For example, when Wang Peijing was posted 
as magistrate of Jingyan county in 1661, there was no resident inside the city-walls. 
After a hard effort of looking for residents, he found only 17 households and 38 male 
adults.42 The census in 1735 however indicated that the population increased to 
1,801 households and 12,257 people including 2,008 male adults. Sixty years later, 
population expanded to 65,024. In 1894, there were 156,854 adults.43 Similarly, 
when the magistrate office of the Qing government was set up in Lezhi in 1694, the 
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census only recorded only 27 native households. In 1906, there were 230,490 people 
in Lezhi.44 In his research, Wang Di estimates that there were 778,380,000 mu of 
agrarian land in 1812, and 1,028,080,000 in 1910.45 During the one hundred years 
from 1812 to 1912, the population more than doubled, but agrarian land had 
expanded only by a third.  
Local gazetteers produced during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
usually discuss the problem of overcrowding population (renman) in sad and worried 
tones. The Wanxian gazetteer edited in 1866 describes that any possible agrarian 
land in the wild mountains had already been cultivated.46 In Jiangyou, “The land of 
one household is only enough for a few people. If there are many sons in one family, 
some have to be adopted by other relatives. It is because land is not enough for 
feeding people.”47 In Jingyan county, where native residents were nearly wiped out 
at the beginning of the Qing dynasty, the population had increased by the 1890s to 
the point that that “Jingyan is especially crowded with people [among all places in 
Sichuan]. Over a half of households have no land. The price of field is so high that no 
other prefecture or county can compete.”48  
The result of the unbalanced expansion of land and people was the aggravation 
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of peasant society stratification. The rural society started stratifying into landlords, 
tenants, owner-cultivators, and agriculture works in the eighteenth century. 
Following this trajectory, the prevailing owner-cultivated economy at the early Qing 
had evolved into a highly stratified society since the nineteenth century and 
especially in the twentieth century. According to an investigation made by the 
Central Agricultural Research Bureau, 51 percent of the peasants in Sichuan in 1912 
were tenants, 19 percent were part tenants, and 30 percent owner-cultivators. By 
1933, accompanying the increase of tenants to 59 percent, owner-cultivators had 
dropped to 22 percent, which was much higher than the national average, 32 percent 
of tenants and 45 percent of owner-cultivators.49 This verifies the lament of many 
local gazetteers that overwhelming numbers of tillers did not own any land.50  
Agricultural Commercialization 
The commercialization of agriculture, the rural handicraft industry, and double, 
even multiple cropping were the major factors that held overpopulation and high 
tenancy levels in the society. Historical sources demonstrated the prosperity of cash 
crop cultivation in Sichuan from the eighteenth century. Peasants were engaged in 
producing a wide range of profitable agricultural products such as cotton, tobacco, 
sugar cane, fruits, safflower, herb, tea, wood oil, silk, ramie, hemp, rapeseeds oil, etc. 
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Most cash crops could grow up all over Sichuan. For example, cotton and rapeseeds 
were popularly produced everywhere. However, some regions developed 
specializations in certain cash crops. Rongchang was the center of ramie and ramie 
cloth production. Tea was the major cash crop in the mountains at the edge of the 
Red Basin. Wood oil was produced in large and good quality in eastern Sichuan, while 
white wax was harvested mainly in southern Sichuan. Sugarcane cultivation was 
concentrated on Fushun, Nanxi, and Neijiang. Tobacco became important cash crops 
in the Chengdu plain.  
Cash crops were of high profit in the nineteenth century. Profit from cotton was 
equal to that from foodstuff crops in Renshou51, and double of that from grains in 
Pengxi52. In Renshou, indigo and safflower were more lucrative than cotton and 
grain.53 Many peasants gave up rice cultivation in favor of indigo cultivation in 
Weiyuan in the late nineteenth century, because of the higher return from indigo 
than rice.54 Cash crop cultivation created quite a few rich families. For instance, 
immigrants dominated sugar cane and tobacco cultivation in Nanxi. These cash crops 
required less labor in cultivation but generated more profit which distinguished rich 
immigrant cultivators from the poor natives in Nanxi.55  
Rural commercialization was further interwoven with the rural handicraft 
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industry. Many of these cash crops had to be processed before consumption. 
Accompanying the growth of cash crop cultivation was the prosperity of the 
handicraft industry based in both rural households and professional workshops. For 
instance, Rongchang specialized in making grass cloth made from ramie. Jiajiang was 
famous for turning bamboo into paper. Neijiang became the “Sugar Town”, and 
Xiushan benefited from producing wood oil. In addition, peasant households widely 
practiced subsidiary handicraft production such as straw hats weaving, cotton 
spinning and weaving, and palm brush making.  
Conversely, commercialized agriculture brought high risks, but the practice of 
multiple cropping diminished the risk of relying on cash crops to a large extent. 
Peasants, especially those petty producers did not have to risk all their lands on a 
monocrop system. Due to the warm climate and variety of vegetation, multiple 
cropping combining foodstuff and cash crops was prevalent in the Sichuan Basin. 
“There are always two crops a year, many times there, and as high as four or five in 
areas where vegetable growing is common [in the Chengdu Plain].”56 Not only in the 
Chengdu Plain, but also in the whole Sichuan Basin, two or three crops a year were 
widespread. Travelers were often impressed by the evergreen landscape once they 
arrived into Sichuan. When one crop failed, it was possible to make up through other 
crops. For example, in Rongxian in 1765, Qiu Youzhang and Zeng Jincheng rented dry 
lands from Wu Tingxiang to plant cotton together. Due to a bad harvest, the income 
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from cotton did not meet the expense of cultivation. Qiu hoped to “recover the loss 
(fanben) through winter crops”. But Zeng secretly cancelled the old tenure and 
planned to cultivate the land alone. (Qiu demanded that Zeng return the 4 taels of 
rent that he paid for the year since the one year had not elapsed. In the dispute, Qiu 
killed Zeng.)57  
Multiple cropping and subsidiary economic activities were an important means 
for tenants to survive the ever-increasing rent rate. According to Republican 
economist Zhang Xiaomei, rent in Sichuan was among the highest in China, ranging 
from 37 to 59 percent of crops depending on land quality in 1929. Rent kept 
increasing in the 1930s. It became common for tenants to submit 80 percent of their 
crops to the landlords.58 But it was a custom that landlords only charged a share 
from one season of crop of regular grains, which was rice for paddy fields, or maize 
or beans for dry lands after the harvest in autumn. In case of cash rent, the amount 
was the market value of similar amount of grains.59 Tenants, hence, kept the winter 
crops and other subsidiary products from the land and household production such as 
bamboos, fruits, fishes, silk, etc. Taking winter crops into consideration, historian Li 
Deying estimates the rate was about 50 percent of the products in the Chengdu Plain 
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in the Republican era. 60  In the following chapter, I will further identify the 
importance of silk to rural economy. 
Conclusion  
Located in the upper Yangzi River, Sichuan was gifted with warm climate, fertile 
soils, and abundant precipitation. Environmental conditions made possible a wide 
range of agricultural crops and multiple cropping. The topographic characteristics of 
the region created a convenient transportation system within the basin that 
facilitated the evolution of a sophisticated market system. While the land was initially 
sparsely populated, local society was highly stratified due to the rapid expansion of 
population. High tenancy and high rent were so prevalent in the Sichuan Basin that it 
required the peasants to pursue agricultural commercialization, multiple cropping, 
and participate in handicraft industries. The commercialization of agriculture and the 
market structure reinforced each other and developed together during the Qing 
dynasty. Despite the existence of the market system reaching out to the metropolis, 
and even the international market, it is notable that the mountain-framed 
geographic location hampered the province from more efficient interaction and 
communication with the outside world. It was against this inter-locking set of 
environmental, social, and economic circumstances, the following chapters will 
reveal that sericulture in Sichuan developed characteristics unique to the region.  
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Rural Sericulture and Peasants 
Sericulture was a rural industry that was tightly connected with the peasantry. It 
was the essential part of the ideal Chinese agrarian model that was portrayed as a 
rural world where men farmed while women wove. In reality, for a very long period 
in Chinese history, peasants were also taxed on raw silk or silk goods. Peasants were 
involved in the entire process of sericulture – from cultivating mulberries on their 
farms to reeling raw silk in their houses. Even after workshops and factories took 
over the tasks of reeling raw silk, the production of cocoons was still part of rural 
sericulture.  
This chapter focuses on the practice of rural sericulture in Sichuan. Scarce 
attention has been paid to studying the relationship between sericulture and the 
rural economy in Sichuan. Historians of Sichuan such as Wang Di, Lin Dun, and Peng 
Tonghu unanimously cited a variety of local gazetteers to attest to the prosperity of 
sericulture in rural Sichuan during the Qing dynasty, which has also persisted well 
into the modern era.1 Their studies on the role of sericulture in the rural economy in 
Sichuan however do not extend beyond gazetteer accounts. Lillian M. Li’s empirical 
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Sichuan in the early Qing), in Sichuan lishi yanjiu wenji (Collected articles on history 
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study of the silk industry in coastal China, especially in the lower Yangzi delta, 
suggests that “in Kiangnan sericulture was an ideal subsidiary occupation for the 
peasant household, but not an ideal primary occupation.”2 Inspired by this insightful 
observation on the relationship between sericulture and the peasant economy, I 
further argue there was a reinforcing relationship between the subsidiary position of 
sericulture in Sichuan and the primitive level of sericulture technology.  
I first explain how sericulture played a more significant economic role in the hilly 
regions of Sichuan that possessed relatively lower foodstuff productivity, than in the 
more fertile alluvial plains. I discuss the range of sericulture techniques the peasants 
traditionally possessed, and the ecological, economic and technical factors that 
contributed to the development and adoption of these techniques. The same 
reasons that sidelined sericulture also restricted the development of sericulture 
technology, which in turn maintained the subsidiary status of sericulture in the rural 
economy. In the last section, I analyze the impact of increased market demand on 
raw silk on rural sericulture in the early twentieth century. While many peasants 
joined in rearing silkworms, many gave up reeling silk.  
Regions of Sericulture Production  
With the exception of its remote, humid, and cold mountainous edges, the 
climate and soil in the entire Sichuan Basin was suitable for sericulture. It was warm 
and humid, which allowed mulberry trees to sprout early, grow well, and bear green 
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leaves for long periods. The soil was generally suitable for growing mulberries 
because of its relatively high fertility. The level alluvial plains had even better soil. 
The growing of silkworms requires a warm climate and accordingly, the average 
temperature within the basin is even higher than that in the lower Yangzi delta. In 
many parts of Sichuan nowadays, silkworms are reared all year round.  
However, the agriculture cultivated in the region was not homogenous, but 
instead, highly diversified. The slightest variance in natural conditions could lead to 
disparate cropping choices. Human-related factors could lead to even greater 
diversity in cultivation. As mentioned in chapter 1, the regional division of cash crops 
and the handicraft industry had been practiced since the eighteenth century. 
Different districts specialized in one or several kinds of cultivation. Similarly, 
sericulture, despite being suitable for cultivation almost all over the Sichuan Basin, 
was primarily concentrated in certain places. Sericulture expert Yin Liangyin listed the 
major sericulture regions in the Republic of China (see the appendix). There were 
three leading sericulture regions in Sichuan, centering on Nanchong and Santai in the 
north, Chongqing in the east, and Leshan in the south of the Sichuan Basin.  
It is notable that the hilly areas were the major regions of cocoons and raw silk 
production. Counties located at the very center of the Chengdu plain in the western 
bottom of the Sichuan Basin are omitted from the map of sericulture areas. Meishan 
was the only county on the Chengdu plain where there was significant sericulture, 
but it was located at the periphery of the Chengdu plain. Mianyang, Leshan and 
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Jiajiang are conventionally considered as the border section of the Chengdu plain, 
but substantial hilly areas were actually under their individual jurisdiction. Historically, 
the Chengdu plain was the center of sericulture and silk trade in China, but it 
gradually lost its importance in the late imperial period, and ceased to be a 
sericulture hub during the Republic. The hilly regions overtook the Chengdu plain as 
the major sericulture center.3 They continued to be the major suppliers of cocoons 
and raw silk in the People’s Republic of China. According to a survey in 1979, the hilly 
regions contained 80 percent of the mulberry trees in the province.4  
Ecological reasons and the consequent economic calculation caused the 
different choices. The Chengdu plain was the most fertile and best-irrigated region of 
the whole province. Peasants were engaged in multiple cropping and cultivation of 
high value cash crops. Multiple crop indexes in the plain were the highest within the 
entire province. Writing in 1928, H. D. Brown and Li Min Liang noted that, “The 
farming is very intensive throughout the plain and the ground is practically never 
without a growing crop.”5 The popular cash crops, such as cotton, tobacco, ramie, 
hemp, and rapeseeds, brought high economic returns but required intensive labor 
and highly fertile soil. Peasants were more attracted to the profitable cash crops that 
could efficiently use up their available land and labor. There was scarce excess labor, 
capital, and land that could be devoted to sericulture.  
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In comparison with the conditions on the alluvial plain, the hilly areas were less 
advantageous for agriculture, because of the lack of level land, fertile soil, and 
convenient irrigation. On the land that was not suitable for agricultural farming, the 
peasants grew economically valuable trees, such as mulberries, wood oil trees, and 
fruit trees. Therefore, sericulture as a sideline was more significant to rural 
households in the hilly regions than those in the fertile plains. For example, it was 
recorded that Langzhong produced only wood oil and raw silk in large amounts, due 
to the infertile soil.6 A more remarkable case was Nanchong, a major cocoon 
producing district in Sichuan. Geographical conditions and land arability determined 
the adoption of sericulture. Sericulture was concentrated in the southern and 
western parts of Nanchong. These areas were primarily made up of uneven dry land 
which was of low grain productivity but suitable for the cultivation of mulberry trees. 
The eastern part, however, was fertile and level, which supported many rich peasants 
who seldom engaged in sericulture.7  
Furthermore, food productivity in the hilly regions was generally lower than that 
in the Chengdu plains. Table 1 shows a survey on foodstuff productivity conducted by 
the Peasant Bank of China in 1941. Productivity in the Chengdu plain was almost 
equal to that in the lower Yangzi delta. Conversely, the major sericulture centers, 
Leshan and Nanchong, both produced low outputs of food crops. In Leshan, the yield 
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for all food crops, except maize, was lower than the average level in the province. 
Rice yield in Leshan was only 65 percent of that in Wenjiang in the Chengdu plain, 
and wheat yield was 46 percent. In Nanchong, the average outputs of all major crops 
were lower than the provincial average.  
TABLE 1  Yield of per mu of rice, wheat, maize, and sweet potato in ten counties in 
Sichuan, May 1940 – April 1941 (in piculs) 8 






Sweet Potato  
(200 farms) 
Shehong 4.28 0.85 0.80 6.73 
Wenjiang 4.09 1.34 1.88 — 
Mianyang 3.62 0.83 0.98 3.92 
Anxian 3.12 0.92 2.21 3.82 
Nanchong 2.87 0.47 0.28 4.06 
Baxian 2.77 0.82 — 2.18 
Leshan 2.69 0.62 1.33 2.79 
Neijiang 2.16 0.52 1.42 3.42 
Wanxian 2.07 0.45 0.66 9.33 
Yibing 1.82 0.38 — 7.08 
Average 2.95 0.72 1.19 4.96 
The low productivity of the hilly regions suggests that small peasants had to rely 
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on their subsidiary occupation more than their counterparts living in the fertile plains. 
In fact, according to Brown’s survey in the 1920s, large family households that only 
possessed small farms depended heavily on the sale of home-made products on the 
side, even though they were in the Chengdu plain.9 For the rural households in the 
hilly regions, where ecological and topographical factors inhibited the high-yield crop 
diversity, sericulture was an ideal sideline. Sericulture made full use of wasted land 
and demanded intensive labor input in a short period of time, but also generated 
relatively high profits for the household. As revealed by Philip C. C. Huang, although 
sericulture did not enable family members to maximize the income they could earn 
individually, it was a rational way of yielding higher net annual income for the 
household as a whole.10 Cocoon production was labor intensive instead of capital 
intensive. With a few trees, peasants could raise silkworms. It utilized surplus family 
labor and waste land that would have been unproductive otherwise. Statistical data 
evince the economic benefits of sericulture. In Junlian from 1898 to 1947, a kilogram 
of cocoons on average was equivalent in value to 11.25 kilograms of rice.11 A 
kilogram of cocoons could normally be exchanged for 10.45 kilograms of rice in 
Jingyan between 1930 and 1936.12  
                                                             
9 H. D. Brown and Li Minliang, “A Survey of 50 farms in the Chengdu Plain, Szechwan”, 
p. 60.   
10 Philip C. C. Huang, The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 
1350 – 1988 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), chapter 5.  
11 Junlian xianzhi (Junlian county gazetteer), 1948, juan 1, cited in Li Zhuxi, Zeng 
Dejiu, Huang Weihu, eds., Jindai Sichuan wujia shiliao (Historical materials of 
commodity price in modern Sichuan) (Chengdu: Sichuan kexue jishu chubanshe, 
1986), pp. 15-18.  
12 Sichuansheng Jingyang xianzhi bianzhuan weiyuanhui, Jingyan xianzhi (Jingyan 
county gazetteer) (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1990), p. 219. 
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Therefore, it is not hard to understand why counties in hilly regions such as 
Cangxi and Yanting credited sericulture as the most vital component of the peasant 
economy as early as in the eighteenth century. In Yanting, the popularity of 
sericulture led to the number of mulberry trees overshadow that of fruit trees and 
other cash trees, according the Yanting gazetteer compiled in 1763.13  
The Jingyan gazetteer in 1900 even detailed the significance of silk culture in a 
peasant economy.  
“Raw silk from Jingyan is the most highly valued silk in the Chengdu silk 
market. Weavers prefer to buy it, and call it Donglu si [silk from the eastern 
road] to distinguish it from those from Jiading, Meishan, Tongchuan, and 
Mianyang. Donglu si is divided into two categories according to thickness. 
Prices are therefore different. The selling price of thin raw silk is higher than 
that of thick silk by twenty percent; so is the cost of production. The annual 
value of raw silk is about several hundred thousand taels. Numerous peasants 
rely on it for a living. All expenditure on land tax, land rent, presents and gifts, 
visit and condolence, debt payment, and rent and hire, often is financed by 
this cash income called yellow silk cash. If a poor peasant asks for a loan with 
a promise of repayment when the yellow silk crop yields, no lender will reject 
the request. [italics mine]”14 
                                                             
13 Cangxi xianzhi (Cangxi county gazetteer), 1783, vol. 2, cited in Wang Di, Kuachu 
fengbi de shijie, p. 149; and Yanting xianzhi (Yanting county gazetteer), 1763, vol. 2.  
14 Jingyan xianzhi, 1900, juan 8.  
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The Practice of Sericulture  
Sichuan peasants did not utilize the same set of techniques that their 
counterparts in other sericulture regions in China did, although they shared the 
understanding of the basic principles and general knowledge pertaining to 
sericulture. Dieter Kuhn notices that the techniques and terminologies used differed 
over China, and suggests that human agents rather than the wide range of 
sericulture manuals were more active in spreading technological innovation in 
pre-modern China.15 Just as sericulture practices differed between the Pearl River 
and the lower Yangzi deltas areas, the practice of sericulture in Sichuan 
demonstrated many distinct characteristics. In the following discussion, I shall 
frequently refer to the technology in other sericulture regions for contrast and 
comparison, so as to identify a distinct set of sericulture techniques in Sichuan. 
Mulberry cultivation is the first stage of sericulture. Peasants in the lower Yangzi 
and South China often designated a portion of their land as mulberry fields. For 
example, in the Kaixiangong village investigated by sociologist Fei Xiaotong, “Along 
the margin of each yu, ten to thirty meters of land are left for the plantation of 
mulberry trees, and a wider space for house building.”16 In Wuxi, the sericulture and 
filature center, about 35 percent of total taxable land was covered by mulberry 
trees.17 Uehara estimated that mulberry fields occupied 30 to 40 percent of the 
                                                             
15 Dieter Kuhn, “Textile Technology”, introduction.  
16 Hsiao-Tung, Fei, Peasant Life in China, A Field Study of Country Life in the Yangtze 
Valley (London: Regan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., LTD), 1943, p. 155.  
17 D. K. Lieu, The Silk Industry of China (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, Limited, 1940), p. 
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arable land in the lower Yangzi.18 In the Pearl River delta, the silkworm raisers 
harvested cocoons several times a year, because of the warm temperature and 
special species of silkworms. The multiple crops year-round supported mulberry 
cultivation on an even larger scale. For example, Shunde developed a monocrop 
economy specializing in silk in the late nineteenth century. “In this delta county there 
are at least 1,000 square miles which are devoted almost entirely to the growing of 
mulberries. One can travel for a day on a passage boat through the region and see 
nothing but mulberry fields as far as the eye can reach.”19  Wang Zhuangmu 
estimated that from 1916 to 1926, the total area of mulberry plantations in 
Guangdong Province was 1,800,000 mu.20  
Unlike their counterparts in coastal China, peasants in Sichuan hardly reserved 
any arable land for mulberry cultivation.21 It was not until the end of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century that mulberry plantations appeared in Sichuan. The rich 
classes, merchants, and schools invested in these plantations, for educational 
purpose or for profit from selling mulberry saplings and leaves. Some peasants in 
                                                                                                                                                                              
7.  
18 Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan (A general survey of 
sericulture in China) (Tokyo: Okada Nichieidō, 1929), p. 76.  
19 C. W. Howard, The Sericulture Industry of South China (Canton: Canton Christian 
Collage, 1923), p. 8, cited in Alvin Y. So, The South China Silk District, p. 78.  
20 Wang Zhuangmu, Minguo sichou shi: 1912 – 1949 (History of silk in the Republican 
China, 1912 – 1949) (Beijing: Zhongguo fangzhi chubanshe, 1996), p. 19.  
21 Sichuansheng difangzhi bianzhuan weiyuanhui, ed., Sichuan shengzhi, sichouzhi 
(Sichuan province gazetteer, silk industry) (Chengdu: Sichuan kexue jishu chubanshe, 
1998), p. 48; and Sun Zeshu, “Chuansang zhi tezheng jiqi zaipeifa” (Characteristics 
and cultivation of Sichuan mulberries), Zhongguo cansi 1, 7 and 8 (February and 
March, 1936), p. 25. Sun Zeshu was a modern sericulturist. He was hired by the 
Sichuan provincial government to spread sericulture in the 1930s. He made reliable 
observation on Sichuan sericulture practices because of his professional background.  
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Santai and its nearby region intercropped food crops with mulberry trees, but even 
this practice was not prevalent in the whole province.22 For the majority of rural 
households, mulberry cultivation never became their major occupation. They 
planted mulberry trees on any remaining excess land that did not disturb their main 
crops, such as on the perimeter of the fields and the corners of courtyards. From the 
mid-1930s onwards, the Republican government conducted sericulture reform and 
promotion in the major sericulture regions. A general survey produced after the 
reform had begun recorded that, on average, in seven sericulture counties in 
southern Sichuan, there were 91.42 mulberry trees in every household that 
improved its silkworm raising techniques in spring 1936, 69.7 trees in autumn 1936, 
107.02 in spring 1937, and 142.92 in autumn 1937.23 Taking the estimate of the 
Xuyong county gazetteer that one mu of mulberry land could accommodate some 
300 trees in the early twentieth century, a household utilized at the most only 0.5 mu 
of land for mulberry cultivation.24 It must be noted that these households were the 
silkworm raisers in the most important sericulture regions and received special 
attention from the modern reformers. Other peasant households probably cultivated 
much fewer trees.  
The mulberry trees cultivated were mostly local varieties that were not specially 
                                                             
22 Sun Zeshu, “Chuansang zhi tezheng jiqi zaipeifa”, pp. 25-26; and Liu Runtao and 
Pan Hongsheng, Sichuan Santai cansi chanxiao zhi yanjiu (Study on silk production 
and marketing in Santai, Sichuan) (Jinling daxue nongxueyuan, 1940), p. 15.  
23 Yin Liangying, Sichuan canye gaijinshi (History of sericultural reform in Sichuan) 
(Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1947), pp. 235-240.  
24 Sichuansheng Xuyong xianzhi bianzhuan weiyuanhui, ed., Xuyong xianzhi (Xuyong 
county gazetteer) (Beijing: Fangzhi chubanshe, 1998), p. 221.  
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selected or treated to improve their quality. The popular practice of growing 
mulberry saplings was by seedling, layering, or grafting. In all cases, it took at least 
three years to nurture saplings.25 Most peasants grew saplings at home. As they 
were bred domestically, there was no quality management and this led to inferior 
varieties being bred or inferior silk being produced. Mulberry tree nurseries 
appeared in the major sericulture centers, such as Leshan and Santai, in the early 
twentieth century. Some silkworm raisers purchased saplings from these nurseries 
and transplanted them onto their own land.26  
Among all the Chinese peasants who cultivated mulberries, the peasants in 
Sichuan probably treated their mulberry trees with the least attention. In Zhejiang, 
Jiangsu, and Guangdong, mulberry lands were regularly tilled, and trees were 
carefully pruned into short trees. In Sichuan however, peasants often let mulberry 
trees grow tall without trimming. They hardly devoted special attention to plowing 
and weeding, only doing so if they were cultivating food crops nearby. When the 
cocoons and silk market was thriving, peasants might give some extra attention to 
the mulberry trees. Some would fertilize the soil with manure once a year, and trim 
branches and twigs in summer and winter.27 Nonetheless, peasants in modern 
Sichuan were generally lax in their management of their mulberry cultivation. 
Mulberry leaves developed poorly, and insects and diseases were widely spread.  
                                                             
25 Minguo xinxiu Hechuan xianzhi (New Hechuan county gazetteer in the Republic of 
China) (Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 1992), pp. 1790-1792.  
26 Sun Zeshu, “Chuansang zhi tezheng jiqi zaipeifa”, p. 25. 
27 Ibid., pp. 26-28; Liu Runtao and Pan Hongsheng, Sichuan Santai cansi chanxiao zhi 
yanjiu, p. 15. 
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Although mulberry leaves were the staple feed of silkworms, silkworm raisers in 
Sichuan did not only use mulberry leaves, especially in the southern sericulture 
region. They also fed young silkworms with the leaves of Cudrania triloba, a thorny 
tree called zhe in Sichuan. Cudrania is easily cultivated and sprouts earlier than 
mulberry trees. Feeding silkworms Cudrania leaves in their early stages allowed 
mulberry leaves to mature fully. Cudrania was widely cultivated and used for feeding 
young silkworms in southern Sichuan. The proportion of Cudrania to mulberry trees 
was as high as 2 to 1 in the two important sericulture districts of the region.28 
Consequently, the majority of silkworms were Cudrania-fed. For instance, the total 
output of cocoons in Jingyan was 189,500 catties in 1949, including 66,300 catties of 
mulberry cocoons and 123,200 catties of Cudrania cocoons.29  
Traditional techniques of preparing silkworm eggs were universal in China. The 
native varieties of silkworm in Sichuan were spring crops. It was common practice for 
silkworm raisers to select fine cocoons for the breeding of future crops after the 
harvest. Only a few peasants purchased at the market. In selecting cocoons, the 
peasants would exercise careful scrutiny, such as examining the appearance and 
shaking them to hear the sound they made. Selected cocoons were left for the moths 
to emerge and lay eggs. Only the best and healthiest moths were allowed to mate 
and to lay eggs on paper or clothes. At this stage, there was neither the use of 
microscopic analysis nor disease detection in the breeding of native eggs. The 
                                                             
28 Yin Liangying, Sichuan canye gaijinshi, p. 139. 
29 Jingyan xianzhi, 1990, p. 218.  
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home-made silkworm egg cards were kept for the next silkworm season. During this 
period, the egg cards were treated several times to eliminate weak eggs with low 
vitality. The treatments included washing egg cards in salty water or chilling them in 
cold winter on certain auspicious days of the year.  
Spring crop of silkworms hatched out in Sichuan at the time around Qingming 
Festival in early April, as that was practiced in the lower Yangzi, because this was the 
time that mulberry leaves sprouted and developed enough. But in southern Sichuan, 
due to the warm climate, it was also common that peasants started preparing for 
hatching silkworms in the early March, around the date known as the Awakening of 
Insects (Jingzhe) on the Chinese calendar. To provide a warm environment to help 
the eggs hatch, Sichuan people used a method similar to that practiced in 
contemporary France: “for a week or more the pieces of paper containing the eggs 
would be carried in the bodice of women or in the hat of man.”30 After eight days, 
the eggs were taken out to enjoy the daylight. At around the time of the vernal 
equinox (chunfen), 21 March, the larvae hatched.31  
Many peasants did not take care of the silkworms carefully. Silkworm rearing 
was secondary to agriculture. As the period of rearing silkworms in spring took place 
concurrently with the busy agrarian season, peasants often could not pay enough 
                                                             
30 The Lyons Chamber of Commerce sent a trade mission to investigate the silk 
industry of Sichuan from 1895 to 1897. The mission made this observation. See Luce 
Boulnois, The Silk Road, trans., Dennis Chamberlain (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc. 
1966), p. 221.  
31 Zhang Bixiu, ed., Leshanshi shizhongqu zhi (The central district of Leshan city 
gazetteer) (Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 2003), p. 154. 
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attention to silkworms. They fed the silkworms irregularly, and without an 
appropriate amount of mulberries leaves. The result was a long rearing duration 
before the larvae hatched from their cocoons. The long rearing duration caused 
silkworms to be more susceptible to diseases and increased risks of death. 
Insufficient feed also led to the silk fiber of cocoons becoming fragile and short. The 
hygienic condition of silkworm was problematic too. Peasants did not regularly clear 
silkworm dung, which caused humidity and the spread of diseases. While clearing 
dung, they lacked efficient means. They moved silkworms one by one by hand. The 
procedure was slow and often hurt the fragile silkworms.32  
Silk reeling started after the harvesting and processing of cocoons. The 
traditional reeling frames were made from bamboo and wood and human-operated. 
They were called large frame (dache) because of their unusual large reels. Although 
the large frames differed in designs within the province,33 they were generally 
simple but efficient and cheap. The large frame with a simple wooden structure was 
commonly adopted in the countryside. Local carpenters could construct the reeling 
frames at low cost by using locally available sources. Peasants could easily maintain 
the devices because of the simple structure. Depending on their reeling skills and the 
quality of the cocoons, peasants produced raw silk of a wide range of fineness and 
quality.  
In addition, peasants also had a set of practices for communicating with the 
                                                             
32 Liu Runtao and Pan Hongsheng, Sichuan Santai cansi chanxiao zhi yanjiu, p.16.  
33 Hosie, Report by Consul-general Hosie on the Province of Ssuch'uan, p. 58. 
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spiritual worlds, which they considered as essential to the production process. This 
was an indispensable part of the indigenous sericulture practice. Sericulture worship 
was a nation-wide practice that was sanctioned and encouraged by the Imperial 
Court. The worship of a variety of sericulture deities was practiced within the 
imperial palaces, local temples, right down to the individual rural households.  
The Chinese rulers had the tradition of holding ceremonies dedicated to patron 
deities of sericulture. Archeological evidence shows that sacrificial ceremonies were 
conducted as early as in the Shang Dynasty.34 The empresses led worship towards 
silkworm deities from the Han dynasty. And Leizu was officially accepted as the deity 
of sericulture in the Northern Zhou (557 - 581).35 The Qing court revived the practice 
of empresses officiating national ceremonies for Leizu in the eighteenth century.36  
Although Leizu was the official patron goddess of sericulture, there evolved a 
wide range of regional and local deities. In Sichuan, people worshiped Dark Green 
Attired God (Qingyishen), the Sericulture Goddess (Cangu), the Three Sericulture 
Maidens (Sanniang), as well as some other local incarnations.37 Silkworm raisers 
                                                             
34 Hu Houxuan, “Yindai de canshang he sizhi” (Sericulture and silk reeling in the 
Shang dynasty), Wenwu, 11 (1972), p. 5.  
35 Wei Zheng et al, Suishu (The history of the Sui dynasty), juan 7, liyizhi (Taipei: 
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gave offerings to the deities at home and in the temples before they started raising 
silkworms, and after the harvest of cocoons. Sometimes local communities arranged 
communal ceremonies. For example, people in Qingshen county believed in the Dark 
Green Attire God, after whom the county was named. During the Qing dynasty, on 
the twenty-first day of the first lunar month, the birthday of the Dark Green Attired 
God, every street had an organization that participated in the procession and festival 
on that day. Later the festival was replaced with the offering of sacrifices to the deity 
by local magistrates in the temple. On the twenty-first day of the seventh month, 
sacrifices were again offered to the deity to offer thanks. Sericulture households all 
worshiped the deity and attributed the thriving growth of mulberry trees and the 
high quality of silk to him.38  
Worship of sericulture deities, on one side, indicates their anticipation for good 
harvests; one the other, suggests the worshipers, particularly the silkworm rearing 
peasants held a fear of unpredictable risk in the process of production and were 
incapable of prohibiting and explaining these dangers. Prayers, therefore, were an 
essential means of preventing risks in the rural sericulture.  
Apparently, rural households in Sichuan adopted cost-saving strategies in 
sericulture. Minimum cash capital was dedicated to sericulture production. Family 
                                                                                                                                                                              
chubanshe, 1991), pp. 478, 480-481; and Huanghan minsu bianxiezu, ed., Guanghan 
minsu (Custom of Guanghan) (Chengdu: Chengdu keji daxue chubanshe, 1993), p. 
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38 Qianlong Qingshen xianzhi (Qingshen county gazetteer in the Qinglong reign), 
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land and family labor supplied nearly all the necessary input in many households.  
Sericulture in rural Sichuan was dominated by the set of age-old and well-used 
techniques that matched the subsidiary characteristics of sericulture production in 
the province.   
The Logic of Rural Technological Choices  
The limited amount of land, the risky nature of sericulture, and the nature of 
markets all contributed to the peasants’ choice of methods in practicing sericulture 
in Sichuan. First, as I have addressed in the previous chapter, the Sichuan Basin had 
become an overpopulated region by the nineteenth century. The sizes of farms were 
limited and continued diminishing. According to the data in two counties in Sichuan, 
the average crop area per farm kept shrinking from 2.03 acres (12.32 mu) in 1870 to 
1.36 acres (8.26 mu) in 1933. It was only slightly larger than that in the lower Yangzi 
in 1870, but became smaller in the later years. 39  Another survey of 1,556 
households in the 1930s calculates that about 70 percent of farms were less than 20 
mu, and nearly half of the farms were smaller than 10 mu. The majority of small 
farms were cultivated by tenants. Seventy percent of these tenants cultivated farms 
that were smaller than 10 mu each.40  
Peasants usually farmed for subsistence rather than for commercial gain. The 
majority of their agricultural produce was retained for their family’s consumption or 
                                                             
39 John Lossing Buck, Land Utilization in China, p. 270.  
40 Zhang Xiaomei, Sichuan jingji cankao ziliao, p. A20.  
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used to pay their rental or land taxes. As I have showed previously, food productivity 
was low in the hilly regions. It was difficult for peasants to eke out a living on such 
small amount of land in the hilly lands of Sichuan, where the land was of lower 
agricultural productivity and its yield highly reliant on the intensive input of human 
labor and fertilizer.41 Even the intercropping of mulberry trees and grains on arable 
land was not accepted by Sichuan peasants. Only in Santai and its nearby region, one 
of the largest sericulture centers, did a few farms adopt the intercropping of 
mulberry and food crops from the early twentieth century onwards,42 following the 
encouragement of a local elite.43  
It was not economical to reserve field space for mulberry trees on a small farm. 
Mulberry trees were hard to cultivate and needed several years of cultivation to 
become mature enough for feeding silkworms. As Lillian M. Li noted about mulberry 
cultivation, “Mulberries are difficult to grow to maturity and easily fail. The first year 
you plant them. Within three years, the fruit will come out. Only six years later do 
you get a flourishing tree.”44 Few peasants could afford to spare a certain amount of 
land for mulberry trees for several years, and it was highly possible that mulberry 
trees failed before they matured. For tenants, this was clearly impossible as their 
tenancy was transferred frequently. They might even terminate their tenancy before 
the mulberry trees matured. At the same time, rental was as high as 50 percent of 
                                                             
41 Lü Pingdeng, Sichuan nongcun jingji, p. 124.  
42 Sun Zeshu, “Chuansang zhi tezheng jiqi zaipeifa”, p. 26.  
43 Chen Kaizhi, Binong Zuiyao (Essential principles for benefiting agriculture) (1897, 
Reprinted, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1956). 
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the total income of the rented land. They need to ensure that they cultivated enough 
to pay off their rent and provide for family consumption.45 Mulberry fields were 
therefore a luxury for those who rented land. Only the well-to-do, primarily local 
elites of economic, political, or cultural influence, started managing mulberry farms 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. This will be explored in chapter 4.  
The second factor that aggravated the difficulty of expanding mulberry land was 
the nature of sericulture. Before the second half of the twentieth century, sericulture 
was a seasonal product. The most common silkworm varieties grew in spring. A few 
peasants reared a summer crop, but the amount was so little that it was generally 
neglected. It was only till the 1930s that the government started introducing autumn 
crops province wide. Only then did double crops of silkworms a year become 
common. Peasants immediately accepted double crops because of the extra income. 
Even so, two harvests a year was not enough to stimulate peasants to convert their 
land into mulberry plantations.  
The seasonal nature of sericulture suggests that it should be conducted 
alongside agriculture rather than as a single crop. The whole process of silkworm 
rearing from hatching to cocooning is finished within three to five weeks, depending 
on the silkworm varieties and rearing techniques used. If peasants reared small 
amounts of silkworms based on their own mulberry leaves, sericulture was an ideal 
means of utilizing surplus family labor and their spare time. But silkworm rearing was 
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labor-intensive. If peasants devoted too much land and labor to sericulture, they 
would face the problem of having idle labor during long lull seasons, as the 
manpower would only be needed for the stage of silkworm rearing. Even after the 
government reformers successfully introduced an autumn crop of silkworms, 
focusing on two crops that required no more than three months a year was not a 
sufficient draw for peasants to devote more land to mulberries trees.  
Sericulture was also a risky enterprise. Misfortune could happen at any stage of 
the process and lead to irrecoverable loss. Mulberry tree cultivation failed easily. 
Even with the help of official instructions and directions from sericulturists, the 
survival rate of mulberry saplings was only 60 percent in Jiajiang in 1954.46 Mulberry 
leaves were susceptible to insects and diseases, which peasants did not possess 
efficient means to prevent and control. For example, insects dealt unprecedented 
damage to mulberry trees in Nanchong, Xichong, Nanbu, and Santai in 1926, and 
consequently caused the decreased output and diminished quality of cocoons in 
these regions.47 Again, in 1939, 200,000 piculs of mulberry leaves were damaged by 
insects in Xichong. 48  The growth of silkworms was full of uncertainty. The 
domestically bred silkworm eggs were often contaminated by disease. In addition, 
more silkworm diseases spread in the growing seasons due to changes in weather, 
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unsanitary conditions, and other factors.  
The prices of mulberry leaves, cocoons, and raw silk were unpredictable, which 
added to the risk of investment. Sometimes silkworm raisers had to rely on the 
mulberry leaf market for supply of extra leaves. When the price of raw silk was high, 
cocoons were valuable and more peasants raised silkworms, which increased price of 
leaves and reduced the profit of selling cocoons. When the price of raw silk was low 
and the numbers of silkworm raisers lessened, it was not profitable for mulberry 
cultivators. Thus both mulberry cultivators and silkworm raisers had to control their 
scale of production to minimize risk.49 Most peasants, therefore, raised silkworms 
through their own mulberry leaves without or with little aid from the market.50 At 
the same time, cocoons perished easily. Producers had to sell fresh cocoons within a 
certain period before the moths pierced the cocoons to come out; this could result in 
unfavorable prices. Otherwise, they had to process cocoons by themselves, which did 
not always ensure the quality of cocoons and also increased production costs. The 
pattern of mulberry cultivation and silkworm rearing was thus a result of various 
factors and considerations. 
Insignificant Impact of Market on Rural Technology  
Sericulture was market-oriented. No peasant produced cocoons or silk for their 
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own consumption. From the late nineteenth century onwards, peasants and 
investors became more interested in sericulture, keeping pace with the growing 
cocoons and raw silk market. To what extent did market forces affect the dynamics of 
the interacting environmental, economic, social, and technological factors that 
constrained peasants’ choices of sericulture technology between the late nineteenth 
century and the 1930s?  
Cocoons and raw silk served three markets, namely, the non-Western tropical 
market, the domestic market, and the Western market. The non-Western tropical 
market demanded silk produced by the indigenous techniques. The people of Burma 
and India for example preferred silk made from the Cudrania silkworms and thick raw 
silk. Silk pieces woven by this kind of silk was stronger than normal soft silk fabric, 
and was less sticky on sweaty skin, which makes it more suitable for the tropical 
climate in India and Burma than mulberry silk. The Burma weaving industry also 
required coarse raw silk of high thickness. Burmese preferences for thick raw silk did 
not change even till the end of the 1940s. Fine silk was still unmarketable at the 
time.51 Large number of Yunnan merchants was engaged in the export business of 
coarse silk and Cudriania silk.52 Due to the continued existence of high demand, 
there was no requirement for technological improvements.  
Local weaving workshops consumed the majority of raw silk produced in 
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Sichuan. Silk weaving was practiced in many places in Sichuan. Although Chengdu 
was not on the list of sericulture regions, it was the largest silk weaving center in the 
province, with the supply of raw silk from other places. The silk pieces of Chengdu 
were of the highest reputation and the government purchased plenty for the 
Imperial Court.53 When Nanjing was occupied by the Taiping troops, the Court set up 
the imperial weaving factory in Chengdu.54 There were 2,000 weaving workshops, 
over 10,000 looms, and 40,000 weavers in Chengdu during the late Qing dynasty. The 
output accounted for 70 percent of the total output of the province.55 The first 
British consul-general Alexander Hosie also gave similar but more detailed 
impressions of the prosperous silk weaving industry in Chengdu at the turn of the 
twentieth century, recounting that “the city contains 6,000 looms, while outside the 
walls there are as many as 3,400 looms for the manufacture of silk crapes. There are, 
too, 500 gauze looms in and around the city with numerous ribbon looms, and the 
weaving of silk braid by hand may be seen in almost every street.”56  
Leshan was a center for both sericulture and silk weaving in southern Sichuan. 
Hosie estimated that the Jiading prefecture, with Leshan as the prefectural seat, 
produced some 6,700 cwts., or about one-sixth of the total raw silk of Sichuan during 
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the last years of the Qing dynasty. The market town Suqi near to Leshan contained 
about 500 looms and there were another about 200 looms in the city of Leshan to 
serve the silk weaving business at that time. Hosie also met “[a] considerable 
number of porters with silk goods from Chia-ting Fu [Jiading Prefecture]” on his 
travel.57  
Other cities in the province, such as Nanchong, Langzhong, and Chongqing also 
had silk weaving industries.58 In places like Hechuan at the turn of the twentieth 
century, the local weaving business consumed the majority of raw silk produced 
locally, and left little amounts of raw silk for the market in Chengdu, and nearly none 
for other markets.59 In Nanchong, the silk center of northern Sichuan, silk pieces 
were made from local raw materials. These silk goods were sold in the local market, 
and bore little significance to the export trade.60  
Throughout the modern Sichuan, the silk weaving industry was dominated by 
the traditional hand looms. The first semi-mechanized weaving factory was 
established in 1916, but stopped operation very soon.61 The first electric power 
loom was not established until the 1930s.62 More power looms appeared during the 
Second Sino-Japanese War, even though the number of mechanized weaving 
factories was still limited. At the same time, the silk goods targeted local and regional 
                                                             
57 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 292, 295.  
58 Hosie, Report by Consul-general Hosie on the Province of Ssuch'uan, p. 75.  
59 Minguo xinxiu Hechuan xianzhi, juan 19, p 1787.  
60 Jiang qingxiang and Li shouyao, eds., Sichuan cansiye, p. 66.  
61 Sichuansheng difangzhi bianzhuan weiyuanhui, ed., Sichuan shengzhi, sichouzhi, p. 
166.  
62 Sichuansheng Jingyang xianzhi bianzhuan weiyuanhui, ed., Jingyan xianzhi, p. 674.  
67 
 
markets that did not require the improvement of raw materials. Traditionally 
produced cocoons and raw silk were suitable for the local weaving industry. There 
was no domestic demand for improved quality silk, hence the impact on the change 
of rural sericulture techniques was insignificant.  
Western demand was the chief stimulator of sericulture production in Sichuan. 
Sichuan raw silk did not enter the Western market until the middle nineteenth 
century,63 but it quickly rose as the leading export commodity of Sichuan. Secondary 
works frequently cite a translated statement that 6,000 piculs of the raw silk were 
exported to overseas from Sichuan in 1871. Another estimate suggests that 5,000 – 
6,000 piculs of Sichuan raw silk were exported to overseas through Shanghai 
annually from 1851 to 1874.64 Better recorded statistical data shows that the 
Western market did drive substantial increase of Sichuan raw silk export as late as 
the end of the nineteenth century. Raw silk was the second largest export 
commodity of Sichuan next to opium in the 1890s. The value of raw silk accounted 
for 17.13 percent of the total value of all duty-paid goods at the Chongqing customs 
in 1896, and 18.31 percent in 1897.65 In the early twentieth century, the provincial 
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government actively promoted sericulture in Sichuan, and suppression on opium 
cultivation further encouraged mulberry cultivation and silkworm rearing (see 
chapter 3). Raw silk rose as the largest commodity in the export list.  
The Western market demanded high quality of raw silk. Its impact on sericulture 
in Sichuan at the turn of the twentieth century was similar to that in the leather 
processing industry in colonial India. Leather production boomed because of foreign 
trade in colonial India, and technological improvement followed but favored mass 
production. The silk production in Sichuan that oriented to the Western market, 
similarly, stimulated the adoption of improved silk reeling techniques only in 
workshops and factories.66 The improvement in reeling technology required cash 
input. This was against the cash-saving logic of small peasants in sericulture 
production. In contrast, many firms started equipping better reeling devices to 
produce for Western market from the turn of the twentieth century. Successively, 
mechanized factories that produced fine silk of standard quality appeared too. More 
details of these transformations will be discussed in the following chapters.  
Petty farmers did not imitate the techniques that manufacture adopted, and 
many gradually gave up silk reeling at the turn of the twentieth century. The general 
trend was that peasants gave up on the non-agricultural stage of sericulture as 
demand for silk and cocoons grew. In other words, the booming raw silk market 
stimulated by foreign trade started the deskilling of peasants by the turn of the.  
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Many peasants chose to sell fresh cocoons in the market. Several factors 
contributed to this decision. The booming of raw silk manufacture created 
prosperous cocoon market. There were about 2,000 reeling workshops in 188067, and 
more in the following years. These firms consumed a large amount of cocoons. 
Cocoon season clashed with busy farming season, when peasants had to be engaged 
in harvesting wheat and transplanting rice seedlings. Fresh cocoons were perishable. 
Peasants needed to reel silk before moths pierced cocoons, which meant heavy work 
in short time. If they decided to process cocoons for future domestic reeling, the 
treatment was skillful and improper treatment of cocoons could reduce the quality of 
silk. Therefore, many peasants preferred selling cocoons to domestic reeling. Only 
when cocoons price was not favorable, they kept cocoons for domestic reeling.68   
The Republican gazetteers often categorize mulberry cultivation and silkworm 
rearing as rural production, and silk reeling as industry. For example, the Mianyang 
gazetteer notes that mulberry cultivation and silkworm rearing were popular in the 
eastern and northern villages of Mianyang. Women and children took the task of 
raising silkworms. However, reeling was not part of the rural household business any 
more.69 The Santai gazetteer details the separation of reeling from rural production. 
Silkworm raisers used to hand-reel silk with large frames in Santai. When more 
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efficient reeling frames were introduced into the region, workshops appeared in 
large numbers. Raw silk produced in the workshops was of better quality and met 
the market needs. While coarse silk was sold in Chengdu, fine silk were shipped to 
Shanghai, and then exported overseas. Peasants gave up reeling, and sold cocoons 
instead.70  Nanchong, another leading sericulture center, experienced a similar 
trajectory.71  
Other than deskilling peasants, the foreign trade brought no significant 
technological change to the general peasantry. There was not any reform directed or 
sponsored by the Western silk dealers. In contrast, Western merchants were directly 
involved in some reformative programs targeted at the stage of rural production in 
the lower Yangzi and South China from the 1910s. The International Committee for 
the Improvement of Sericulture (Zhongguo hezhong cansang gailianghui) was 
established in Shanghai in 1917. It was sponsored by French, British, and American 
merchants in Shanghai, with the participation of the Jiangsu-Zhejiang-Anhui Silk and 
Cocoon Guild (Jiangzhewan sijian zonggonghui). It set up silkworm breeding stations 
and sericulture instruction offices in the lower Yangzi. These early institutions spread 
modern technology, especially new silkworm varieties, to rural producers. Similarly, 
the Guangdong Silk Research Institute (Guangdongsheng siye yanjiusuo), and the 
Guangdong, British, American, French chambers of commerce collectively set up a 
silk reform committee in Guangdong in 1918. After the committee dissolved in 1919, 
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American silk merchants helped the Lingnan Agricultural College carry out sericulture 
reform.72 However, there was no such reform in rural Sichuan at all. Peasants were 
isolated from the foreign technological improvement directly brought by the Western 
powers.  
The export of raw silk did not push peasants to improve traditional technologies 
either. It was true that more peasants and more regions were involved in sericulture. 
Gazetteers such as those belonging to Fushun, Weiyuan, and Suining vividly recorded 
that sericulture was booming in the early Republic.73 These new participants did not 
produce cocoons by borrowing new technologies, but followed the traditional 
method of production. Peasants cultivated mulberries on excess land and reared 
small amounts of silkworms, in a manner that needed improvement. The traditional 
ways of production continued well throughout Sichuan in the 1930s. The growth of 
cocoon output was primarily due to the growth in numbers of participant households, 
and not increased output per household or per capita.  
Conclusion  
The confluence of ecological, economic and social constraints shaped how 
peasants chose and maintained the sericulture technology they used. For the large 
population of small peasants in Sichuan, sericulture was one of the means of 
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obtaining secondary income. Sericulture was more important to the peasants in the 
hilly regions than to those in the fertile plain. Limited land availability and the nature 
of sericulture restricted the development of sericulture in rural societies. The 
traditional techniques allowed peasants to practice sericulture with minimum input. 
Family members supplied the labor. The mulberry trees were planted in limited 
amounts on extraneous pieces of land that otherwise had little use. Trees received 
only casual trimming and tilling. Silkworms were often domestically bred and reared, 
which cost nothing but rendered the silkworms disease prone. Peasants had little 
knowledge on disease prevention and depended on their luck and prayers to rear 
silkworms. Their technical deficiencies in turn contributed to the subsidiary nature of 
sericulture in rural economy.  
In fact, the small peasants themselves could not achieve the transformation of 
their stagnated traditional technology, due to their vulnerable economic and social 
situation. Market demand, especially that from the West, stimulated the total output 
cocoons and raw silk, and triggered the expansion of household reeling into 
workshop manufacture. Small peasants gave up domestic reeling in the face of the 
more competitive workshops and later, mechanized factories. The Western market 
did not compensate this deskilling of peasants with any new sericulture skills. It did 
not bring any direct technological reform; neither was Western influence strong 
enough to drive small peasants to seek and adopt more productive technology. 
Western-driven technological modernization in the countryside of inland province 




The Court and Provincial Government during the New Policy Reforms, 1901 – 1911 
In 1900, the Boxer Uprising caused the occupation of Beijing by foreign troops 
and the flight of the Imperial Court in 1900.1 During her flight, the Empress Dowager 
finally admitted that reform was unavoidable and announced an edict in January 
1901 calling for reform plans.2 This started a decade of aggressive reforms between 
1901 and 1911, and led to the eventual collapse of the dynasty as a result of the 
1911 Revolution. The series of administrative, economic, educational, military, and 
constitutional reforms carried out during this decade were called the New Policy 
(xinzheng) reforms. 
Many works suggest that the rural communities were the victims of the New 
Policy reforms. Joseph Esherick argues that, in Hunan-Hubei, the reforms favored 
urban inhabitants and the rich, while the peasants and the poor paid for the reforms 
but received little in return. Urban and rural China became polarized and became 
alienated from each other during this period.3 Agriculture was neglected. “The 
Confucian attention to agriculture was replaced by the Western fixation on industry 
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and trade.”4 Kristin Stapleton further argues that the reforms were carried out most 
intensively in the cities, and that the early reform programs had already caused the 
polarization of the cities and the countryside by the time the constitutional reforms 
created administrative boundaries between them.5 These arguments echoed Philip 
Kuhn’s view that “Early modernization was a phenomenon of the cities, especially 
the treaty ports, and left rural China relatively untouched. Centered as it was upon 
the cities, the modernizing process began to produce a new urban elite that found it 
increasingly hard to identify itself with the problems of rural China. The gap between 
modernizing and pre-modern cultures thus tended to become coterminous with the 
gap between city and countryside.”6  
The government’s efforts in sericultural improvement in Sichuan demonstrate 
however that the alienation of the countryside was neither the goal nor the intention 
of the New Policy reforms. Following the central government’s plans, the provincial 
governments promoted technological reform in sericulture in Sichuan. Rather than 
merely promoting industry and commerce, both the central and provincial 
governments considered rural improvement as an indispensible part of the reforms.  
This chapter focuses on the strategies of the central and provincial governments 
towards developing rural technology as part of the New Policy reforms. The course of 
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sericulture reform in Sichuan reveals divergence between the Imperial Court and the 
provincial government on the issue of how to improve agricultural and industrial 
production. The Court strongly promoted modernization based on Western models 
and technology, while the provincial government chose to encourage both native and 
foreign technologies as long as they could increase productivity.  
The first section examines two elements of the New Policy reforms that were 
related to sericulture. On the one hand, the New Policy stressed learning from 
foreign countries to modernize and westernize Chinese systems and practices; on the 
other, it granted agriculture, industry, and commerce equal statuses. The New Policy 
reforms sought to achieve the modernization of these three sectors of the national 
economy by modeling them after the West and Japan. The second section of this 
chapter details the Sichuan provincial government’s sericulture reform. The 
provincial government carried out educational programs, implemented taxation 
relief and rewards, and enacted protectionist regulations for investors and producers. 
It tried to promote modern technology only within its educational programs, 
revealing no strong inclinations towards the wholesale adoption of Western 
technology or practices within other aspects of its reforms.  
The Court: Modernizing Economic Enterprises 
Throughout the imperial era, rural household based agriculture was the focus of 
the governments’ economic policies, while the imperial ideology considered 
merchants as harmful, non-productive, and parasitic. Even though merchants had 
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become a strong force that wielded significant influence in society from the Song 
dynasty (960-1279) onwards, industry and trade were never officially promoted, 
guided, and protected by Chinese imperial governments before the late nineteenth 
century. Mabel Lee argues that the gentry’s class disparaged and denigrated the 
merchant class as a way of maintaining their social status and political power. 
Merchants thus had to join the gentry group to improve their social status, which 
actually required them to perpetuate this hierarchy.7 The reality of the merchants’ 
growing power and the inter-porosity between the merchant and gentry classes 
made Wellington K. K. Chan comment that there was “a gap between theory and 
practice with respect to the merchant’s social position.”8  
Researchers such as Dwight H. Perkins, however, argue that the obstacle that 
restricted the Chinese modernization in the nineteenth century was not Confucian 
ideology, but the institutional limitations and deficiencies of the central government. 
It did not possess enough revenue to directly fuel industrialization. It did not provide 
an efficient modern banking system to help the private sector with capital formation 
either. There was no modern educational system to facilitate the spread of 
technological improvement either. The lack of governmental support in the areas of 
capital formation and technological diffusion exerted a greater impact in retarding 
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the industrialization and modernization of China before the nineteenth century.9  
Regardless of whether the sluggish modernization and industrialization of China 
was due to ideological constraints or institutional inadequacies, the onset of the 
twentieth century was about to change all these factors. The Boxer Uprising and the 
humiliating flight of the court had convinced all leaders in the Court, including the 
Empress Dowager Cixi who in 1898 strongly opposed reforms, of the necessity and 
urgency of all-encompassing transformations. China had to model itself after the 
foreign countries. The Qing Court consequently made a last-ditch attempt to 
eliminate all obstacles on China’s course to modernization. 
During her flight from the occupation of Beijing by the allied foreign forces, the 
Empress Dowager Cixi finally announced an edict in January 1901 calling on high 
officials to submit reform plans. The edict declared that: “At the time of 
reconsolidation, all government affairs require fundamental rectification for the 
gradual achievement of a strong and wealthy China. The Empress Dowager believes 
that the weakness of China should be corrected by borrowing the strong points of 
the foreign countries, and that the lessons from the past can guide us in the 
future.”10  
Answering this call, Huguang Governor-General Zhang Zhidong and Liangjiang 
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Governor-General Liu Kunyi jointly submitted three memorials, after garnering the 
opinions of the leading merchants and gentry, that were later called the “Three joint 
memorials for reform by the Huguang and Liangjiang Governor-Generals” (Jiangchu 
huizhou sanzhe), on 12, 19, and 20 July. According to Chinese historian Wu Chunmei, 
the three memorials formed the first complete reformative plan in modern China 
and represented the mainstream society’s most profound understanding of 
reformation in China.11 The throne immediately responded to the memorials and 
endorsed them as the guiding principle of the New Policy reforms.12  
Unlike the Self-strengthening Movement that highlighted primarily Western 
military and defense technologies, the New Policy reforms sought to embrace foreign 
knowledge in all aspects of society. In the past half century, when China was 
defeated in the military confrontations with the West, and her economic weakness 
was revealed by the unfavorable foreign trade balance, a group of officials 
represented by Governor-Generals Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang started 
establishing modern military and defense enterprises as a means of 
self-strengthening. This group failed to extend the logic of achieving military 
superiority to the transformation of the entire Chinese system.13  
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In contrast, the New Policy reforms “marked a radical departure for the Chinese 
state, involving a sustained effort to import foreign models and adapt them to 
Chinese realities.” 14  The three memorials pursued the idea of gradual but 
fundamental changes of China’s economic, educational, military, legal, and political 
system. The reforms were modeled after the West and Japan. It was argued that, 
“adopting the Western system was the strategy for wealth.”15 The first memorial 
addressed educational reform, and the second administrative reforms. The third in 
particular formulated eleven guidelines on learning from foreign countries, including 
encouraging study overseas, increasing military power, training armies by foreign 
methods, improving rural production, promoting modern science and technology, 
implementing modern laws on mining, railways, and commerce, changing the 
monetary system, rectifying taxation practices, starting a modern postal system, 
imposing high tariffs on foreign opium, and translating Japanese and Western books. 
In addition, they appealed to the central government to carry out all these 
indispensable projects.  
One of the significant changes was the equalization of the statuses of 
agriculture, industry, and commerce. With the administrative reform of the Six 
Boards, the role of industry and commerce was transformed. In 1903, the Ministry of 
Commerce was established to take charge of agriculture, industry, mining, 
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transportation, and finance. Industry and trade, hence, was officially embraced as 
essential components of the state economy, like agriculture. The Ministry of 
Commerce was further reorganized as the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and 
Commerce in 1906. From the beginning, the Ministry of Commence paid equal 
attention to all economic sectors, as shown by its four departments, namely, the 
department of Trade, the Department of Agriculture and Forestry, the Department of 
Industry, and the Department of Auditing.16  
The elevation of the statuses of industry and trade did not mean the 
degradation of agriculture. The central idea of the economic reforms of the New 
Policy concentrated not only on industry and commerce, but also on rural production. 
The translation of the term “shiye” as industry often led to the image that the late 
Qing government’s economic policies favored industry over agriculture. In fact, the 
Ministry of Commerce clearly indicated that shiye included all types of economic 
enterprises such as agriculture, industry, transportation, mining, etc.17  
Ideologically, agrarian production was still considered as “ben” (essential). The 
“ben” used here was not the opposite of “mo” (inessential), the derogatory term 
used to characterize industry and commerce in the previous dynasties, but instead 
meant the first stage of production that industry and commerce depended on. Liu 
Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong pointed out that, “The way to make people rich and the 
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country affluent is to produce more native goods. If there is no agriculture, there will 
be no raw materials for industry, and no goods to trade.” The Ministry of Commerce 
shared the same understanding. According to the memorial it submitted to the 
throne, “The foundation point of commerce lies in the encouragement of native 
goods, and commerce is based on industry, and industry is based on agriculture. If 
agriculture does not develop, the foundation will not be stable, and industry and 
commerce will have nothing to rely on.”18 Historian Juan Chung Jen argues that the 
Ministry of Commerce and its successors between 1903 and 1916 all possessed the 
idea of the joint-development of agriculture, industry, and commerce.19 
The memorials submitted by Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong called for agricultural 
modernization and industrialization. On the aspect of agriculture, they argued that 
farmers followed the local traditions passed down by the older generations without 
capitalizing on new technology. They suggested four approaches to agricultural 
reform, all focused on the improvement of agricultural technology. First, the court 
should encourage students to study new agricultural technology overseas by offering 
financial support for their studies, and governmental positions after they returned. 
Second, the provincial governments should circulate agriculture manuals to the local 
governments. The local governments should instruct local gentry and leaders to try 
the new technology and new varieties of crops, and then distribute the feasible ones. 
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Those who made achievements and contributions should be rewarded. Third, the 
governments should enlighten and lead the peasantry in the adoption of new 
varieties, machines, and practices. The provincial governments should establish 
agriculture schools to conduct experiments. Although the last approach was to 
enlarge acreage by reclaiming waste land and postponing taxation on reclaimed land, 
it also provided for the experimentation of the Western agriculture tools and seeds 
on the waste land.20  
Similarly, the policy makers were fully aware that industrialization was critical to 
the wealth of the nation. “People often argue the wealth of the West was from trade, 
but do not recognize that their wealth was actually from industry. Trade circulates 
finished goods. Industry processes unfinished goods, to refine the inferior, to 
increase the value of the cheap, and to utilize the waste.” They were confident in 
industrialization, “We are not able to rival against the European countries and the 
United States in terms of trade and commerce. But we absolutely can compete 
against the other countries through technology.” They suggested setting up 
engineering schools, organizing technology encouragement stations, rewarding 
skillful technicians, and encouraging and protecting inventions and innovations.21  
Although the Court did not formulate any specific plan on sericulture, these 
memorials and the subsequent edicts and reforms unquestionably bore implications 
for sericulture in paving the way for the modernization of both the agricultural and 
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non-agricultural stages of silk production. Agricultural modernization and 
industrialization were interwoven and neither should be ignored. First, the 
agricultural stage of sericulture needed the introduction of new seeds and practices 
that were primarily borrowed from overseas. Second, the non-agriculture stage of 
sericulture had become mechanized for greater productivity.  
Reform Efforts of the Provincial Government 
The reform ideas of the central government depended on a powerful and loyal 
provincial government to implement and realize. Sichuan was always an important 
political division of the Qing government. While majority of provinces were under 
the administration of governors in the Qing dynasty, only Zhili and Sichuan were 
provinces where the positions of governor were concurrently held by 
governor-generals, the highest level of regional authority in Qing. Except the Zhili and 
Sichuan governor-generals, the other governor-generals supervised more than one 
province.22 In the second half of the nineteenth century, Sichuan was important 
because it was a support viceroyalty that provided subsidies and revenue to support 
other regions. In the last decade of the Qing, however, its status in the imperial 
political map even gradually upgraded to the leading viceroyalty and required 
outside subsidies and support.23  
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The series of Sichuan Governor-Generals during the ten years of New Policy 
reforms were all politically powerful and administratively capable men. They were 
Cen Chunxuan (August 1902 – August 1903), Xiliang (1903 – 1907), Zhao Erxun (June 
1908 – February 1911), and Zhao Erfeng (March 1907 – June 1908, and February – 
December 1911). Except for Cen Chunxuan, the rest three were bannermen. These 
people shared a similar political background. Coming to prominent at the time the 
Court fled from Beijing when the Allied Forces occupied the city, they were leading 
imperial political figures who were close to the Empress Dowager Cixi before she 
died in 1908.24  
Cen Chunxuan occupied the relatively insignificant position of Jiangsu’s 
provincial treasurer in 1900 before he took charge of the Empress Dowager’s escort, 
but he became Sichuan’s Governor-General in 1902 and achieved fame for his 
accomplishments in that office. Xiliang was Hunan’s provincial treasurer before he 
was appointed Governor of Shanxi in 1900 to protect the flight of the Court. He was 
not only trusted by the Empress Dowager, but also connected with influential 
politicians Zhang Zhidong and Yuan Shikai. Zhao Erxun was once Cen Chunxuan’s 
subordinate. Empress Dowager appointed him as the Sichuan Governor-General in 
1907 to balance the power of Han Chinese Cen Chunxuan when the latter held the 
prominent position of Minister of Postal Services and Communications in 1907. 
Before Zhao Erxun arrived in Sichuan, his brother Zhao Erfeng was the interim 
Governor-General. After the death of the Empress Dowager, the Zhao brothers 
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continued to be the leading figures of Chinese politics and were accountable only to 
the throne.25  
These Sichuan governors-generals were all interested in reform. Between 1902 
and 1911, they imposed numerous duties on local magistrates, concerning law 
enforcement, economic, judicial, administrative, educational, and other matters.26 
Even when the majority of provincial governments were reluctant to organize 
consultative bureaus (ziyiju) because it would increase local power, Zhao actively 
supported them.27 Sichuan historian He Yimin comments, “The Xinzheng reforms of 
Sichuan Province were both more rapid and more thorough than other Chinese 
provinces’.”28  
The economic milieu during the late Qing favored sericulture reform. The 
contagious pebrine disease destroyed European sericulture in the middle nineteenth 
century. The disease was first discovered in France in the 1840s, and soon spread 
throughout the Europe in the 1850s and the Middle East in the 1860s.29 French 
sericulture never fully recovered from the devastation, and had to depend on 
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imported raw silk to support her still prosperous weaving industry. Later, at the turn 
of the twentieth century, the United States became another consumer of Chinese 
raw silk second to France in importance, and it would soon overtake France as the 
largest importer of Chinese raw silk.30 International demand stimulated production. 
Exports of all kinds of Chinese raw silk increased from 69,000 piculs in 1871 to 
173,000 in 1891, and 216,000 in 1901.31 In addition, better raw silk was required by 
the power-looms that were adopted in the West in the second half of the nineteenth 
century.32 The Silk Association of America explained to Chinese producers in the 
1910s, “the high price of labor and the speed of American machines make the low 
grade silk more expensive than the higher grades which can be worked with less 
labor and at a higher speed.”33 The overseas market for Chinese raw silk could be 
exploited by expanding silk output, and the improved quality could make it more 
competitive. Increasing the quantity and quality of raw silk produced relied on 
sericulture reform.  
In Sichuan, the importance of the silk industry was further highlighted by the 
ban on poppy cultivation. In 1906, the Court pursued its determination to suppress 
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opium. It ordered the complete eradication of opium in China within ten years with 
an eleven-article program.34 The Sichuan government implemented penal taxation 
on opium and tightly controlled the production, distribution and consumption of 
opium. After Zhao Erxun assumed the position of governor-general in 1908, opium 
suppression was even more intensive. In August 1909, Zhao ordered to completely 
root out the cultivation of opium in the coming season, and he firmly carried out this 
plan.35 The success of opium eradication was recorded in both Western and Chinese 
sources. Alexander Hosie made a special trip to investigate the impact of the Qing’s 
government policy on opium. His personal observation and the testimony of the 
others revealed that poppy cultivation was suppressed in Sichuan in 1910.36 The 
local gazetteers of Wanyuan, Changshou, Luxian, Fengdu, Huayang counties also 
noted that poppy cultivation was nearly wiped out at that time.37  
Opium was the most important commodity to Sichuan’s economy, not only to 
the government, but also to the farmers. Poppy could generate for the peasants 
more cash income than food crops. Hosie estimated that an acre of poppy field 
yielded raw dry opium worth £5.16s.8d in contrast to £4.5s.6d for an equivalent yield 
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of wheat.38 The suppression of poppy cultivation threatened rural livelihood. In 
some regions, such as in Changshou, poppy cultivators resisted the ban and the 
prefectural government had to send troop to suppress the unrest.39  
Opium formed the lion share of Sichuan exports from the late nineteenth 
century onwards. For instance, in 1896, 936,667 lbs. of Sichuan produced opium 
passed the Chongqing maritime customs, and it constituted 26.90 percent of the 
total value of exports from Chongqing. The numbers even increased to 1,252,266 lbs. 
and 30.60 percent in the next year.40 These numbers did not include the large 
amount of opium that did not pass through the maritime customs. The governmental 
policy of eliminating opium, undoubtedly, was a blow to the Sichuan economy and 
trade balance. 
The Sichuan government had to find substitutes for opium in order to maintain 
economic and social stability. The best possible substitute was sericulture products. 
Next to opium, sericulture goods, including raw silk, cocoons, and silk refuse, was 
second in importance in terms of the value of exports from Chongqing.41 There was 
much potential for generating wealth from sericulture and the silk industry. For 
instance, Guang’an was not famous for silk before the twentieth century. The 
suppression of opium forced the peasants to switch from poppy cultivation to 
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mulberry cultivation to seek income from sericulture.42 At the same time, sericulture 
promotion had long been a traditional task of the Chinese bureaucracy. E-Tu Zen Sun 
suggests that “the promotion of sericulture had worked itself into the administrative 
ethos of the traditional culture, and had come to be regarded as a part of the 
government’s duties in the realm of public administration.”43  This legacy well 
continued in the early twentieth century.  
The provincial government’s concern with the promotion of sericulture started 
with institutional change at the provincial level. The Bureau of Commerce, the 
provincial representative of the Ministry of Commerce, first set up a pilot silk reeling 
workshop for the transmission of improved reeling technique in the provincial capital, 
Chengdu, in 1903. This government-owned Model Silk Reeling Workshop used 
wooden hand-operated re-reeling frames to produce raw silk for export. At the same 
time, an official of the Bureau of Industry bought back a reeling device from Japan.44 
Following the New Policy’s agricultural reform plan, the provincial government 
established the Bureau of Agriculture in 1905. The Bureau of Agriculture supervised 
farming, sericulture, forestation, and animal husbandry. It set up commodity 
exhibition halls, organized fairs, and published agricultural manuals.45 In 1906, the 
government started providing short-term sericulture education program, and the 
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Sichuan Provincial Agricultural School (Sichuan tongsheng nongzheng xuetang) was 
established, with a department of sericulture providing a three-year education 
program.46 If “[g]overnment policy maker seemed not to realized that a modern silk 
industry would require fundamental institutional changes” at the end of the 
nineteenth century, 47  the situation in Sichuan was clearly changing from the 
beginning of the twentieth century.  
Meanwhile, local officials undertook various means of promoting sericulture, 
but the technologies employed in these sericulture promotional programs at the 
local level were inconsequential. The Yanting magistrate compiled a manual on 
sericulture in 1904. The Yilong government distributed copies of a sericulture manual 
to sericulture districts. In 1905, Pixian planted over 10,000 mulberry trees on city 
walls. In 1906, Anxian set up a special office to disseminate agricultural and 
sericultural technologies.48 These local official endeavors were still dispersed and 
uncoordinated before 1907. Like their pre-twentieth-century predecessors, they 
reflected neither significant innovation in sericulture knowledge, nor centralized and 
systematic diffusion methods. They encouraged primarily the age-old practices.  
However, the arbitrary promotion of sericulture at the local level was replaced 
by more systematic and intensive programs that were enforced province-wide after 
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1907, when Zhou Shanpei assumed the post of Intendant for the Encouragement of 
Enterprise (Quanyedao) in Sichuan. He was the representative of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce at the provincial level. Although the Intendants 
could contact the Court directly, bypassing the provincial government, they were 
tightly controlled by the provincial governors and governor-generals. Their 
promotion highly depended on the recommendations of the latter and they were 
officially the latter’s subordinates. Before Zhou took this position, he had made his 
fame through reforming the police, and managing the provincial bureau of 
commerce, mining, and industry. He worked hand in hand with the 
governor-generals in following the instructions from the central government. He was 
confident of his contributions in reforming silk, cotton, sugar, tea production, and 
promoting the introduction of steamers for transportation in Sichuan. “Regarding 
anything that is essential to the long-term benefit of Sichuan, did I not plan, or not 
do my best to realize the blueprint?”49 
Zhou was familiar with sericulture, as a native in Zhejiang, a sericulture province 
in the lower Yangzi. Backed by the provincial government, he carried out a number of 
reforms and promotion projects on the silk industry in Sichuan. He took personal 
charge of the Provincial Sericulture Bureau. The provincial bureau had four 
departments, each respectively responsible for supervising sericulture promotion, 
silkworm rearing, mulberry cultivation, and silk reeling. The provincial bureau 
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managed technological invention and improvement. It hired professionals from the 
Zhejiang Sericulture School (Zhejiang canxueguan) in Hangzhou in the lower Yangzi 
delta. The Zhejiang Sericulture School was the first sericulture school and trained the 
first generation of modern sericulturists in China. Many sericulturists and new 
silkworm varieties in Sichuan came from the school. For example, Zheng Kai and 
Zhou Jixian, the heads in charge of silkworm breeding and mulberry cultivation were 
both from the school.  
The professionals from the Zhejiang Sericulture School took charge of 
technological improvements in Chengdu. They imported new silkworm varieties, 
such as those named as Zhugui, Xinyuan, and Xinchang, from the lower Yangzi. These 
varieties yielded white cocoons that were different from the leading native varieties 
that produced yellow silk in Sichuan. In addition to raising silkworms in spring, they 
began rearing summer crops of silkworm. They also bought in the hu mulberry and lu 
mulberry, the species of mulberries that yielded high quality of leaves in the lower 
Yangzi and were different from those cultivated in Sichuan. Furthermore, they 
introduced framed egg cards for the moths to lay their eggs individually and 
separately on paper- or cloth- made cards. This started the adoption of framed egg 
cards in the province.50  
The local offices were responsible for technological diffusion. The provincial 
government specified achievements in developing sericulture and the silk industry as 
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one important criterion for the evaluation of the performances of magistrates on 
prefectural and county levels. It required every major silk producing county and 
prefecture to establish specific offices to take charge of sericulture and the silk 
industry.51 The order from Chengdu pushed the local magistrates to found, from 
1908, sericulture promotion centers in all the regions that were suitable for 
sericulture. These centers were primarily educational institutions providing advanced 
or elementary programs. The advanced programs required students to study more 
than three semesters, while students in elementary programs graduate after two 
semesters. The governmental promotion was particularly active after 1909. By 
September 1909, 17 counties had set up centers of advanced program, another 52 
offered elementary programs, and three had both advanced and elementary 
programs. In total, 3,400 students were enrolled in these centers.52 By 1911, more 
than 130 promotion centers had been founded within the province, with 4,200 
students in total.53 In addition, there were even special programs targeted at women 
and monks. In 1910, a women’s sericulture training center was set up in Chengdu. It 
recruited 80 women.54 Training programs for Buddhist monks in the provincial 
sericulture promotion center in 1910 and 1911.55  
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These modern sericulture promotion centers primarily taught modern 
sericulture knowledge. The teachers were mainly graduates from modern sericulture 
institutes. They diffused the knowledge that they learned in the modern sericulture 
schools. For example, Cheng Timing, a graduate of the department of sericulture at 
the Provincial Agricultural School, was in charge of the sericulture promotion center 
of Jingyan. The curriculum he offered included mulberry cultivation, silkworm rearing, 
silk reeling, the pathology, physiology, and anatomy of silkworms, the use of 
microscopes, silkworm egg production, and the examination of silkworm egg, cocoon, 
and raw silk, etc.56 Subjects like pathology or physiology was completely new 
knowledge that was never previously available in the traditional sericulture manuals 
and practices.  
However, the level of modern technological improvement should not be 
overstated. According to a Japanese investigation in 1926, the sericulture schools 
continued rearing Zhugui and Xinyuan silkworms, which, unfortunately, did not 
produce high quality cocoons. These silkworm species probably had degenerated by 
the time. The lu mulberries were widely cultivated in Baoning prefecture in northern 
Sichuan, but the hu mulberry was too expensive to become prevalent anywhere in 
the province. Although the framed egg cards were produced in many places in 
Sichuan in the mid-1920s, the majority of farmers continued to use the traditional 
means of producing silkworm eggs.57 The bivoltine summer crop of silkworm only 
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spread into a few localities, and its output was nearly negligible.  
While setting up public sericulture institutes, the provincial and local 
governments strongly supported private efforts. First, the governmental officials 
were willing to grant private sericulture societies that aimed at increasing sericulture 
productivity legal status. For instance, the first sericulture society in Sichuan received 
support from the magistrates of Jingyan, Hezhou, and Jiangjin, at a time when the 
public sericulture institutes had not appeared yet.58 When more sericulture societies 
were established in the later years, the officials welcomed them with complimentary 
comments such as “it is a blessing to the future of local sericulture;” “industry is the 
urgent task.”59  
Second, the government provided private mulberry plantations with legal and 
institutional protection. The traditional practice of sericulture did not produce 
mulberry plantations in the countryside. But some well-to-do people started 
exploring the possibility of achieving economies of scale in mulberry cultivation from 
the late Qing dynasty. The appearance of the private mulberry plantation, which 
attained economies of scale was a great piece of progress in sericulture in Sichuan. 
Most private mulberry plantations were started on rented land. After the crops 
began to yield, disputes about land rent were common because of the imperfect 
contracts. Landlords either increased land rental, or threatened to terminate tenancy. 
The provincial government looked at these cases as an obstacle to sericulture 
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development, and issued four rules.  
1. If the land is rented for mulberry cultivation, but tenancy is not 
specified in the contract, the land is considered as being under 
permanent tenancy and the lender shall not terminate the lease. 
2. If the land has been rented over five years, the lender can increase 
rent, but shall not increase the required deposit. The total increased 
amount of rent shall not be more than 20 percent of the initial rent.  
3. Tenant shall not cut down mulberry trees after their tenancy 
terminates. 
4. If the mulberry plantation is reclaimed wasteland, the lender shall 
never increase rent.60 
The official encouragement of silk production was two-fold. The provincial and 
local governments encouraged and protected the agricultural stage of sericulture on 
the one hand, and advocated high quality raw silk production and export on the 
other. They recognized that raw silk would be the major source of generating foreign 
exchange, and hence paid great attention on producing raw silk for export purpose. 
According to one account, Zhou Shanpei arranged a meeting of the leaders of the 
Sichuan silk industry, soon after he assumed the position of Intendant. In this 
meeting, he praised the establishment of the first steam filature in Sichuan and 
strongly advocated raw silk export. He claimed, “It will be a shame if Sichuan silk is 
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not seen in the New World.”61  
The Intendant office and the related institutions implemented supportive 
policies and regulations to encourage silk improvement for the overseas market. In 
the spring of 1910, Zhou contracted a Shanghai silk dealer to help market “improved” 
Sichuan raw silk to foreign silk dealers. The improved silk (gailiangsi) was produced 
by both the improved non-mechanized reeling devices and by mechanized steam 
filatures. It was finer than the hand-reeled domestic silk (tusi) reeled by the large 
frames. The Intendant office collected and sent the improved raw silk to Shanghai for 
export through contracted Shanghai silk dealers.62  Furthermore, for facilitating 
improved raw silk export, Zhou enacted the “Regulation for Pledging Improved Raw 
Silk” in 1910. According to this regulation, holders who had difficulties exporting over 
800 liang of raw silk could put their silk in pledge for loans from the silk guilds in 
Chengdu, Chongqing, and Tongchuan. The Intendant office took the responsibility of 
sending samples to silk guilds for quality examination. The loan was 80 percent of the 
current price of native silk at the interest rate of one percent per month. The guilds 
then sent the pledged silk to Shanghai to sell. After deducting regular operational 
cost, loan, and interest, the income was returned to the commissioner without any 
commission.63 This was a rather favorable regulation for raw silk producers.  
Tax reduction was the most significant and attractive policy that the government 
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offered to silk producers who could produce fine silk. Researchers such as S.A.M. 
Adshead, Stephen R. Mackinnon, and Kristin Staple often stress that the heavy taxes 
for government modernization projects jeopardized the interests of the local 
merchants.64 Although the argument was verified by a variety of cases, it neglects to 
consider the possibility that the imperial government could reduce taxation to favor 
the producers and merchants under certain conditions, such as the case in silk 
industry in Sichuan.  
In Sichuan, a regulation in effect from the early 1910 exempted improved silk 
that qualified for export through Shanghai from a lijin levy. The local offices for the 
encouragement of industry were responsible for examining raw silk and offering lijin 
exemption tickets. The positions of raw silk examiners, Silk Examination Committee 
Members, as they were called, were normally assigned to the teachers in local 
sericulture promotion centers, for they were usually the professional sericulturists 
among the local government officials. According to the revised regulations 
promulgated in 1911, the procedure was quite strict. The examination criteria 
included fineness, evenness, breakage, and color. Examiners were required to finish 
their examination within one day, and the offices should return the examination 
results within three days. No delay was allowed. The regulations also quite efficiently 
prevented malpractice. Three copies of examination results were made. One was 
issued to the silk owners, one kept by the offices, and the last one submitted to the 
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Intendant with the examined sample. Examiners were held accountable for the 
results.65 When the silk was transferred through Chongqing, it would be reexamined 
by the Chongqing silk guild again.66 This method ensured the rights of raw silk 
exporters as well as the quality of export raw silk. 
Raw silk that qualified was issued with lijin exemption tickets. The exemption 
duration was the time needed for its transportation from the place of departure to 
the Chongqing Maritime Customs, assuming that the shipment took two days to 
travel fifty kilometers. During this period, the qualified silk would not be levied any 
lijin when it passed lijin stations.67 For instance, if the distance from the producing 
district to Chongqing was 500 kilometers, the producers of the qualified silk did not 
have to pay lijin for 20 days when they shipped the silk to Chongqing. By 1910, the 
major silk markets, Chongqing, Chengdu, Leshan, Santai, and Guang’an, all had 
examiners to examine raw silk for export.68 It was estimated that this policy could 
save silk exporters 2. 6 to 3.6 taels for every picul of raw silk.69 In addition to lijin 
exemption, the Provincial Sericutlure Bureau awarded producers seven taels for 
every picul of qualified raw silk exported to Shanghai.70  
Tax deduction and cash rewards were attractive policies for those who invested 
in improved raw silk production, especially the steam filatures that could produce 
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fine silk of standard and high quality. On the one hand, improved fine silk was about 
580 to 600 taels a picul, double the price of coarse domestic silk reeled using 
pre-modern methods.71 On the other, improved silk enjoyed lijin exemption and 
financial rewards that domestic silk could not acquire. The attractive returns 
stimulated improved raw silk production in Sichuan during the very last years of the 
imperial China.  
The reform endeavors of the provincial and local governments on sericulture in 
Sichuan, in fact, focused on the improvement of quality and quantity rather than the 
adoption of particular foreign technology. Only the public education section placed 
emphasis on modern sericulture technologies in their curriculum. It taught new 
means of producing and examining silkworm eggs, and spread foreign knowledge on 
silkworms and diseases. Government policy and taxation support, however, did not 
show such strong preference for foreign technology. It protected private mulberry 
plantations which could use any kind of technology to cultivate mulberries. It 
encouraged superior quality raw silk through taxation policies and financial rewards, 
without specifying that the improved raw silk should only be produced in modern 
mechanized factories.  
Conclusion 
The New Policy reforms during the last years of the Qing dynasty were designed 
                                                             
71 According to the Chongqing Silk Guild, the best domestic raw silk was worth 389 
taels per 1,000 liang in 1908. There was not any mechanized raw silk to export 
through Chongqing that year. See Baxian, 6 – 7 – 1364.  
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to transform every aspect of the empire by borrowing and adopting Western and 
Japanese institutions and knowledge. The central government legalized the equal 
position of agriculture, industry, and commerce, and pursued their development 
without bias. It heralded reforms that planned to realize agricultural modernization 
and industrialization.  
The Sichuan provincial government reinterpreted the decrees from the central 
government to suit regional condition, especially in the case of sericulture. It paid 
close attention to sericulture reform because of the increasing importance of silk as a 
source of livelihood for the people and export revenue for the province. At the 
provincial level, it initiated technological reform, introduced new technology and 
varieties of mulberry trees and silkworms, set up provincial schools for technological 
research and the training of experts, and offered political and financial support to 
stimulate technological improvement. It further stimulated technological diffusion at 
the prefectural and county levels by tying officials’ promotion with their prefectures 
and counties’ performance in sericulture.  
Both the central government and provincial government took the peasantry into 
their consideration in planning and implementing the New Policy Reforms. 
Governments from the provincial level down to the county seat encouraged both 
agricultural and non-agricultural stages of sericulture production. It was impossible 
to develop the non-agricultural sector only, as the production of raw silk was 
dependent on the agricultural stages of sericulture. In fact, this work will reveal that 
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it is impractical to distinguish between the rural and the urban in sericulture 
throughout modern Sichuan. For the agrarian-based industry, no real success in the 
industrial sector could be achieved without improvements at the agricultural stages.  
In terms of diffusing knowledge and skills in sericulture, the provincial 
government did not specially stress on foreign technology, as planned by the Court. 
The provincial government was flexible with the improvements in sericulture. It 
introduced foreign technological reforms at the agricultural stages by setting up 
institutes and hiring experts to impart foreign knowledge. In contrast, it did not 
intervene in the industrial stage of silk reeling, except to exert financial and political 
influence on the producers. It delineated no clear modernization agenda on raw silk 
manufacturing. The vague term “improved raw silk” was used to describe both 
mechanized and non-mechanized raw silk, as long as it was better than the 




Private Participation in Rural and Industrial Production, 1901 – 1911 
In Meiji Japan, the “literate landlord-businessman-experimenter” led the way in 
developing sericulture, boosted by favorable international demand and government 
encouragement. Richard J. Smethurst enumerates a long list of well-to-do landlords 
who participated in the improvement of sericulture technology in Yamanashi in 
Japan. These landlords were interested in sericulture reform, and had both time and 
capital to invest in its pursuit. They became leaders in technological innovation and 
diffusion. They conducted experiments and promoted new technology through 
demonstrations before the turn of the twentieth century, when more and more 
tenants also became literate and could read and learn from publications.1  
The economic and political environments in Sichuan in the early twentieth 
century bore many similarities to the conditions that stimulated the Meiji sericulture 
reform. There was escalating international demand for raw silk and cocoons. The 
imperial government eradicated the cultural and ideological bias against industry and 
trade. During the closing years of the Qing dynasty, the central and provincial 
governments, and local society achieved a consensus on the desirability of 
transforming China. Like their Meiji counterparts, the well-to-do classes in Sichuan 
became active champions and actors in sericulture reform.  
                                                             
1 Richard J. Smethurst, Agricultural Development and Tenancy Disputes in Japan, 
1870 – 1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).  
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The involvement of the educated well-to-do classes implies that civil society 
functioned in spreading new technology in late Qing Sichuan. Instead of confronting 
the Manchu government, these elites acted as the government’s collaborators, 
stimulated by economic gains and their social obligations. They made more 
significant and direct contributions to technological innovation and diffusion than the 
government had at the time. They were the innovators, advocates, and testers of the 
new technologies. They hoped to attain both personal profits and serve societal 
interests through technological improvement. Supported and protected by the 
provincial and local authorities, these private players participated in rural production 
by setting up a large number of sericulture societies, as well as boosted the industrial 
sector by establishing factories to produce improved raw silk. Commercialization and 
industrialization did not divorce the rich from rural production, but created a new 
link between them. The rich did not only prefer safe land investment, but were also 
ready to invest large capital in risky businesses that might not generate quick return.  
This chapter first discusses how private agents joined the sericulture reform 
movement during the closing years of the Qing. Many participants were educated 
and were often interested in promoting education and in saving the province through 
economic development. Chen Wanxi (Chen Kaizhi), the most successful sericulture 
entrepreneur in Sichuan, presents an interesting case study. In promoting 
technological diffusion, Chen was influenced by both his Confucian background and 
nationalism. However, an evaluation of Chen’s sericulture manuals proves that he 
continued to utilize traditional practices at the agricultural stage of sericulture 
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although he did not reject modern mechanization in the non-agricultural sectors.  
Booming Private Sericultural Societies  
Private efforts at modernizing sericulture technology started long before the 
central government decided to implement the New Policy reforms. For example, 
Jardine, Matheson & Co. established the Ewo Filature in Shanghai in 1861, while 
Chinese merchants began investing in filatures from 1881 in Shanghai. With the 
appearance of large number of private Chinese steam filatures in Shanghai and 
Guangdong, filature silk overtook domestic hand-reeled raw silk as the top exported 
silk commodity from 1898 onwards.2 The first private Chinese sericulture school was 
set up in Hangzhou in 1897. The Nongxue bao (Journal of agriculture), the first 
journal of its kind, was also founded in 1897. The journal frequently translated and 
published the latest news and discoveries in sericulture.  
Sichuan was a late comer in sericulture modernization, in comparison with 
coastal China. The gentry-literati in Sichuan did not actively participate in sericulture 
reform and promotion until the twentieth century, when the development of 
sericulture in Japan and other regions of China caught the attention of Sichuan’s 
educated populace. They were also concerned with China’s continued weakness on 
the international stage. As the leaders of local society, they believed that they should 
take up the task of saving the nation through economic enterprises. The Boxer 
                                                             
2 Chen Ciyu, Jindai zhongguo de jixie saosi gongye (The silk industry of modern China, 
1860 – 1945) (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1989), pp. 16, 27.  
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Uprising was the trigger that convinced both the imperial Court and the most 
stubborn conservatives that reform was vital and urgent. Furthermore, the 
commitment of the Court towards reform stimulated “immense voluntary, 
non-government effort” in local society, which was “the most striking feature” of the 
New Policy reform movement. 3  This was vividly underscored by the private 
involvement in sericulture in Sichuan.  
The Sichuan Sericulture Society (Sichuan cansang gongshe) that combined 
educational programs and business was the first sericultural enterprise in twentieth 
century Sichuan. It was initiated by Shi Xie, an official of the Qing government and a 
native in the Sichuan sericulture region. When Shi was assigned to a post in Hubei 
province, he passed over the plan to Zhang Senkai, who realized it in 1903.  
Zhang Senkai was the chairman of the Sichuan Sericulture Society. He was a 
non-official scholar at the time he took over Shi’s responsibilities. In fact, he was 
more renowned as a historian than as a sericulture reformer later. He held the juren 
degree as he had passed the imperial examination at the provincial level in 1893. He 
started paying attention to sericulture reform when he was sojourning in Shanghai in 
1894. According to his own account, he was disappointed by the low price of Sichuan 
raw silk in the Shanghai market, and began reading the articles on sericulture in the 
Nongxue bao from 1897. The humiliation of the Boxer Uprising and the flight of the 
                                                             
3 Jack Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions, China from the 1800s to the 1980s (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 140. 
107 
 
Court stimulated him to initiate reform for economic competitiveness.4  
The Sichuan Sericulture Society at first hoped to receive help from the Japanese 
consulate in Chongqing. Chongqing was opened as a treaty port in 1891. 
Subsequently, the Treaty of Shimonoseki signed after the first Sino-Japanese War 
granted Japan the right to set up a consulate in the Chinese treaty port. Hence, a 
Japanese consulate was set up in Chongqing in 1896. Before he transferred his plan 
to Zhang, Shi Xie had contacted the Japanese consulate on the issue of sericulture 
reform. He planned to invite Japanese sericulturists to teach people in Sichuan 
“Japanese and Western sericulture.”5 
However, Japanese influence actually had little impact on the establishment of 
the society. Instead, the work was carried out completely by the Chinese elites. 
Financial difficulties prohibited Sichuan elites from direct contact with Japanese 
sericulturists, who by the time had developed a set of knowledge based on 
laboratory tests and scientific principles. Relying on his own influence, Zhang 
solicited help from the local society. The members and investors of the Sichuan 
Sericulture Society included influential gentry bearing imperial titles and 
governmental positions from all over Sichuan. They provided strong support for 
Zhang to realize his plan.  
The sericulture reforms the society pursued were very much alike those 
                                                             
4 Minguo xinxiu hechuan xianzhi, pp. 1830 -1831. 
5 Ibid., p. 1831.  
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conducted by the Provincial Sericultural Bureau a few years later. The society hired 
Chinese sericulturists from the Zhejiang Sericulture School. It introduced silkworm 
varieties called Xinyuan and Zhugui varieties. These varieties spun white silk that was 
popular in the western market. It also tried to promote silkworm varieties that could 
be cropped in summer, imported saplings of the hu mulberry breed from the lower 
Yangzi, taught students to produce framed silkworm egg cards, and emphasized the 
disinfection of sericulture equipment.6  
Through providing education, the Sichuan Sericulture Society made major 
achievements in technological diffusion. In 1903, the society was registered as the 
Private Vocational Middle School (Minli sheye xuetang). It was the first vocational 
school for sericulture in Sichuan, as well as one of the few early sericulture schools in 
China. By 1910, the school had trained over 110 students. 28 graduates were also 
sent to Japan to study by the society. The rest went to the other districts of the 
province to spread sericulture and reeling skills.7 
Although the Sichuan Sericulture Society appeared before the beginning of 
official support, sericultural societies did not bloom until the Intendant for the 
Encouragement of Enterprise was set up in Sichuan after 1907. As discussed in 
chapter 3, government policies offered protection and financial awards to the 
participants while international demand for raw silk made the reform profitable. As a 
result, the well-to-do people in the regions that were suitable for sericulture invested 
                                                             
6 Ibid., pp. 1789, 1801, 1830, 1883.  
7 Li Zhaoming, 20 shiji Sichuan quan jilu, p.18. 
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in sericultural societies. For example, in late 1908, sericultural societies began to rise 
in Nanchuan, Shehong, and Yizhou.8 The number of private sericultural societies 
peaked in 1909 and 1910. According to Baxian archival documents, at least five 
sericultural societies were established, or applied to be set up, in Baxian between 
October 1909 and May 1910.9 In mid-1911, even Buddhist temples and monasteries 
organized sericultural societies and appealed to the government for recognition and 
protection. 10  The Baxian gazetteer describes how government encouragement 
resulted in the prosperity of private planters, “sericultural societies appeared in great 
numbers. ... Paddy fields that yielded 100 shi of rice were turned into mulberry 
lands.”11 The “100 shi of rice” is probably approximate number or an exageration. 
But considering that 4.4 shi of rice per mu was the average output in Sichuan in the 
Qing12, this line does suggest the local interests in mulberry cultivation.  
The existing documents reveal that many societies sought to maximize profits 
through utilizing improved techniques and benefits from the economy of scale. They 
specialized in mulberry cultivation, silkworms rearing, silkworm eggs breeding, and 
raw silk reeling. Silkworm eggs, and mulberry saplings and leaves especially, were the 
major sources of their profit. The majority of funding received was spent on renting 
                                                             
8 Chengdu ribao (Chengdu daily) (the 27th days of the 10th month, 1908, and 29th day 
of the 11th month in Chinese calendar), 1908.  
9 Baxian, 6 – 54 – 01557, 6 – 54 – 01558, 6 – 54 – 01559, and 6 – 54 – 01560.  
10 Baxian, 6 – 54 – 01566. 
11 Minguo baxianzhi (Republican Baxian county gazetteer), 1939, juan 11.  
12 Zhou Bangjun, “Qingdai Sichuan liangshi muchan yu nongye laodong shengchanlü 
yanjiu” (Rice yield per mu and agricultural labor productivity in Qing Sichuan), 
Zhongguo nongshi 23, 3(2005), p. 63. 
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land and purchasing mulberry. For instance, in Baxian, the Yichuan Sericulture 
Society bought 50,000 mulberry saplings, the Dexin Sericulture Society purchased 
over 80,000, and the Yuxi Sericulture Society even cultivated 100,000 saplings.13 
Such large-scale cultivation correspondingly required large amounts of land in the 
countryside. It was not rare to see societies owning over one hundred mu of 
mulberry plantations. Therefore, investment in sericultural societies was great. Some 
societies had initial investments of over 10,000 taels.14  
Madeleine Zelin has noticed that the merchants in Sichuan were adventurous 
entrepreneurs who could take on high-cost and high-risk businesses, as in the case of 
salt well drilling.15 In their eagerness to advance sericulture, the well-to-do in 
Sichuan were similarly committed to the long-term investment in sericultural 
societies. The large amount of investment in production processes, especially on 
mulberry cultivation, could not generate returns in a short time. In comparison with 
other commodities such as foodstuff crops, rapeseeds, and cotton, sericulture was 
much more risky. Unpredictable weather conditions, pests, diseases, and market 
fluctuation could easily destroy the efforts of previous years. These obstacles, which 
impeded small-holders and peasants from investment in sericulture, did not stop the 
well-to-do.  
The investors included students of modern or foreign learning, Confucian 
                                                             
13 Baxian, 6 – 54 – 01557, and 6 – 54 – 01559.  
14 Baxian, 6 – 54 – 01557.  
15 Madeleine Zelin, The Merchants of Zigong, Industrial Entrepreneurship in Early 
Modern China (New York, Colombia University Press, 2005). 
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scholars with imperial examination degrees, government position holders, merchants, 
Buddhist monks, etc. They were primarily the educated richer classes of the local 
society who could afford the large and long-term investment. More importantly, they 
were confident in that they could reduce the risk by adopting new technology. Even if 
they did not know modern techniques, they were able to learn these or to hire 
experts. In fact, some societies were even organized by Japan- or locally-trained 
modern sericulturists. These people possessed both knowledge and capital. They 
could afford to wait to reap long-term returns. In the meantime, their knowledge 
could reduce the risk that small farmers would face. Once successful, the economies 
of scale would result in a dramatic increase in productivity.  
It is notable that despite their profit-maximization agenda, many sericultural 
societies were modeled after the Sichuan Sericulture Society. They provided 
education or training programs, and carried out technological research. Some 
well-organized societies even provided quite advanced levels of education. One 
founder of the Sichuan Sericulture Society, Shi Xie, returned back to his native 
prefecture Jiading and raised 4,000 taels from the local elites to establish another 
sericulture society. This society invited a Japanese expert to teach modern 
sericulture.16  
Thus, the booming of sericultural societies in Sichuan challenged the idea that 
commercialization encouraged landlords to become disconnected from production, 
                                                             
16 Jingyanxian zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, ed., Jingyan cansi yitiaolong, p, 8. 
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as Joseph Esherick once suggested. 17  Instead of divorcing themselves from 
production, the well-to-do actively participated in the sericultural societies amidst 
the increasing commercialization of sericulture. They established partnerships and 
pooled their capital to support rural production. The participants were different from 
either absentee landlords or managerial landlords. One of the most significant 
changes they brought to Sichuan was private mulberry plantations, which was not 
possible for small peasant households. 
Furthermore, these rich investors did not monopolize the new technology that 
they used to gain profit. The private sericultural societies often offered educational 
programs that could attract more participants. The well-to-do were not merely 
absent landowners, but practiced, taught and improved mulberry cultivation as well 
as pursued other technological improvements related to rural stages of sericulture.  
However, technological achievements for the agricultural stage of sericulture 
were limited. Except for the promotion of new mulberry varieties, few new 
techniques were used in the cultivation of mulberry plantations. Instead, the 
methods used were already available in the traditional sericultural manuals. The 
societies merely practiced them in a manner that was more systematic and leveraged 
on the economies of scale. In terms of silkworm rearing, since they could not 
efficiently resolve the problem of silkworm diseases, no significant progress was 
possible. For example, the Sichuan Sericulture Society had only the capacity to 
                                                             
17 Joseph Esherick, Reform and Revolution in China, p. 67. 
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produce over 4,000 disease-free silkworm egg cards by 1908.18  
Furthermore, as revealed by the Sichuan Sericulture Society, the application of 
modern techniques was constricted by prevailing circumstances. The disease-free 
silkworm eggs were essential to the growth of silkworm and yield of cocoons. 
Microscopes were required to detect disease-contaminated silkworm eggs. 
Microscopes were so expensive at that time that a chief technician left the society 
and took away a microscope as collateral for his unpaid salary. It was impossible for 
petty producers to acquire microscopes. The society therefore had to promote the 
traditional methods of selecting silkworm eggs through observing their shape, size 
and color using the human eye. Similarly, the methods of mulberry cultivation and 
insect prevention treatment that Zhang Senkai recorded in his book resembled 
traditional methods that were recorded in traditional Chinese sericulture manuals.19  
Technological Improvement in Silk Reeling  
Technological change in silk reeling was more significant than in mulberry 
cultivation and silkworm rearing during the closing years of the Qing. The 
technological changes were primarily carried out by private individuals and agencies, 
while the government offered little direct intervention besides policy support and 
economic incentives. The private individuals and agencies adopted two strategies 
towards the reform of silk reeling. They either improved the human-operated reeling 
                                                             
18 Minguo xinxiu hechuan xianzhi, p. 1836. 
19 Ibid., pp. 1835, 1789-1796.  
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frame or chose to use the western machines that were powered by steam engines.  
By the late Qing, the disadvantages of indigenous reeling devices had alarmed 
people in Sichuan. The traditional large frame was the most popular reeling devices 
in Sichuan in the nineteenth century. The device had appeared in the Song dynasty.20 
There was no technological improvement in the reeling device used in Sichuan from 
the Song dynasty to the late Qing. This traditional reeling technique produced coarse 
raw silk of low quality. Alexander Hosie had lamented the primitiveness of the reeling 
techniques in Sichuan.21 Zhang Senkai, similarly, complained that the traditional 
reeling produced only coarse and uneven silk that was worth less than half of the 
value of filature silk in the lower Yangzi.22 But they differed in their proposals of the 
technologies that could improve silk quality. Hosie suggested adopting the “foreign 
reeling plant”, while Zhang and his Sichuan Sericulture Society was dedicated to 
adapting traditional techniques to the new requirements without necessarily 
embracing mechanization.  
One of the most significant innovations in reeling technology in Sichuan at the 
turn of the twentieth century was the appearance of new reeling device called small 
frame (xiaoche), as an adaptation to local condition. The small frame had smaller 
reels, in comparison with the traditional large frame. It was superior to the large 
frame, in producing better quality of raw silk. This innovation was a local innovation 
                                                             
20 Dieter Kuhn, “Textile Technology”, p. 389. 
21 Hosie, Report by Consul-general Hosie on the Province of Ssuch'uan, p. 60.  
22 Minguo xinxiu hechuan xianzhi, p. 1848. 
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brought on by the interior location of Sichuan. It was hard to introduce mechanized 
reeling equipment into Sichuan due to the difficulty of transportation. For instance, 
the Chongqing Silk Guild transported reeling machine components from Yichang to 
Leshan in 1910. The cargo weighed 97,314 catties. It took seven days to disembark 
the cargo, and one boatman nearly drowned while unloading the goods.23 Therefore, 
the locals invented the small frame by imitating after the modern machines in the 
filatures. The small frame had a similar structure to the mechanized reeling machines, 
but was not machined and rather supplied by human power.24  
A technique of re-reeling raw silk spread widely too. The Sichuan Sericulture 
Society was an active advocate of the raw silk re-reeling technique. The Society 
cooperated with the local elites to establish the re-reeling Jingwei Silk Workshop in 
1908, and Huigong Silk Workshop in 1911.25 The re-reeling approach spun raw silk 
thread a second time so that it could minimize the rough addition of extra filaments, 
which resulted in coarseness and unevenness. The whole process depended on 
nimble human fingers, without any additional element of mechanization. According 
to Dieter Kuhn, the re-reeling technique had been widely known in Zhili, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, and Sichuan in the nineteenth century.26 However, the practice did not 
become popular in Hechuan until the twentieth century, and Hechuan became one 
                                                             
23 Baxian, 6 – 54 – 01373. 
24 Xu Xinwu, Zhongguo jindai saosi gongyeshi (History of mechanized silk reeling 
industry of modern China) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1990), p. 248. 
25 Wang Di, Kuachu fengbi de shijie, p. 338. Chen Ciyu, Jindai zhongguo de jixie saosi 
gongye, p, 208.  
26 Dieter Kuhn, “Textile Technology”, p. 175.  
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of the leading regions for the production of re-reeled silk in the first half of the 
century.27 Zhang proudly proclaimed that the prosperity of raw silk re-reeling in 
Hezhou resulted from the leadership of the re-reeling workshop of the Sichuan 
Sericulture Society.28  
Furthermore, the Sichuan Sericulture Society further improved the small frame. 
In 1907, a student invented a hand-operated multiple-reel frame (renli liandong 
zhisiche). It tied several small reels together, which could be run at the same time 
using a hand-operated crank. The hand-operated multiple-reel frame increased 
productivity. This technology was later widely adopted by the reeling workshops that 
used small frames.29  
Meanwhile, mechanized steam filatures appeared in Sichuan, despite the 
difficulty of transporting machines from outside of the province. The profits from 
filature silk, the favorable government policy, and growing international demand 
stimulated the appearance of steam filatures in Sichuan. At least six filatures were 
set up during this decade, namely, the Binong Filature in 190830, Shumei Filature in 
                                                             
27 Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, p. 775.  
28 Minguo xinxiu hechuan xianzhi, p. 1926.  
29 Sichuansheng difangzhi bianzhuan weiyuanhui, ed., Sichuan shengzhi, sichouzhi, p. 
133.  
30 The Binong started silk reeling production by using non-mechanized reeling 
devices in 1902, but soon developed into mechanized production. Most sources 
suggest that the Binong transformed into filature and started mechanized production 
in 1908. See Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, p. 774; 
and Gao Peixun, Liu Hangchen, Lu Zuofu, and Huang Mianzhan, “Sichuan cansiye 
gailiang chubu jingguo baogao” (Report on the first stage of reforming sericulture in 
Sichuan), Sichuan Shanhou duban gongshu tuchang gaijing weiyuanhui yuekan 1, 1 
(1934), p. 67.  
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1908, Yongjinxiang Filature in 1908, Xudong Filature (later renamed Tianfu) in 1910, 
Chengcheng Filature in 1910, and Bichuan Filature in 1911. 
The output of filature raw silk kept increasing in the last years of the Qing, 
following the growth of filatures. The export of Sichuan filature silk was first 
mentioned in the Returns of Trade and Trade Reports in 1909. But filature silk 
probably had been already sold in Shanghai before. According to the Baxian archival 
documents, the Yongjinxiang Filature started producing filature raw silk in Santai as 
early as 1908. Its filature silk was sold at the price of about 550 teals per picul in 
Shanghai that year.31 In 1912, the first year of the new Republic, 1,247 piculs of 
yellow filature silk and 67 piculs of white filature silk were exported through the 
Chongqing customs.32  
Unlike the silk industry centers in Shanghai, Wuxi, and Guangdong, where 
filatures were introduced by Westerners, compradors, or merchants with overseas 
economic connections, the early establishment of filatures in Sichuan reveals the 
active participation of educated members of local society. The largest and earliest 
steam filature in the province was set up by an ex-private teacher and xiucai degree 
holder, Chen Wanxi. Chen also established another filature in Leshan in 1913. The 
Shumei Filature was established in 1908 by Shi Qingyang. Shi was a xiucai before he 
went to Japan to study sericulture and joined in Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Alliance 
in Japan in 1906. He was an active supporter of sericulture and established a 
                                                             
31 Baxian, 6 – 54 – 01374. 
32 China Maritime Customs, Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1914, pp. 874, 878.  
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sericulture society. A local biography eulogized him as having “spent the whole 
fortune of his family to set up the filature.” Later, Wen Yousong took over the Shumei 
Filature and merged it with another filature to form the Xudong Filature. Wen was 
also a xiucai degree holder and private teacher in Chongqing. He was close to the 
Japanese and opened schools named as kaizhi (enlightenment).33  
It is safe to argue that both moral and financial reasons motivated the educated 
well-to-do to invest in improved factories. As businessmen, these innovators and 
investors pursued high economic returns. Improved raw silk fetched a higher market 
price than non-filature and non-re-reeled domestic raw silk produced by the 
traditional large frames. The improved raw silk sold at 580 to 600 taels per picul, 
while the non-filature and non-re-reeled silk was at 270 to 300 taels per picul at the 
time.34  
At the same time, their background as educators and scholars pushed them to 
extol the virtues of cherishing the people and saving China from foreign economic 
encroachment. However, they often identified China with the Sichuan province alone. 
For example, Zhang Senkai was ashamed by the fact that Sichuan raw silk fetched the 
lowest price in the Shanghai market and hoped to reform sericulture in Sichuan.35 
Chen Wanxi expected his sericultural practices to be diffused to “the whole Sichuan 
                                                             
33 Sichuansheng difangzhi bianzhuan weiyuanhui, ed., Sichuan shengzi, renwuzhi 
(Sichuan province gazetteer, People) (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2001), p. 
392.  
34 Baxian, 6 – 54 – 01341.  
35 Minguo xinxiu Hechuan xianzhi, p. 1788.  
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population and the whole Sichuan province”.36 When Yongjingxiang Filature was 
forced to closed down in 1909, the Intendant Zhou Shanpei suggested the local 
society to take over it because the “silk industry is critical to the whole province.”37 A 
proposal to establish a First Sichuan Sericulture Co. Ltd. recommended that the 
government offer it protection because silk brought tremendous and long lasting 
benefit to the economy of Sichuan.38 The students who had studied in Japan 
suggested that people encouraged one another to improve silk quality in Sichuan, for 
the purpose of recovering Chinese rights and interest.39 The larger theme of saving 
the nation and national economy was actually submerged beneath a regionalist 
outlook centered on Sichuan.  
In the late Qing promotion of the silk industry, the provincial government and 
local well-to-do classes were engaged in reciprocal collaboration. The government 
created an ideal environment for the introduction and utilization of new technology. 
Local people especially the educated elites responded to the policies actively and 
positively. Many silk producers equipped improved indigenous devices or even 
modern machines, and directly benefited from the government’s promotional 
policies. On the one hand, participation in the silk industry was accompanied and 
supported by government policies. On the other, it allowed them to fulfill their social 
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roles and responsibilities while reaping lucrative returns. Therefore, the local elites 
cooperated with the local and provincial governments in promoting sericulture.  
Chen Wanxi: A Confucian Entrepreneur   
Chen Wanxi was the most prominent and successful silk entrepreneur in 
Sichuan in the early twentieth century. His career in sericulture started in the late 
nineteenth century. By the time the new Republic had replaced the Chinese imperial 
system, he had made his major contributions in the technological innovation of 
sericulture. He was more a representative of the traditional scholars than modern 
radical reformers. Therefore I categorize him as the representative of the elite 
advocates during the late Qing, despite the continued prosperity of his business until 
the mid-1920s.  
This section examines how Chen’s status as a Confucian-entrepreneur 
influenced his technological contributions. Chen had been a village Confucian 
teacher before he and his family accumulated wealth through sericulture from the 
late nineteenth century onwards, and set up the first steam filature in Sichuan. 
Strongly influenced by Confucian ideals, he actively promoted the development of 
sericulture and silk industry across the whole province. However, the sericultural 
manuals he composed reveal that he primarily relied on indigenous understandings 
in the agricultural stage of sericulture. The sources used in this section are 
biographies written by Chen’s contemporaries, oral history compiled at the end of 
the twentieth century, and my interview with Chen’s grandson, Chen Gangzu. Chen 
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Wanxi himself composed three sericultural manuals, two of which remain in 
existence, allowing the examination of his Confucian beliefs and moral values, as well 
as his sericultural knowledge.  
Chen Wanxi was born in a village near Santai in northern Sichuan in 1855. The 
family of seven people, including four younger sons born later, had only a piece of 
land covering 1.7 mu to farm.40 It was impossible for a family to survive on this 
amount of land, but no other source material reveals what kind of sideline his family 
depended on. Despite his family’s poverty, Chen was sent to study under the village’s 
private teacher. His classmate described him as the best student in the class.41 He 
passed the imperial examination at the county level and acquired the xiucai degree 
in 1871.42 Then he worked as a private school teacher in the village temple, at the 
same time preparing to sit for higher level examinations. However, he would fail the 
examinations several times in the following years.43 Without a higher degree and 
large plot of land, Chen could barely support his family with his income as a village 
teacher. It was probably the desperation of poverty and the lack of success in the 
imperial examinations that stimulated his decision to effect change. An account 
records his lament that, “With neither success in learning Confucian classics nor skill 
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for self-sufficiency, I am a lazy vagrant.”44 
Chen was inspired by the monks of the village temple where he taught students. 
The monks made profits by selling the leaves of the temple’s mulberry trees every 
year. The profit from the mulberry trees during one cocoon season was greater than 
his annual teaching allowance. It seems that sericulture was only the resort of the 
impoverished in Santai in the nineteenth century. The social status of silkworm 
raisers was lower than that of farmers. Chen recalled that his family members 
obstructed his plan of converting arable land for a mulberry plantation, because only 
the desperately impoverished people practiced sericulture and none prospered from 
it. Various sources record that Chen’s decision was also ridiculed by his village at the 
time.45  
Nevertheless, Chen convinced his brothers to start planting mulberry in 1877. 
They intercropped mulberry trees and other foodstuff crops in the family field, and 
also planted mulberry on other possible land corners. With the increased output of 
mulberry leaves, they expanded from raising three trays of silkworms to 21 trays in a 
few years. They reeled raw silk at home by using simple large frames that were 
widely adopted in rural Sichuan.46  
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The Chens accumulated wealth quickly. Later, they rented land to plant 
mulberry trees.47 One source claims that they rented mulberry plantations as large 
as 500 mu.48 Another estimated that 100,000 mulberry trees in total were planted in 
the plantation.49 The preface of Chen’s Quansangshuo (Encouragement of mulberry 
cultivation) records that in the 1910s, the Chens harvested over 200,000 catties of 
mulberry leaves, and over 100 piculs of fresh cocoons.50  
Chen Wanxi visited steam filatures in Guangdong at the end of the 1890s, and 
he was duly impressed by the advanced machines and steam boilers. He borrowed 
money from the parents of a student that he taught, and established a reeling 
factory in 1902. It was named as Binong (literally, benefit agriculture). The factory 
started reeling raw silk by 12 small frames. The filature compound was completely 
finished in 1905, with five buildings, including shopfloors, warehouse, and 
dormitories.51 The filature continued increasing the number of reeling machines 
boasted of 320 machines in total in the republic era.52 Its scale was a marvel, and its 
advancement was outstanding in Sichuan at the beginning of the twentieth century.  
It was recorded that Chen controlled the filature strictly. He visited the 
shopfloors every day. If he saw anything wrong, he stopped the operation to give a 
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lecture immediately. There were also scheduled lectures too: to the administrative 
staff on the dates ending with one, three, and five every month; to the cocoon 
peeling workshop on the dates ending with two, four, and eight; and to the reeling 
workshop on the dates ending with three, six, and nine.53  
Santai in northern Sichuan, where Chen made his fortune, was not suitable for 
the further expansion of the silk industry due to the lack of fuel. From the 1910s, 
Chen gradually transferred the center of his silk business to Leshan in southern 
Sichuan. Leshan was more advantageous than Santai because of the long sericultural 
tradition, convenient water transportation, and easy access to the coal market. Chen 
established the Huaxing Filature, originally named Jiaxiang Filature in Leshan in 1913. 
The filature was located outside the city wall of Leshan county. It began with capital 
of 20,000 taels, a much grander starting point than the Binong filature. In the 
beginning, there were 120 mechanized reeling machines and over 200 workers. By 
1927, the filature had developed into a prosperous one, with 360 reeling machines 
and about 1,000 workers. The Chens made huge profits not only as producers of raw 
silk, but also as dealers for other filatures.54   
Because of his fame in the silk industry, Chen was appointed to some 
government positions, such as Sericulture Advisor of Sichuan Province, Head of the 
Bureau of Sericulture of Santai county, and Head of the Industry Bureau of Sichuan 
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Province. The Chens also managed good relationships with local civil, and especially, 
military governments. Chen Wanxi and other influential local people helped the 
Leshan military authorities to build the first public park in Leshan. When he died in 
1926, his funeral procession was escorted by local military leaders and their troops.55  
Confucian motivation and knowledge sharing 
Chen’s writing reflects his strong desire to save China, especially Sichuan, 
through economic activities. He argued that sericulture was a means of relieving the 
country and people from impoverishment. The benefit from improved sericulture 
could revise the unbalanced international trade record that allowed outsiders to 
exploit the Chinese population and China’s wealth. Like most of the 
contemporaneous Sichuan sericulture promoters however, his mind was focused on 
Sichuan alone. He concerned on modeling Sichuan after the lower Yangzi delta in 
terms of the latter’s sericulture economy and technology.56 The couplets he posted 
on the gates of his filatures further demonstrate his ambitions for Sichuan. The 
couplets on both sides of the gate of the Binong Filature read, “Borrowing 400,000 
copper cashes, start Sichuan industry” and, “After decades of invalidism, prescribe 
medicine to wake up the sick.” The ones for the Huaxing Filature read, “From 
mulberry to silkworm to silk, start to change the established practice from the North 
Sichuan.” “From family to village to country, gradually spread reputation to foreign 
countries.” There was also a horizontal inscription on the doorway’s beam which 
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proclaimed, “Benefit Sichuan.”57 
It is hard to tell the extent to which his economic nationalism was a result of his 
Confucian background, but Chen Wanxi did present himself as a loyal follower of 
Confucianism throughout his life. He was educated in the Confucian classics and 
started his career as a Confucian teacher. Although he accepted foreign technology 
and became a successful industrialist, neither his ideology nor his business 
management practices was westernized. In his photographs, he dressed like the 
Chinese gentry with traditional gown and jacket. The only modern thing shown in the 
picture was a foreign hat that was popular and considered as a part of formal outfit 
in Republican China. It is hard to imagine the old Chinese gentleman as an 
industrialist tycoon in Sichuan. This image that he left was further verified by his 
books, writings, and business management practices.  
According to Chen, Confucian teachings guided him to practice sericulture. Sage 
Mencius’s saying that prosperous sericulture was an important symbol of national 
wealth and strength encouraged him to invest in sericulture. Mencius had opined 
that “A household with field of five mu should cultivate mulberry, so that the old 
could wear silk. If the old could wear silk and eat meat, the king of the state is 
invincible.”58 Confucian teachings motivated him to conduct experiments while 
practicing sericulture, because Confucius once praised the Sage Shun because he 
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“loved to ask questions and loved to examine familiar words, passing over what was 
unhelpful to expand upon those ideas that had merit.”59  
Chen stressed he practiced the five characteristics of benevolence (ren) as 
prescribed by Confucius in the management of his enterprises. To be benevolent 
means to be respectful (gong), lenient (kuan), honest (xin), intelligent (min), and kind 
(hui). He was comfortable with harvesting the profit from sericulture. “I consider [the 
profit from] sericulture as what I deserve. It is offered by the heaven and generated 
from the earth. I contest with no one. The whole world cannot take away sericulture 
from me.” This was being respectful. He treated workers like his children - leniently. 
He paid the salary of workers according to their work performance and to fixed rules 
and regulations, which is equivalent to being “honest”. To help others memorize the 
principles of sericulture, he composed Filature Folk Song and Women Reeling Song. 
He considered these pieces of work a reflection of his intelligence. His ability to allow 
everyone to work for him demonstrated kindness.60  
The Confucian philosopher’s dictum surely provided Chen great psychological 
comfort. The imperial government and Confucian sages both encouraged silk 
production. When Chen started planting mulberry trees and raising silkworms and 
received the ridicule of his fellow villagers, he could quote the sages’ teachings to 
explain he was following their direction. When he expanded into raw silk 
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manufacturing and became a rich businessman, the quotations were important to 
negate the “cunning” characteristic of profit seeking in trade and industry that was 
despised by conservatives. Throughout his entire life, he took every opportunity to 
impress others with the image of Confucian followers. 
However, Confucianism is more appropriately explained as his values and 
outlook on the world and life. It seems that he was not a hypocritical Confucian 
follower. The values and outlook that he was inculcated in when he was young and 
that he taught when he was a teacher were impossible to be discarded. He even 
tried to teach Confucian values to the silkworm raisers through his sericulture 
manuals. He believed those teachings could create reciprocal benefit between the 
natural environment and the people, and among the people by regulating people’s 
behavior. He felt comfortable in following Confucian teachings and in modeling his 
life in the image of a Confucian follower. In his last years, his interest turned to 
neo-Confucianism, and he was industrious in exploring it, according to one 
biography.61  
His Confucian beliefs and his nationalism convinced Chen to share his profitable 
technology with the whole society. Personal achievement was not the end of one’s 
Confucian cultivation, but the beginning of a route to manage state affairs and to 
govern the world well. As Chen says, “My enterprise started in supporting myself, 
and then allowed me to support the others.” “I dare not monopolize the profit from 
                                                             




Chen composed sericultural manuals, the Binong zuiyao (Essential principles for 
benefiting agriculture) and the Quansangshuo, to spread his knowledge on mulberry 
cultivation, silkworm egg card production and preparation, and silkworm rearing. In 
the preface of the Binong zuiyao, Chen’s friend explained Chen’s purpose in writing 
this book in detail,  
“In the past ten years or more, Chen put away his writing brush and ink slab, 
and dedicated himself to sericulture. His profit is fairly good and his family 
has achieved well-being. Fellow villagers admire his success and know that he 
is not a reckless person. They often consult him about sericulture. Chen is 
always patient in explaining, and gradually plans to publicize his knowledge. … 
Chen considers the hardship of people, and wants to broadcast the benefit of 
sericulture. Afraid of not reaching every household, he has to write it 
down.”63  
In the Quansangshuo, Chen further articulated his wishes,  
“I hope for the relatives, friends, and people in nearby counties who have 
learned my skill to spread the skill to all people in Sichuan.” 
“Now China is poor and the people are in hardship. Everyone wants 
improvement. If the government promotes sericulture from above, and the 
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local leaders support it from below, fathers persuade sons, elder bothers 
encourage younger brothers, and people follow policies, achievements will be 
made with small effort. We can expect prosperity soon.”64 
These works were printed in substantial quantities and circulated throughout 
the whole province. The Yilong county government distributed copies of the Binong 
zuiyao to its sericultural districts as a guidebook in 1904. 65  Mianzhu county 
circulated the Quansangshuo to all administrative levels in the county in 1918.66 The 
provincial governors and officials all encouraged other counties and prefectures to 
follow Chen’s example in promoting sericulture and developing the silk industry.67  
Other than composing manuals to spread sericulture indirectly, he taught 
sericulture technology by example. Chen’s success set up a model of gaining wealth 
from sericulture in Santai. Sericulture became a popular practice for both the poor 
and the rich classes in the region at the turn of the twentieth century, when it had 
earlier been an occupation for the poor peasants in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Chen taught and encouraged his relatives, friends, neighbors, and others to engage in 
mulberry cultivation. In some cases, he even provided financial aid or technical 
instruction to those who wanted to participate in sericulture.68  
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In the 1900s, following Chen’s leadership, the county became famous for its 
sericulture and related businesses. The local gazetteer said that “Ever since Chen 
Wanxi composed the Binong zuiyao and reformed sericulture in our county, the silk 
industry is more and more prosperous. The families of long-standing fame and clans 
of large wealth may not farm, but it is rare that they are not engaged in silkworm 
rearing.”69 Nearby regions purchased mulberry seeds and mulberry saplings from 
Santai when the provincial and local government carried out sericulture promotion 
programs during the late Qing reforms. Chen proudly and exaggeratedly described 
the situation at that time, “in the two rivers of Santai, fishes are intoxicated by the 
pulp of the mulberry fruits, and boats are filled with mulberry seedlings.”70 It is no 
wonder that the Santai gazetteer categorized him within the group of individuals who 
were benevolent to the society.71 Chen also introduced the practice of intercropping 
mulberries and foodstuff crops into his region. A report in the 1930s notes that 
investigators occasionally witnessed the intercropping of mulberries and foodstuff 
crops in Santai while peasants in nearly all other sericulture regions in Sichuan only 
cultivated mulberries on waste land or yard corners. 
Chen encouraged mulberry cultivation and silkworm rearing partly for the sake 
of getting better and cheaper cocoons for his silk reeling business. However, his 
direct participation in the technological diffusion of silk reeling demonstrates that he 
voluntarily shared the gains with the whole society. His activity was very much unlike 
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the silk entrepreneurs in Europe. In fourteenth century Italy, towns and guilds kept 
silk technology a top secret for their own benefit.72 Similarly, improvements or 
innovations in silk making were concealed by the factories in the nineteenth century 
Britain.73  
Chen did not keep the technologies for the sole benefit of his own family or 
county, but enthusiastically spread these across the entire province. He first 
introduced the non-re-reeling small frame, and later, the re-reeling small frame. The 
latter one had a re-reeling procedure to finish silk reeled off the cocoons, and hence 
could yield better silk than the former one. Although these devices were still 
human-operated and labor-intensive, the quality of raw silk was increased 
significantly. Fine and even raw silk from the improved reeling frames replaced the 
traditional coarse silk reeled in Santai.74  
Chen was willing to share the improved reeling technology with people beyond 
his region too. He trained technicians in factory management and the use of reeling 
technology. The Intendant for the Encouragement of Enterprise granted technicians 
trained in Chen’s filature the same status as the graduates of the provincial 
sericulture promotion center. These technicians possessed good reputations and 
were often hired by new factories with high salaries. They helped set up and manage 
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quite a few reeling factories in Sichuan, such as in Qianwei, Baoning, and Mianyang. 
Besides providing technicians and managers, Chen was personally involved in the 
establishment of reeling factories in other Sichuan regions, by purchasing machines, 
selling goods, and even collecting capital.75  
Binong zuiyao: technology and morality  
Chen Wanxi composed the Binong zuiyao in 1897, two decades after he 
dedicated himself to the advancement of sericulture. This is the first and the most 
influential sericultural manual that he composed in his life. It was popularly 
circulated in the province in the early twentieth century. It was also one of the most 
influential sericulture manuals in modern Sichuan. Its importance in the history of 
sericulture is underlined by its reprint by the renowned leading Chinese publisher 
Zhonghua shuju in 1956.  
It is notable that the manual was not a result of absorbing foreign scientific 
knowledge, but based on empirical experience, traditional skills, and ancient 
agriculture books. During his early years as a mulberry plantation owner, Chen read 
two books carefully and thoroughly, the Nongsang jiyao (Essentials of agriculture and 
sericulture) published by the Yuan government and the Sannongji (Records of three 
aspects of agriculture) authored by a Sichuan native in the 1760.76 The techniques of 
Chinese sericulture lasted several thousand years and experienced few significant 
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improvements since their shaping in the Song. The Nongsang jiyao was officially 
published in 1286. The Sannongji was written about one hundred years before Chen 
was born. These works are based on indigenous knowledge that was popularly 
practiced in China but also had many weaknesses, particularly in understanding, 
preventing and curing diseases.   
What Chen had done was to test the effectiveness of these traditional 
techniques through his own practice. Historically, the Chinese educated elites and 
government officials composed sericulture manuals, but hardly any writer verified 
the reliability of the techniques that were recorded. Chen’s manual was therefore 
distinctive despite primarily following the traditional techniques.  
“I do not include some ancient methods of grafting mulberry and rearing 
silkworm, because I tried all of them and my experiments did not prove that 
some of them are effective. But I am not sure whether it is because it is not 
suitable for the region or because I did not have it done rightly.”   
“The clumsy village women … either followed older generations, or learned 
from hearsay. These are all ancient ways. … I tried these and proved them 
effective. Therefore I dare to publish them.”77  
The most remarkable new method that Chen contributed is probably the cliff 
cave for storing mulberry leaves. The best leaves for feeding silkworms should be 
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fresh and clean. Leaves should be neither too dry nor too damp. High temperature 
can easily dry up the juice, or ferment the leaves. In the silkworm season, the early 
summer, it is hot and rain comes unpredictably. The storage of leaves was 
traditionally problematic and troublesome. Chen found out that putting leaves in cliff 
caves could preserve their freshness longer because the temperature inside the cave 
is lower than that in the house or in the hovel below trees.78 In my interview with 
the director of the Sichuan Provincial Silkworm Breeding Station in Suqi, Leshan, the 
director showed me the silkworm rearing buildings. These buildings have 
semi-basements, which were used to keep mulberry leaves because its coolness was 
ideal for keeping the leaves fresh. The cliff cave actually served the same function as 
the semi-basements in the modern buildings.79  
There were more inventions. For example, Chen creatively used machine-woven 
fine textile to make silkworm egg cards. According to him, this was better than 
traditionally used thick paper. In pest control, his advice reveals the wisdom of taking 
advantages of local conditions. Smoking tobacco pipe was a popular practice in the 
villages in Sichuan. For controlling mulberry longicorn, he suggests a convenient and 
cheap method of injecting oil that remained in tobacco pipe into the hole drilled by 
longicorn. His suggestion proved effective.80   
Despites some innovations and his ceaseless experimentation on the 
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effectiveness of traditional knowledge, Chen at the most presented an understanding 
of sericulture based on empirical practice. He could not explain the reasons and the 
phenomena in measurable and testable scientific ways. For example, Chen doubted 
the usefulness of washing silkworm egg cards with salty water. He experimented and 
proved that silkworm eggs could survive salty water washing. However, he gave a 
wrong explanation for it. He thought that the nature of silkworms belonged to “fire”. 
Accordingly, he thought salty water could neutralize its nature, and calmed down its 
temper.81 Although he pointed out that egg washing could kill weak eggs, his basic 
principle was faulty. He did not notice that the egg washing has side-effects. Salty 
water had little effect on disinfection, much less than limewater, another traditional 
egg washing material. But both adversely affected the embryogenesis of eggs.82 
Chen’s explanation of many silkworm diseases was empirical but lacked proper 
theories. Before reading the following quotes, one needs bear in mind that the West 
had made significant contribution to identifying and preventing silkworm diseases in 
by the time. For instance, Louis Pasteur by the end of the 1860s had found the cause 
of the pebrine disease and invented a method of controlling it, the worst disease that 
had nearly wiped out sericulture in France. 
“[Silkworm] likes cleanness and hates dirt. Once they sense the foul, silkworm 
shrinks. And the fine silkworm of deep green and white colors changes into 
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yellow and stopped eating immediately. After three days, it dies. … [It] likes 
dry and hates dampness. If it is too damp, the silkworm gets white mold. [It] 
likes yang and hates yin. If it was hurt by yin, it often catches white 
muscardine. In the sunny and warm day, windows ought to be opened to 
facilitate the aeration of yang. [It] likes ventilation but not being blown by 
direct wind. …If the window is facing the wind, the silkworm will catch colds. 
Those who get a cold will extend their bodies but will not eat. And the door to 
the silkworm rearing room should not be opened rapidly. Wind that blows on 
the silkworm all of a sudden is called cunning wind. It makes the silkworm 
catch red muscardine easily.” 
“Obscene words and scatological languages are not allowed. Strangers and 
people in mourning are forbidden from entering the rearing room. If a 
stranger enters the silkworm rearing room or calls outside the door, the 
silkworm becomes sick immediately. It either moves around on the mat, or 
stops eating. If people in mourning enter the room, the silkworm often dies of 
sudden illness.” 
“Fog is poisonous. If the silkworm eats leaves picked in fog before the Big 
Sleep, it will become the white-stomach silkworm when it is old. White body 
fluid oozes out from its stomach. If a fine silkworm is contaminated by the 
fluid, it also dies. If it is foggy, the door to the silkworm rearing room should 
be closed. … If the silkworm eats leaves that have been stored too long before 
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the Big Sleep, it also catches the disease of white-stomach.”83 
Modern scientific research has proven that these factors and conditions 
outlined by Chen were not the triggers of silkworm diseases. The white muscardine 
disease is not the result of unsuitable yin and red muscardine disease is not acquired 
from the silkworm being chilled by the wind. Instead, they both result from fungal 
infection. 
Furthermore, that insulting words, strangers, and people in mourning can cause 
the diseases and even death seems irrational. These ideas were based on the 
popular belief that silkworm liked cleanliness in their physical environment – where 
they lived, the food they ate and – their spiritual condition, which must remain 
unsullied. Insulting words were dirty. People in mourning had contact with death. 
And strangers were dangerous. All of these posed threats to the spiritual condition, 
according to popular beliefs then.  
In talking about feeding silkworm with good leaves, Chen was right. However, 
the cause of disease with the symptom of a white stomach is not related to the 
leaves picked in the fog, or the “fog leaves” as they were called. Fog is not harmful, 
nor fatal to silkworm. The so-called “white stomach” disease is passed on by eating 
leaves contaminated by viruses such as Bombyx mori cytoplasmic polyhedrosis virus 
(BmCPV) and Bombyx mori nucleopolyhedrovirus (BmNPY). Neither do long-stored 
leaves cause “white stomach”. Long-storage of leaves increased the risk of 
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contamination by viruses. Fresh leaves contain higher nutrition than long-stored 
leaves, but the stale leaves themselves were not the reason of disease.  
All in all, there was no distinctive fundamental difference between the Binong 
zuiyao and other Chinese sericulture manuals. The Binong zuiyao merely accepted 
the traditional Chinese sericulture techniques and tested them in the local 
environment. On the one hand, it retained sophisticated skill and knowledge based 
on thousands of years of practice in China. On the other hand, it provided neither 
scientific explanations for the practices nor revolutionary methods. About ten years 
later, when Chen became the owner of two large steam filatures in Sichuan, he 
composed the Quansangshuo to encourage mulberry cultivation in Sichuan. However, 
like the Binong zuiyao, it still shows little influence from foreign scientific 
achievements. 
In addition to following and developing traditional sericultural technologies in 
mulberry cultivation and silkworm rearing, Chen also deliberately included Chinese 
moral teachings as an essential part of his sericulture skill repertoire. He actively 
broadcasted these moral teachings to the masses. These teachings are filled with a 
strong sense of the principles of reward and retribution.  
At first glance, the idea of virtue and evil presented by Chen Wanxi was not a 
result of Confucianism, but a reflection of Buddhism or popular folk beliefs. Killing life 
is unbearable. Those who done evil will be punished, and those who done good will 
be rewarded. This is normally explained with the theory of Karma. In Chinese folk 
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beliefs that were influenced by Buddhism, inappropriate killing could bring 
punishment too. Buddhism and Buddhism-infused folk beliefs probably influenced 
Chen’s perspectives.  
However, the close examination of the text reveals also a strong Confucian 
influence. First of all, retribution comes when people are not considerate to others. 
Confucius encourages consideration. A man should be sensitive to others’ feeling and 
not apply what he does not like to others. Chen elaborated it with the case of 
practicing sericulture. According to him, peasants engaging in sericulture should love 
others’ mulberry trees as their own. Vandalism of others’ trees is tantamount to 
vandalizing the vandal’s own heart. Once the heart is vandalized, his life and property 
are in jeopardy. Stolen leaves are dirty and silkworm fed by stolen leaves will not be 
successful. Foul leaves cause sickness of silkworms and should not be sold to others. 
“Think about integrity when facing personal gains. If one does not practice 
consideration for others, he is behaving unjustly, which surely brings punishment 
from the heaven.”84  
Second, Chen recommended silkworm raisers to pray to sericulture deities 
reverently, though he did not believe in divination. Divinations will not come true, 
but devotion reflects dedication and virtue. In praying and making offerings, one 
often makes promises to be righteous. Any violation of the promises can bring 
misfortune or punishment. In the sericulture society organized and led by Chen, 
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everyone had to pray on the birthday of the silkworm god, on the twelfth days of the 
last lunar month.85 Rather than the plain prayers of commoners and peasants who 
simply prayed for good harvests, in the philosophy of Chen Wanxi, praying to 
sericulture gods conveyed a more important message – a promise of self-discipline. 
“Anyone who is greedy for, and monopolizes, profit is against Heaven.”86 
Third, in Chen’s opinion, a silkworm has a life like a human being. The silkworm’s 
life cycle is like that of human being. He analogized the cocooned silkworm as a 
Confucian immaculate man who died but left merits and accomplishment. In contrast, 
the silkworm that did not cocoon was like petty man who ate but did not contribute 
to the world.87 One should not kill silkworms, even those sick ones. The killing of 
silkworms would lead to punishment. He illustrated a case in 1893. When leaves 
were expensive a villager discarded all his silkworms into his stove, and subsequently 
this person’s house burnt down several days later.88 His sericulture society strictly 
forbade any killing of silkworms.89  
Unlike Buddhism, Confucianism does not entirely oppose killing. Confucianism 
holds the idea that, on the one hand, one should not fear death, and on the other, 
one should also have affectionate love for life, and any easy rejection of life is 
unforgivable. This affection extends not only to human life, but also to other living 
                                                             
85 Yin Liangying, Sichuan canye gaijinshi, p. 22.  
86 Chen Kaizhi, Binong zuiyao, p. 3. 
87 Ibid., p. 4.  
88 Ibid., pp. 40-41.  
89 Yin Liangying, Sichuan canye gaijinshi, p. 23.  
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creatures. What it is against is the inappropriate time of killing. The Sayings of 
Confucius records a story about Gao Chai who did not kill during inappropriate times, 
and comments, “Do not kill the insects just waking up from winter sleep. This is to 
follow the way (dao) of human being. Do not nip grass and trees that had just 
budded. This is called benevolence.”90 It was the Buddhism that introduced the idea 
that all killing is not allowed and will result in punishment. Research has revealed 
that this Buddhist attitude had reverted to the previous set of beliefs by the time of 
the Ming and Qing dynasties.91 Instead, it is untimely killing and inappropriate killing 
that brings punishment. At the same time, Chinese society highly appreciated the 
well-being of cattle and silkworms because they are both beneficial to human beings. 
The case of burning silkworms that Chen Wanxi illustrated was an example of 
inappropriate killing. Cocooning was the end of silkworm’s life cycle. Killing them 
before they cocoon was an unbearable sin which incurred punishment. What Chen 
preached was not the Buddhist principle of Karma, but the Confucian love of life and 
appreciation of death.  
These illustrations and teachings reflect Confucian morality. Unlike the rural 
small peasants who believed in sericulture deities for protection and defense from 
misfortune, Chen believed that men were required by divine authority to practice 
self-discipline in order to create perfect Confucian men and maintain communal 
welfare. These moral teachings encouraged people to be reverent to gods, controlled 
                                                             
90 Kongzi jiayu (The school sayings of Confucius), dizixing, chapter 12.  
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personal activities, expressed positive expectations, promised a bright future, and 
explained unwanted results.  
Nevertheless, this kind of moral teaching was not a driver of technological 
improvement, but a handicap.92 There was no effective defense or active response 
in the advent of natural disasters. There was no means of preventing and curing 
diseases. God and heaven were the only protection. Sincere prayers and good 
behavior were the sole way. The devotion and adherence to the idea of the judgment 
of virtue and evil was therefore a factor in preventing the modern development of 
sericulture.  
Conclusion  
The literate well-to-do elites who had economic, political, and cultural influence 
at the local society actively participated in sericulture reform in Sichuan during the 
closing years of the Qing dynasty. They were frustrated with the economic and 
political situation of China and Sichuan in the nineteenth century. Some 
revolutionaries sought both economic and political reforms. More considered that 
the political failure was the result of economic deficiencies that ought to be 
improved. They started large scale mulberry plantations in the countryside, 
conducted and propagated technological improvements in silk reeling. They invested 
in steam filatures and successfully entered the international filature silk market. 
Through training programs and teaching by example, these wealthy participants 
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shared sericulture technologies with the broader society. For these private 
participants, the indigenous and foreign technologies were not necessarily 
distinguished from each other. They innovated, promoted, and practiced the 
techniques they considered the most suitable to the present social, economic, 
cultural, and technological conditions.  
Chen Wanxi was one of the pioneers in utilizing the principles of the economies 
of scale in sericulture and the most successful filature entrepreneur in Sichuan. He 
probably reminds readers of Zhang Jian, one of the most extensively studied Chinese 
entrepreneurs in modern China.93 In fact, he represented many contemporaneous 
educated elites who participated in economic enterprises. He was influenced by 
Confucian values and traditional sericulture technologies, but did not reject modern 
technology. He was interested in both educational and economic enterprise. As a 
member of the literate elite who was engaged in sericulture without previous skills, 
he did not extract skills and knowledge from rural producers. On the contrary, he 
actively participated in diffusing skills to rural producers.  
Despite their devotion to improving and sharing technology in the society, these 
private efforts were generally weak. Chen’s sericulture manuals were filled with 
moral teaching, and lacked effective means of controlling disease, the largest threat 
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to rural cocoon production. The sericulture societies that taught foreign knowledge, 
however, were not better than Chen in spreading improved sericulture, in terms of 
scale and influence. More importantly, there was no means of relieving producers 
from silkworm diseases, the major factor that caused loss in cocoon production. 
Individual private promoters were incapable of leading major change in the 
productivity of cocoon output. As private promoters, they had neither sufficient 
knowledge nor firm strength to fight against the shortcomings of sericulture and silk 
industry in Sichuan.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Prosperous Business and Limited Technological Development in the Age of 
Warlordism, 1910s – 1931 
The reform efforts to rescue the waning dynasty brought about radical effects 
that precipitated the 1911 Revolution and contributed to the dynasty’s sudden 
collapse. Sichuan was politically detached from central government control soon 
after the founding of the Republic of China, and was not reintegrated into Chinese 
national politics until 1935. During this interim period, this province was engulfed by 
rampant wars among various warlords.  
The wars endowed upon Sichuan an image of political chaos and economic 
backwardness. Journalist John Gunther commented in 1942, “For years it was the 
most backward province of China proper”.1 S. A. M. Adshead argues that, after 1911, 
Sichuan “became the worst province of a half-modern republic”.2 David Bonavia, 
similarly, views Sichuan as being plagued by “considerable disorder” and “economic 
depression” brought by the civil wars that erupted after the death of Yuan Shikai in 
1916.3 In their research on Sichuan warlords, Kuang Shanyi and Yang Guangyan 
claim that the heavy taxes the warlords imposed on trade and various commodities 
                                                             
1 John Gunther, Inside Asia (New York, London: Harper & Brothers: 1942), p. 202.  
2 S. A. M. Adshead, Province and Politics in Late Imperial China, p. 2. 
3 David Bonavia, China’s Warlords (Hongkong: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 
145-149.  
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caused the decline of industry and commerce, especially the silk industry.4  
However, historical records demonstrate that there was in reality growth in the 
levels of industry and commerce during the 1910s and 1920s. The silk industry, for 
example, presents a remarkable case that refutes the commonly-accepted claim that 
warlordism gravely obstructed industrial and economic growth in Sichuan. In terms 
of the output of cocoons and raw silk, the silk industry experienced unprecedented 
prosperity during this period. The data raises questions about whether the political 
situation had damaged and inhibited the development of industry and economy as 
heavily as many researchers have assumed.  
Against a background of political disintegration among national, provincial, and 
local levels, local elites, military authorities, and Japanese investors affected 
sericulture in different ways. While the military authorities hardly helped to develop 
sericulture in Sichuan, they did not impose extremely heavy taxation on sericultural 
products. The military competition among warlords and the absence of centralized 
economic management left the task of technological development in the hands of 
the local luminaries. The local elites continued to introduce techniques and 
technologies, albeit with limited influence on the local community. In contrast to the 
rather obsolete technologies that local elites spread, subsequent Japanese influence 
exerted a more significant impact on the diffusion of advanced technology in raw silk 
                                                             
4 Kuang Shanji and Yang Guangyan, eds., Sichuan junfashi (History of warlords in 
Sichuan) (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1991), p. 396. For similar argument, 
also see Sichuan jianshi bianxiezu, ed., Sichuan jianshi, pp. 259-262. 
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reeling.  
Sichuan during the Republic 
The railway crises triggered the collapse of the Manchu regime. Private 
merchant management or governmental control over railways was the central issue. 
The railway-rights recovery activists strongly opposed foreign involvement in the 
railways but the government was financially needy and had to rely on tax surcharges 
and foreign loans. The Zhejiang-Jiangsu, Guangdong-Hunan-Hubei, and Sichuan 
railway recovery episodes were the largest and most influential among the 
railway-rights recovery movement. The Sichuan Railway Company was established in 
1904. The government initiated a “rental share” system that levied 3 percent 
surcharge on rental income to finance the company. It was reorganized as a 
privately-managed company in 1907, but the company was rife with internal strife, 
inefficiency, and corruption. The corruption and financial failure caused by illegal 
investment led to the government’s decision to nationalize the railway in Sichuan in 
1911, and this was yet again financed through acquiring loans from the Western 
countries. These decisions roused patriotic sentiments, as well as acrimony over the 
unsatisfactory compensation of previous share-holders.5 Demonstrations and strikes 
soon erupted, and escalated in the following months into armed violence throughout 
the province. The Qing court had to send troops in Hubei to suppress the 
                                                             
5 Mary Backus Rankin, “Nationalistic Contestation and Mobilization Politics: Practice 
and Rhetoric of Railway-Rights Recovery at the End of the Qing”, Modern China, 28, 3 
(July, 2002), pp. 317, 323 -324.  
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railway-rights recovery movement in Sichuan. Consequently, the army mutinied in 
Wuchang, Hubei, in October 1911, which led to the end of the imperial political 
system in China.  
Sichuan province renounced Manchu government control in November 1911. A 
new provincial government called the Great Han Sichuan Military Government 
(Dahan Sichuan junzhengfu) was organized under Pu Dianjun, the renowned leader 
of the railway-rights recovery movement in Sichuan. This newly established 
government had neither the military power to control the troops from various 
backgrounds nor the political ability to appease political dissidents, and collapsed in 
less than a fortnight. The failure of the provincial government suggests that Sichuan 
had fallen into a state of disintegration beyond the control of any local authority.  
Sichuan was a perfect base for the warlords. After Yuan Shikai’s demise in 1916, 
there was no central government that could reconstruct a political structure that was 
able to supervise all the regions in China. Sichuan was geographically distant from 
the reach of the central power, which made control and penetration from outside 
difficult. Economically, the province was abundant in natural resources, and 
possessed the capacity to support independent political entities. Furthermore, the 
large rural population presented a ready supply of manpower for military operations.  
Sichuan after the 1911 Revolution was dominated by militarists and wars. James 
E. Sheridan counted 477 wars in Sichuan between 1912 and 1935.6 With the 
                                                             
6 James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration, the Republican Era in Chinese History, 
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exception of the first years of the Republic when Yuan Shikai was in power, Sichuan 
was engulfed by fierce wars in the 1910s. The 1920s however, saw relative peace, 
according to Robert A. Kapp, due to the shaping of the garrison system, which 
successfully restored the political equilibrium within Sichuan.7 The warlords started 
the garrison system in 1918. Garrison areas varied over time depending on the 
territories controlled by the warlords but they remained relatively stable between 
the mid-1920s and 1930. The garrison areas were almost autonomous kingdoms, in 
which the military authorities monopolized power over both civil and military affairs. 
Military rivalries created economic difficulties in Sichuan. Wars frequently 
destroyed crops in the countryside, and inhibited regular business in the towns. 
Afraid of being conscripted, peasants often abandoned their lands and went into 
hiding. 8  Irrigation systems fell out of maintenance. The ability of the rural 
communities to defend themselves from natural disasters declined. Warlords printed 
money excessively within their garrison areas, which caused the inconsistency of the 
currency system and inflation.  
Among all the negative impacts of warlordism on the economy, tax exploitation 
was the most condemned. Unlike the Manchu government that spent a great 
amount of tax revenue on reform projects that could be of benefit to the society, the 
military regimes relied on taxation to maintain armies, support war expenditure, and 
                                                                                                                                                                              
1912 – 1949 (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 199.  
7 Robert A. Kapp, Szechwan and the Chinese Republic: Provincial Militarism and 
Central Power, 1911-1938 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973). 
8 Peng Tonghu, Sichuan jindai jingjishi, pp. 223-227.  
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accumulate personal wealth, rather than attempt economic and social reconstruction. 
From 1912 to 1930, land tax increased nearly 38 times. 9  In some cases the 
government collected land taxes for decades in advance.10 In addition, various 
categories of fees were extracted, such as opium-prohibition fees, surcharges on the 
land tax, commodity taxes on land deeds, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco, salt tax, 
miscellaneous levies, etc.11 Jacob Eyferth records a local joke expressing resentment 
towards the taxation - “since ancient times there’s never been a toilet fee, but 
nowadays only a fart is free.”12  
Despite the economic difficulties and political turmoil, there were also physical 
developments in the province. For example, by 1935, modern roads had connected 
Chengdu with several major regional commercial centers. The first railway was 
constructed in 1931.13 Telephone communication had reached many rural villages by 
the early 1930s.14 The first province-financed university, the University of Chengdu, 
                                                             
9 John Lossing Buck, Land Utilization in China, p. 330.  
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was established in 1925. The urban landscape was transformed by the introduction 
of modern public parks and infrastructure. Modern industries and transportation 
facilities continued to develop during the era. The most famous and successful of 
these was the Minsheng Shipping Company. It successfully conducted and dominated 
steam shipping in the upper Yangzi River.15 Sichuan at the time was not in a 
completely dark age of cultural decline, social collapse, and economic bankruptcy.  
The Prosperous Silk Business 
Like other economic sectors, sericulture expanded in the age of warlordism in 
the 1910s and 1920s. The output of both cocoons and raw silk significantly increased 
from the late Qing onwards. The production of Sichuan cocoons was estimated to 
have reached the levels of 205,800 piculs in 1880, 640,000 in 1915-1917, 600,000 in 
1925, and 468,000 in 1926.16 Cocoon output had increased at least twice from the 
late nineteenth century to the mid-1920s. In terms of growth rate, Sichuan’s was the 
highest among all the provinces.  
TABLE 2  Estimates of annual output of cocoons by provinces (in piculs)17 
 1880 1915 – 1917 1925 1926 
                                                             
15 Robert A. Kapp, “Chungking as a Center of Warlord Power, 1926 – 1937”, p. 151.  
16 Lillian M. Li, China’s Silk Trade, p. 98. These data are extracted from various 
sources. Estimates of Chinese cocoon output have long been recognized as 
inaccurate because of the nature of Chinese sericulture. However, these data are the 
most reliable ones that researchers can acquire nowadays. According to different 
source materials, the cocoon yields were significantly different in 1925 and 1926. But 
according to the custom statistics, the export of Sichuan raw silk in 1926 was much 
more than 1925, and two times of that in the 1910s.  
17 Lillian M. Li, China’s Silk Trade, p. 98.  
 153
Zhejiang 825,500 876,766 1,000,000 1,140,000 
Jiangsu 275,200 266,745 350,000 545,000 
Guangdong 576,100 768,300 1,000,000 1,057,400 
Sichuan 205,800 640,000 600,000 468,000 
Hubei 79,100 100,000 100,000 122,900 
Henan 100,800 — 100,000 42,900 
Many counties recorded the prosperity of sericulture during these years, as 
revealed by increased cocoon prices and booming demand. In Cangxi, the price of a 
local measure of fresh cocoons increased from 30 to 40 cents in 1912 to 60 to 70 
cents in the 1920s. In 1925, the price reached even as high as 80 to 90 cents.18 The 
output of cocoons in Jingyan increased from about 150,000 catties at the beginning 
of the Republic to over 800,000 catties after 1921.19 The output of raw silk doubled 
from 1,129 piculs in 1927 to 2,562 piculs in Nanchong in 1930.20 In Suining, output 
of raw silk in the late 1920s was about 10 times more than that in the 1900s, while 
the price increased six to seven fold.21 Santai experienced its most prosperous years 
of sericulture between 1927 and 1930.22  
International demand that had been growing since the second half of the 
                                                             
18 Li Shuqian, ed., Cangxi cansizhi (History of sericulture in Cangxi county) (Chengdu: 
Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1996), p. 126.  
19 Jingyanxian zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui, ed., Jingyan cansi yitiaolong, p. 8.  
20 Yin Liangying, Sichuan canye gaijinshi, p. 325.  
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22 Xiao Juefei, “Santai cansiye gaikuang” (General description of sericulture in Santai), 
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 154
nineteenth century was the major stimulus of the increased output. The total 
amount of raw silk exported from Sichuan increased from 7,762 piculs in 1912 to 
16,571 in 1930, and reached 23,364 in 1918.23 These figures did not include the 
large quantities of non-filature silk that were exported to India and Burma through 
Kunming. Growing exports of raw silk brought huge revenue for Sichuan, as well as 
China. The value of exported Sichuan raw silk always constituted over 20 percent of 
the total value of exported Chinese raw silk. In quite a few years, Sichuan’s share 
climbed to over 30 or even as high as 40 percent. The data reveals a prosperous 
sericulture industry during the first two decades of Republican Sichuan (see Table 3).  
TABLE 3  Percentage of value of exported Sichuan raw silk within total export of 
Chinese raw silk 24  
Year Value of exported Sichuan 
Raw Silk ($/Chinese dollars) 
Value of total exported Chinese 
Raw Silk ($/Chinese dollars) 
Percentage 
1912 6,163,000 17,259,000 35.7 
1913 5,263,000 18,903,000 27.8 
1914 6,964,000 21,592,000 32.2 
1915 6,386,000 25,765,000 24.8 
1916 7,693,000 27,737,000 27.7 
1917 8,497,097 25,420,562 33.4 
1918 8,920,667 27,324,100 32.6 
                                                             
23 Jiang qingxiang and Li shouyao, eds. Sichuan cansiye, pp. 14-16.  
24 Ibid., pp. 17-19. 
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1919 6,872,279 30,825,975 22.3 
1920 5,197,742 21,825,787 23.7 
1921 13,041,089 33,725,513 32.7 
1922 10,633,747 43,042,487 24.7 
1923 16,472,985 50,997,394 32.3 
1924 11,644,330 53,519,313 21.7 
1925 11,141,004 51,015,085 21.8 
1926 16,356,259 40,231,072 40.7 
1927 11,875,427 51,782,303 22.9 
1928 13,308,381 57,617,459 23.1 
1929 17,801,175 69,067,645 25.8 
1930 19,480,483 72,142,430 27.0 
1931 14,181,499 56,673,105 25.0 
In the mid-1930s, the provincial government reviewed the state of sericulture in 
previous years, and concluded that “in the past decades, Sichuan raw silk’s export 
was very prosperous.” This prosperity was not impeded by the uncertain domestic 
politics and instead, was encouraged by international demand. For example, in 1923, 
the government concluded that “although the domestic situation was in disorder,” 
business was “very stable.”25 Furthermore, an earthquake in Yokohama, Japan, 
destroyed 40,000 bales of Japanese silk, and greatly increased Western demand for 
                                                             
25 Jiang changxu, ed. Sichuansheng zhi zhuyao wuchan (Major products of Sichuan 
province) (Chongqing: Chongqing minsheng shiye gongsi jingji yanjiushi, 1936), p. 15.  
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Chinese raw silk.26 The best Sichuan filature silk was sold for as high as 1,700 taels 
per picul in the Shanghai market that year.27 Similarly, even though the local 
situation in Sichuan was disturbed by the warlords in 1924 and 1925, the profit from 
raw silk remained high due to the bullish international and domestic markets.28  
Among the categories of export raw silk, filature silk saw the most significant 
increase in output and exports. In 1912, only 1,247 piculs of filature silk were 
exported through Chongqing customs. The amount increased to 2,021 in 1914. In 
1919, 3,177 piculs of filature silk were exported through Chongqing and Wanxian 
customs. After the 1920s, the rise of Japanese style filatures further increased the 
output of filature silk to about 6,500 piculs.29 However, the increased yield of filature 
silk was still overshadowed by the even greater amount of non-filature silk produced 
in Sichuan. The reasons will be examined in the following chapter. 
It is also notable that the increased export of raw silk did not ensue at the 
expense of domestic consumption. The exported silk formed only about 30 percent 
of the total output in Sichuan.30 Even as the export of silk overseas boomed, the 
local silk weaving industry was also thriving. There were about 400 weaving 
workshops with over 11,000 looms staffed by 40,000 to 50,000 workers in Chengdu. 
                                                             
26 China Maritime Customs, Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1923 (Shanghai: 
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The annual output was about 550,000 bolts of a variety of ranges of silk pieces.31 In 
Leshan in the 1920s, the output of silk pieces was about 100,000 bolts. 32 
Furthermore, other finished silk goods such as silk ribbons, khatags, and silk thread, 
consumed large amounts of raw silk within the province.  
Taxation of Sericulture 
This section examines the impact of taxation on sericulture in Sichuan. The level 
of taxation levied could facilitate or obstruct the development of technology. From 
the second half of the eighteenth century, for instance, the Spanish kings carried out 
substantial taxation reforms on textile production, in the hope of developing the 
textile industry in Spain. However, the central Spanish regions did not take advantage 
of the tax relief, in contrast to the development of textile industries in the littoral 
regions that enjoyed the light taxes. 33  In Sichuan, local military governments 
implemented taxation policies that did not favor the producers. On the contrary, 
many contemporary accounts and secondary works criticize taxation as having been 
the most destructive factor on sericulture. Heavy taxation means reduced net profit 
for the participants of sericulture, and increased purchase prices for consumers. The 
government stripped off a significant portion of revenue from mulberry cultivators, 
silkworm raisers, and raw silk producers, and silk dealers. In 1925, the Chongqing Silk 
                                                             
31 Liu Shizeng, “Chengdushi zhi chouduan changjiye” (Weaving industry in Chengdu), 
Jianshe zhouxun 1, 5 (April 1937), p. 1.  
32 Yin Liangying, Sichuan canye gaijinshi, p. 371.  
33 James Clayburn La Force, The Development of the Spanish Textile Industry, 1750 – 
1800 (Berkeley, University of California Press), chapter 7.  
 158
Guild, for example, complained that the high taxation rates obstructed sericulture 
production and trade. Silk dealers lost money and stopped dealing in raw silk, which 
in turn led to economic hardship for petty sericulture farmers and workers.34 
However, was taxation as harmful as it was claimed to have been?  
Taxes were imposed on every stage of sericulture, from the sale of mulberry 
leaves, the sale and transportation of cocoons, to the transportation and export of 
raw silk. In the major sericulture regions, there were mulberry and Cudriania leaf 
markets. Trade on the staple food of silkworms was conducted in the brokerage 
houses in some regions, such as Meishan. The brokerage houses were subjected to 
brokerage tax.35 However, the trade of leaves through brokers was apparently not 
universal. In Santai, brokers were only involved in the purchase of mulberry leaves 
several months ahead of the silkworm season. In Nanchong, most of the trade on 
leaves was directly conducted between mulberry cultivators and silkworm raisers. A 
small fraction of the leaves that went to the market was subjected to a measurement 
tax in Nanchong. The rate was 10 percent.36 As most silkworm raisers depended 
primarily on their own leaves, and the trade on leaves often bypassed the market, 
leaves were relatively less liable to taxation than cocoons and silk, in spite of the high 
measurement tax rate. 
                                                             
34 “Chongqing siye gonghui kuaiyou daidian” (Telegraph from the Chongqing Silk 
Guild), Shuping zazhi, 7(June 1925).  
35 Huang Yunpeng, et al. Sichuan caizheng lu (Records of finance in Sichuan) (n.p.: 
1926), p. 279. 
36 Yin Liangying, Sichuan canye gaijinshi, pp. 332, 349.  
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All sericulture regions imposed taxation on the sale of cocoons and silk in 
Sichuan, but the total amount exacted should not be exaggerated. These taxes had 
various names and were collected through different means. In Santai, cocoons and 
silk were taxed several times by different governmental departments, to offset the 
expenditure on military affairs, education, municipal matters, and local militias.37 In 
Cangxi, the county bureau of industry charged every silk reeling frame 400 copper 
cashes (wen) as a cocoon measurement tax in 1918. In 1929, the chamber of 
commerce further imposed a tax of three wen for every 1,000 wen worth of cocoons 
sold.38 In 1919, the Meishan government imposed levies on leaves and cocoons to 
collect funds to send students to study at the provincial sericulture school.39 In some 
places, cocoon sellers were levied 2.5 percent of the selling price as a cocoon tax in 
1926.40 Despite the variety of levies, the total amount imposed was not as great as 
considered. For instance, the 400 wen of tax imposed on reeling frames in Cangxi 
was not high. In comparison, a picul of rice in Chengdu in July 1918 cost 40,400 
wen.41 In Leshan, the leading sericulture and commercial center and in southern 
Sichuan, the local gazetteer compiled in 1934 reveals that only 2,000 strings of 
copper cashes were collected annually as taxation on cocoons and raw silk. The same 
gazetteer estimated that about 1,000,000 catties of cocoons were produced in the 
                                                             
37 Santai xianzhi, 1931, juan 12.  
38 Li Shuqian ed., Cangxi cansizhi, p. 10.  
39 Huang Yunpeng, et al. Sichuan caizheng lu, p. 360.  
40 Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, p. 798.  
41 Chengdushi difangzhi bianzhuan weiyuanhui, ed., Chengdushi wujiazhi (Record of 
commodity price in Chengdu) (Chengdu: Sichuan cishu chubanshe, 1998), p. 67.  
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region. 42  
The transit taxes and commercial protection fees that individual military 
garrisons levied on goods passing through their regions were much heavier. As the 
silk reeling centers were usually cocoon producing centers and the non-mechanized 
workshops purchased cocoons from the local market, these were little affected by 
the transit tax on cocoons. Some filatures located in the sericulture centers, such as 
those in Leshan, had an abundant supply of local cocoons too. Only the filature in 
Chongqing had to purchase cocoons from distant sources and thus was heavily 
affected by the transit costs on cocoons. It is notable that there was not a single 
cocoon hong (jianhang) in Sichuan. The cocoon hongs were equipped with ovens 
used to dry cocoons, and sold the dried cocoons to the filatures and raw silk 
producers in the lower Yangzi.43 Most cocoons that Chongqing filatures used were 
from Langzhong, Nanchong, Bishan, and their nearby regions. The filatures in 
Chongqing had to dispatch staff to the cocoon producing areas to purchase and dry 
fresh cocoons for each year’s production needs. They set up cocoon purchasing 
stations (jianzhuang) during the cocoon seasons. Peasants and middlemen could sell 
cocoons at these stations, which often had cocoon drying equipment. After being 
dried, cocoons were shipped back to the factories in Chongqing. The transit taxes on 
dried cocoons ranged from 0.41 to 5.91 taels per picul, depending on the distance 
between the cocoon producing areas and Chongqing. The local military authorities 
                                                             
42 Minguo Leshan xianzhi, 1934, juans 4 and 7.  
43 Lillian M. Li, China’s Silk Trade, p. 29.  
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sometimes levied commercial protection fees on cocoon drying stations too. 
Although the protection fee in 1926 could be as high as 4.98 taels per picul of dried 
cocoons, it was not levied everywhere.44  
In comparison with the lower Yangzi regions, cocoons were taxed less in Sichuan, 
and correspondingly, the processing costs were reduced. On average, the total taxes 
on a picul of dried cocoons to be processed and shipped to Chongqing in the 
mid-1920s were 4.98 taels. According to the same investigator, one picul of dried 
cocoons was charged about $12.8 or 8.53 taels of taxes in Jiangsu, and about $13.6 
or 9.07 taels in Zhejiang at the time.45 If cocoons were shipped to Shanghai, the cost 
was even higher. For every measure of cocoons required to reel one picul of raw silk 
that was shipped to Shanghai, about 55.39 taels of transit tax in total were incurred, 
in sharp contrast to 22.41 taels in Sichuan.46 Therefore, in terms of tax costs on raw 
materials, filatures in Sichuan were actually less harassed by taxes than those in 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang.  
The raw silk incurred taxes when they were being transported. The majority of 
steam filatures were located in Chongqing, and nearby regions. These products 
entered the Shanghai international raw silk market through the Chongqing customs, 
and avoided the multiple transit taxes on transportation inside the province. From 
                                                             
44 Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, p. 795. 
45 Ibid., p. 215.  
46 Ibid., pp. 352-354; and Lillian M. Li, China’s Silk Trade, p. 167. It took about four to 
five piculs of dried cocoons to produce one picul of filature silk in Sichuan. Take the 
median, 4.5 piculs, and then the cocoon taxes for producing a picul of raw silk was 
estimated 22.41 taels in the mid-1920s. 
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the point where raw silk was shipped out from Chongqing to its arrival in Shanghai 
for sale, it cost about 48 taels. These included 3.00 taels for packing, 7.70 for export 
duty at Chongqing customs, 15.25 for shipping and insurance, 4.10 for coast trade 
duty and Shanghai landing expenses, 6.10 for warehouses and insurance, 3.20 for 
wharfage fees and the Huangpu River conservancy tax and other fees, and 8.70 for 
other business costs.47  
The second filature center of Sichuan was Leshan in southern Sichuan. Filature 
raw silk did not incur much transit taxes in Leshan, despite its distance to the treaty 
port of Chongqing. Raw silk producers adopted a postal system for the shipment of 
products. They sent out parcels of filature silk to Shanghai through the post office. 
Couriering valuable commodities through the post office offered greater security 
than normal transportations, and became popular in the 1920s.48 Every parcel of 
raw silk weighted 12.5 catties and cost $7 for postage and tax. It was convenient, safe, 
and cheap. One picul of raw silk fetched about $56 or 37.33 taels once it arrived in 
Shanghai.49  
Non-filature silk on the other hand was probably subjected to exploitative 
transit taxes by the garrisons, due to the distance between the producing areas and 
the markets. In 1925, the Chongqing Silk Guild complained that the transit taxes 
crippled raw silk transportation, 
                                                             
47 Ibid., p.840. 
48 China Maritime Customs, Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1923, p. 6.  
49 Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, pp. 838-839.  
 163
“Raw silk is critical to the retrieval of China’s rights and interests. The 
government had noticed this a long time ago, and enacted regulations to 
exempt fine raw silk from lijin levies. The government’s desire to promote 
sericulture has been widely known. However, in Sichuan in recent years, 
military incidents are numerous, and there are various forms of taxes and 
levies. The local garrisons have extorted taxes whenever cocoons are 
purchased. When silk is reeled and exported, many tax stations on the route 
impose other taxes under various names. It costs about more than $60 [about 
40 taels] to send a picul of raw silk out of the province. There are over 50 tax 
stations in total. As a result, silk dealers often lose money and cannot be 
engaged in economic activities. In consequence, the silk workers reeling silk, 
the women rearing silkworms, numbering millions of people, are suffering.”50  
The report further recounted that about 40 taels of tax was imposed on 
non-filature silk being transported out of Sichuan. This figure probably did not 
include the freight fees, duties, insurance, and other costs that were incurred after 
the shipment left Chongqing. Uehara Shigemi estimated that it cost 70 taels to export 
one picul of non-filature raw silk produced by the non-mechanized small frames is 
probably more representative.51 
                                                             
50 “Chongqing siye gonghui kuaiyou daidian”, Shuping zazhi, 7 (June 1925). The 
majority of filature silk could avoid transit tax stations because of their specially 
location or special transportation, the report should refer to the non-filature silk that 
took long distance to arrive Chongqing to export.  
51 Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, p. 838. 
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In comparison with silk reeling industries in other regions of China, the taxes 
that the warlord governments exacted from Sichuan silk was not particularly heavy. 
Neither Wuxi nor Shanghai filatures enjoyed significantly better tax policies than 
Sichuan filatures. It is recorded that, in the mid-1920s, it also cost about 38.46 taels 
of taxes to ship one picul of raw silk reeled in Wuxi to Shanghai. The Shanghai 
filatures had to pay taxes about 67.13 taels in total to produce a picul of raw silk.52 
Furthermore, Furthermore, Lillian M. Li’s estimation on total tax of raw silk in the 
lower Yangzi was about 5 percent.53 My calculation was about 3 to 8 percent of the 
contemporary price of Sichuan filatures silk, similar to that in the lower Yangzi delta. 
As pointed by Li, this was not unbearable during the years under studying.  
Works on the economy of Sichuan during the warlord period often cite an 
account of the taxes of Sichuan raw silk in 1930 as evidence of the burdensome taxes 
imposed by military authorities in the province.54 In this document, the transit tax 
was considered the heaviest tax burden on silk goods and impeded the development 
of silk industry. Taxation on raw silk was levied again and again when passing through 
the areas guarded by different garrisons. Even within a single garrison, the shipment 
would be taxed repeatedly by different officials belonging to the garrison as it passes 
through their jurisdiction. This popularly-cited source material recounted that a picul 
of raw silk passed through four garrisons from Santai to Chongqing and was taxed 
                                                             
52 Ibid., pp. 352-354, 454. 
53 Lillian M. Li, China’s Silk Trade, p. 184.  
54 For example, Sichuan jianshi bianxiezu, ed., Sichuan jianshi, pp. 260-261; Kuang 
Shanji and Yang Guangyan, eds., Sichuan junfashi, p. 364; and Zhang Youyi, ed., 
Zhongguo jindai nongyeshi ziliao, vol.3, pp. 138-139.  
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five times, paying about 130 dollars in total.55 The tax burden in 1930 surely was 
more onerous in comparison to that in the 1920s in Sichuan, but the Sichuan silk 
industry was not the only recipient of heavy taxation in China. In the same year, taxes 
on raw silk in Wuxi county, Jiangsu, also amounted to over 100 dollars per picul.56  
There was heavy taxation on silk goods all across the country. The accusation 
that high taxation imposed by the warlords caused the underdevelopment of the 
Sichuan silk industry was too superficial. If the filatures in treaty ports such as 
Chongqing and Shanghai did not need to pay transit taxes on raw silk, they were 
charged taxes on cocoons because their urban location did not provide this essential 
raw material. If they had been located in sericulture centers such as Leshan and 
Santai in Sichuan, Shunde in Guangdong, and Wuxi in Jiangsu, they would have been 
charged with less cocoon taxes, but still had to suffer more transit taxes on the raw 
silk. Sichuan was not singled out as the worst case of the warlords’ governance. A 
provincial report in 1934 suggests that the transportation conditions from Sichuan to 
Shanghai had increased the costs greatly, and disadvantaged Sichuan silk vis-à-vis silk 
from other regions. Even so, it also noted that Sichuan silk were taxed less than that 
in Guangdong, although it was still more than the case in the lower Yangzi regions.57  
Local Government and Elites: Limited Efforts of Technological Diffusion 
                                                             
55 Yinhang zhoubao (Bank’s weekly) 14, 50 (30 December 1930), miscellaneous, pp. 
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56 Lynda S. Bell, One Industry, Two Chinas.  
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Although the military governments did not specially prohibit the development 
of the silk industry, they hardly encouraged it either. The situation led to dispersed 
and outdated promotional programs at the local level in Sichuan. During the first half 
of the Republic, sericulture promotional programs were designed and carried out by 
individual localities with very little involvement from the higher authorities. The 
influence of the central government could not penetrate into Sichuan, while the 
provincial government, if it was still functioning, showed little interest in 
technological improvement in sericulture. The lack of central planning and guidance 
limited the scale and quality of technological improvement in Sichuan. Regional 
technological development was left in the hand of the local elites. Technological 
improvements varied in areas, but were generally disappointing.  
After the Manchu government collapsed, most institutions continued to exist, as 
least in name. The Provincial Bureau of Sericulture, which was supervised by the 
Intendant for the Encouragement of Enterprise in the Qing, was transferred to the 
charge of the Provincial Department of Construction. Meanwhile, the sericulture 
promotion centers remained in existence after the turbulence of the 1911 Revolution. 
In 1914, the provincial government required the local governments to continue 
running the sericulture promotion centers, while the counties that did not possess 
promotion centers should transform established sericulture societies into such 
promotion centers.58 Later, these promotion centers’ programs and activities were 
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merged with the educational activities of the sericultural offices belonging to each 
county’s department of industry.  
Before the 1940s, there was a lack of qualified government-sponsored advanced 
sericulture schools in the province. The Provincial Advanced Agricultural School 
(Shengli gaodeng nongye xuexiao) and the Advanced Sericulture Educational 
Institute (Gaodeng canye jiangxisuo) provided higher education in sericulture in 
Chengdu.59 The Provincial Advanced Agriculture School was previously the Provincial 
Agricultural School founded by the Intendant for the Encouragement of Enterprise 
during the Qing. It offered a three-year program on sericulture from 1913 to 1926, 
but the department of sericulture was removed in 1927 when the school was 
merged with the University of Sichuan, and did not reopen until 1931.60 The 
Advanced Sericulture Educational Institute was based on a sericulture teachers’ 
school that was founded during the Qing. Both institutes had teachers educated in 
Japan. But to the disappointment of Japanese investigator Uehara, the two institutes 
had not remarkable achievements. He easily found maggots of parasite flies in the 
cocoons of the silkworm breeding stock of the Provincial Advanced Agricultural 
School, and noticed the silkworms reared in the Advanced Sericulture Educational 
Institute were weak.61  
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Among the large number of sericulture counties, only a few conducted some 
tangible work on sericulture. These counties largely depended on silk production and 
often had influential figures to promote sericulture. I identify these figures as 
semi-official elites. They were of elite background, assumed certain civil government 
positions now and then, and were hardly separable from the officialdom. The easy 
transformation of identities was common in small and closely-knitted communities. 
Their identity as civil government officials, however, shall not be overstated, 
especially in this historical phase when military power was in real control. Their 
attitude towards technological diffusion was not affected by their positions. They 
sometimes joined the government and conducted reform projects with government 
subsidies, and sometimes carried out private technological improvement and 
diffusion projects even though the government did not recruit them.  
Many social science studies have noticed the roles of local elites played in 
technological transformation in different Chinese regions. In his study in Kaixiangong 
village in Jiangsu Province, sociologist Fei Xiaotong found that the local leaders were 
vital in bridging outside sericulturists and local peasants. For economic benefits and 
social prestige, they actively supported the change. With the cooperation of the 
sericulturists, the provincial government, and the local leaders, technological 
transformation was significant in the village.62 Kenneth Pameranz studies the inland 
Huang-Yun region in North China. In the case of spreading new cotton varieties, rural 
society in northern Huang-Yun received the new seeds easily because of lacking rural 
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bosses. In contrast, in the southern part, the strong village elites opposed and 
obstructed the introduction of new seeds.63  
Local elites displayed their own characteristics in sericulture reform in Jingyan 
and Nanchong, two counties that elite-led diffusion was well recorded in Sichuan. 
Jingyan presents an example of how local entrepreneurs diffused sericulture 
technology during the period. It was one of the counties that were greatly reliant on 
income from sericulture. Here, Cheng Timing encouraged technological development 
through his personal efforts and endeavors as well as his official duties and activities. 
Cheng was a graduate from the Sichuan Provincial Agricultural School and was the 
pioneer in organizing the first private sericulture society in the county in 1909. In the 
1910s, he owned the largest reeling workshops and was the leading silk industrialist 
of the country. He also raised funds among the local elites and set up the Bianlongxi 
Sericulture Society in his village in 1916. The society employed an expert from the 
lower Yangzi area to teach mulberry cultivation. The society had a plantation of 6,000 
mulberries of a fine variety. These mulberries yielded leaves of a higher quality than 
native varieties, and in greater quantities as well. These were welcomed by silkworm 
raisers. Later, he cooperated with some other elites in the county seat to set up the 
Huying Sericulture Society near to the county seat. It boasted a larger plantation of 
over 11,000 fine mulberries. The society was a model for the cultivation of fine 
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mulberries and attracted many visitors.64  
From 1921, Cheng joined the county government to teach sericulture. Four 
sessions of the sericulture educational program were completed between 1921 and 
1929, with 66 graduates. The curriculum included mulberry cultivation and field 
preparation, spring silkworm rearing, silkworm anatomy, silkworm egg production 
and examination, application of microscope, pupa killing, cocoon drying and storage, 
cocoon and raw silk examination, silk reeling and silk wadding making, and silkworm 
net and mount making. It could be seen that the curriculum was not different from 
that provided by the sericulture promotion center in the same county twenty years 
ago.65 
Under the leadership of Zhang Lan, private and governmental efforts to 
promote sericulture technology were the most active in Nanchong among all 
sericultural counties in Sichuan. Zhang was a native of Nanchong. He had a xiucai 
degree and studied in Japan. After he returned from Japan, he enthusiastically 
participated in local educational and political reforms. He was the chief leader of the 
railway-rights recovery movement, and his involvement won him great respect and 
trust within the province. His fame rose again when he pushed the campaign against 
Yuan Shikai. In 1917, when Sichuan was plunged into chaos because of the conflicts 
between Sichuan’s troops and armies from neighboring provinces, Zhang was the 
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only candidate for the position of Provincial Governor acceptable to both the locals 
and the Beijing government. Among all the governors of Sichuan from 1912 to 1937, 
he was the only civil governor who controlled no troops. He held so much influence 
that even Liu Xiang, the warlord who finally united Sichuan in 1933, had to show 
reverence to him.66 After 1949, he became one of the first vice presidents of the 
People’s Central Government in the People’s Republic of China.  
Although Nanchong was a traditional sericulture region, it was Zhang’s 
leadership that elevated it towards becoming the leading sericulture center in 
Republican Sichuan. Technological development in Nanchong was slower than in 
Leshan and Santai at the beginning of the twentieth century. It did not adopt the use 
of small frames to reel raw silk until a Santai merchant introduced the practice in 
1912.67 When Zhang was in charge of the administration in northern Sichuan, he 
noticed the superiority of Japanese silk to Chinese silk. He sent Sheng Keqin and 
Wang Xingxian to study sericulture in Japan. Wang investigated for a few months and 
returned to suggest opening government supervised silkworm egg stations to 
improve the quality of eggs, while Sheng entered a sericulture school for further 
study.68 Zhang, Wang, and other local elites set up the Guoshan Sericulture society 
in Nanchong in 1914.69 This society recruited a large number of students and taught 
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them mulberry cultivation, silkworm rearing, and silk reeling. It cultivated 60,000 
mulberries of fine varieties, introduced a Japanese variety of silkworms, and 
produced re-reeled silk.70  Sheng and Wang were subsequently accorded high 
reputations in the history of the silk industry of Nanchong. Sheng in particular was 
later hailed as “the founder of the modern silk industry” of Nanchong. 
After Zhang Lan was removed from his governmental post in 1920, local elites in 
Nanchong still looked up to Zhang as their leader. Zhang promoted local 
self-government based on the development of education and economy.71 He took 
up the position of president of the Nanchong Middle School in 1921. He later merged 
the vocational education system into the Middle School to provide students with 
both general education and vocational skills. The school included departments of 
general education, teacher’s training, medicine, agriculture and sericulture, and 
industry. The school was strong in sericulture education with a full range of 
sericulture equipment at its disposal. It even cooperated with a local silk and dying 
guild to set up a weaving factory.72 Sheng Keqin taught sericulture in the school.73 
The school’s capacity and fame for sericultural education contributed to its 
emergence as one of the leading advanced sericulture schools during the War of 
Resistance against Japan. It was believed that it was these promotional and 
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pp. 301-302.  
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educational efforts that stimulated the general interest in sericulture in Nanchong 
during the Republic.74 Later Sheng started investing in the silk reeling industry by 
setting up a small frame workshop and gradually upgrading the workshop into a 
full-fledged filature.75 This was the beginning of filature silk production in Nanchong. 
Even though technological diffusion in Jingyan and Nanchong proceeded in an 
incomparable manner, it was not without flaws. In Jingyan, the efforts demonstrate 
very little technological progress from the late Qing dynasty onwards. Even in terms 
of the number of trained students, these educational programs were too small in 
scale to influence local sericulture. In Nanchong, the most successful technological 
innovation introduced was the Japanese variety of silkworms that was locally called 
purple flowers because of the purplish tint of their cocoons. Even so, purple flower 
silkworms only became popular in the Nanchong region and was bred and reared by 
the traditional Chinese ways. Despite the emergence of a large number of small 
frame workshops, steam filatures appeared very late and in rather limited numbers. 
There was only one mechanized filature in Nanchong before the 1940s. It was the 
Liuhe filature established by Sheng Keqin in 1917. The filature was later merged with 
Tongde reeling factory that used the non-mechanized reeling devices.76 During this 
period, the most prevalent type of device used for reeling raw silk in Nanchong and 
its nearby regions was the small frames.  
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In such limited educational and technological conditions, it is hard to imagine 
that any influential and effective technological improvement work would be carried 
out in Sichuan during the first two decades of the Republic. The limited promotion 
efforts in Sichuan contrasted sharply with those in other provinces. The elementary 
educational programs that were carried out in Jingyan and Nanchong were more of 
the exception than the norm, and the quality of advanced sericultural education 
could not be assured. The public sericultural institutes were so insignificant that 
contemporary observers considered them as having almost existed in name only.77 
In contrast, their counterparts in other provinces, such as the Provincial Sericulture 
School of Zhejiang, the Hushuguan Girls’ Sericulture School, the sericultural 
department of the University of Nanjing, and the Lingnan Agricultural College had 
made significant progress in sericultural reform, especially in the introduction and 
distribution of improved silkworm eggs that were disease-free. Moreover, after the 
Nationalist Government became established in Nanjing in 1927, the provincial 
governments in Zhejiang and Jiangsu dedicated much energy and support to 
sericulture and silk industry within their jurisdiction.  
State disengagement was detrimental to Sichuan sericulture technological 
improvement in the 1910s and 1920s. The public sector largely neglected 
technological reform in the political disintegration and uncertainty. Unlike in the 
1900s when provincial and local governments enthusiastically guided and supported 
technological diffusion, the local luminaries single-handedly managed it. But the 
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efforts of these individuals alone were not sufficient to fulfill the task of reforming 
sericulture and developing modern industry. Their influence was confined to their 
locality. Regarding the whole province in the two decades, the public promotional 
projects were rather limited.   
Japanese: Diffusion of Mechanized Production  
Although the Treaty of Shimonoseki granted foreign counties the right to 
establish factories in the treaty ports in 1895, the Japanese did not participate in silk 
production in Sichuan until after the establishment of the Republic. The arrival of the 
Japanese factories, despite its limited scale, directly impacted technological diffusion 
in the reeling industry in Sichuan. It spread the Japanese style of reeling and factory 
management, as well as making steam engines available to local purchasers.  
Miyasaka Kurō started exploring the native products in Sichuan by setting up the 
Shinri Trading Company (Shinri Yōkō) in 1908. Chen Yaozhang was the comprador of 
the firm. Under the joint effort of these two individuals, the firm dominated the 
trade of Sichuan native products such as bristles and hides. In 1913, the firm 
participated in raw silk production by investing in the Yushin Filature. The Yushin 
Filature was a Sino-Japanese joint venture. Miyasaka, Chen Yaozhang, and You Shibo, 
a native bank owner, pooled together pooled 30,000 taels of capital. The company 
was registered and established in the Japanese concession of Chongqing in 1915. In 
the beginning, the Japanese held a dominant two-thirds of the shares, but the 
balance was soon disturbed in favor of the Chinese investors following their input of 
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another 60,000 taels in 1916. In 1924, Miyasaka and You were the highest authorities 
in charge of finance and trade, while another two Chinese were the production 
managers.78  
Despite the joint nature of the venture and the considerable Chinese stake, 
Japanese influence in the filature was strong. It adopted the use of both Japanese 
machines and management practices. Japanese staff controlled technological 
management in the filature. The chief technician was an expert from the National 
Sericultural Experimentation Station of Japan. Under him, there were three female 
teachers. There were additional Japanese technicians in charge of general affairs, 
cocoon boiling, and packing.79  
The firm had 116 Shinshu style reeling machines in 1915, and added 100 reels in 
1922, and another 140 reels in 1923. These Japanese style reeling machines were 
more advanced than the Italian Tavelle reeling system that was adopted in Sichuan 
from the early twentieth century onwards. The early Sichuan entrepreneurs 
borrowed the Italian Tavelle system from Shanghai, where the system was popular. 
The raw silk was not re-reeled after it was finished on the Tavelle machines. The 
same basin was used for both cocoon boiling and silk reeling. It usually took a long 
time to boil cocoons which reduced productivity efficiency. Furthermore, the silk 
thread tangled easily in the boiling basin. Turbid cocoon boiling water also could 
affect the luster of silk by contaminated silk thread. The Japanese system separated 
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cocoon boiling and silk reeling. It also added the step of re-reeling to reduce 
imperfection. In 1924, the Yushin Filature introduced mechanized cocoon boiling 
machines into Sichuan for the first time. The mechanized boiling machine was 
labor-saving by abolishing the child laborers who used to attend to the boiling basins 
at the reeling machines.80 The Yushin Filature presented an example of more 
advanced reeling technology than the Tavelle system.  
Later, the machine maintenance department of the Yushin Filature was split 
from the filature to form the independent Daishin Iron Workshop in 1921. It 
specialized in constructing reeling machines and boilers. Reeling machines produced 
by this factory was sold at low prices. It also helped filatures to design and construct 
plants. With the establishment of the Daishin Iron Workshop, local investors gained 
access to the cheap and convenient supply of Japanese style filature equipment. 
Nearly all the Japanese style filatures in Sichuan appeared only after 1920.81 
They were more or less related to the Yushin or the Daishin. A partner investor of the 
Yushin Filature, Chen Shaoyao, established the Fanjiang Filature in his hometown, 
Jiangjin county, in 1924. The Fanjiang Filature was modeled after the Yushin in terms 
of both technology and management.82 Similarly, the Tongde Filature in Nanchong 
was also founded by people who were closely related to the Yushin Filature. Some 
                                                             
80 Ibid., pp. 817-819. 
81 According to Shina sanshigyō taikan, another Japanese style filature was set up in 
Wanxian in 1916. It is possible that filature was a Japanese owned filature because at 
the time, Japanese style filature was not known to Sichuan natives yet. However, it is 
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more information about it.  
82 Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, p. 824.  
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previously non-mechanized workshops were transformed into a Japanese style 
filature by purchasing reeling machines from the Daishin Iron Workshop, and 
introducing Osaka-produced boilers and generators. The filatures that relied on the 
Tavelle system also tried to imitate the Japanese system. The Daishin Iron Workshop 
undertook the task of transforming the Lihua Filature, which had previously used the 
Tavelle system, into a Japanese style filature in 1924. The Tavelle Huaxing Filature 
also purchased one Japanese boiling machine although it did not adopt the Japanese 
system.83 In fact, the majority of the filatures set up in Sichuan during the 1920s 
followed the Japanese model. The reels in Japanese-style filatures accounted for 
about 35 percent of the total reels in all kinds of filatures in Sichuan in 1926.84  
Conclusion 
Despite the disorder brought by the rampant wars and warlordism, sericulture 
in Sichuan experienced growth in output and export in the 1910s and 1920s. This 
growth was not driven by direct official guidance and intervention. There was no 
centralized government to carry out large scale reform programs, but the warring 
warlords and the military garrisons did not handicap technological development in 
spite of their ignorance on sericultural matters. Although high taxes were imposed on 
sericulture, especially on cocoons and raw silk, it is also notable that high taxes on 
the silk industry were imposed across China at the time. High taxation costs were not 
                                                             
83 Ibid., pp. 825-830; Zhongguo gongchengshi xuehui, ed., Zhongguo gongchengshi 
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exclusive to the silk industry and hence, did not necessarily destroy the Sichuan 
people’s enthusiasm for participating in it.  
Limited improvements and reform programs were carried only by local 
communities that depended on income from sericulture and silk industry, and by the 
influential elites who were capable of leading and encouraging reform. Both the 
technological factors and the impact of these reforms however were unsatisfactory. 
They hardly exceeded beyond the knowledge and skill that had been introduced and 
spread into Sichuan previously. Furthermore, it hardly reached a significant number 
of producers.  
In contrast, the presence of Japanese factories brought before the local 
investors a new model of silk reeling industry. The success of Japanese filatures 
popularized Japanese-style filatures in Sichuan, especially during the 1920s. The 
establishment of a Japanese machinery factory made modern silk reeling equipment 
accessible to local investors. It is notable this influence had little relations to 
“imperialism”. The Yushin Filature had no special advantages over Chinese filatures. 
Japanese and Chinese producers were both charged the same rate of taxation and 
faced the same competition in the international markets. It is arguable that the 
Japanese “imperialism” was ironically beneficial to the technological improvement 
and diffusion in Sichuan in the 1920s. The Japanese’s technological contribution was 




Technological Choices in the Silk Reeling Industry 
The growth in output levels of Sichuan raw silk during the Republican era was 
characterized by the use of a wide range of production methods on different 
technological levels. These technologies ranged from the simple traditional reeling 
frames to the relatively advanced Japanese style reeling factories, with 
non-mechanized methods and techniques in predominance. Unlike in coastal China 
where the export of filature silk had overtaken the export of domestic silk in the 
Western markets by the turn of the twentieth century, the Sichuan silk industry 
stagnated during the transition from traditional reeling machines to modern steam 
filatures. The steam filature had arrived in Sichuan later than in the coastal regions by 
over thirty years, and was spread only in limited number and scale. All filature silk 
went to the Western market, but never exceeded the amount of non-filature silk in 
the export of Sichuan raw silk. The non-mechanized production was in pre-dominant 
in terms of both the number of firms and output of silk.  
Why did raw silk production in Sichuan not become mechanized as it had in 
Shanghai, Wuxi, and Shunde? The mechanized production of raw silk was available in 
China from the 1860s. The adoption of mechanization was more of a private decision 
of investors than a government directive from the top. The attitude of the authorities 
towards sericulture, especially raw silk production, in the 1910s and 1920s can be 
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described as neither supportive nor obstructive. On the one hand, there was no 
governmental encouragement at the time. On the other, the authorities did not 
significantly obstruct the growth of sericulture and silk industry through taxation. 
Instead, the more important factors that affected technological choices were the 
economic considerations of the private investors.  
In a brief description of Sichuan sericulture, Lillian M. Li attributed the state of 
reeling technology to market forces. Producers produced for different markets that 
required different standards of product quality. Sichuan was the largest supplier of 
yellow silk. The market for yellow silk protected it from competition in the Western 
market. At the same time, the majority of Sichuan silk was consumed within the 
province or went to the tropical counties. Looms in these regions did not require 
better silk that would require technological improvement to produce.1   
This chapter further argues that supply factors contributed to the different 
technological choices of investors in Sichuan in the 1910s and 1920s. It first describes 
the wide range of reeling technologies adopted in Republican Sichuan, before 
proceeding to examine the economic reasons that affected the choice of technology. 
Economic rationality directed technological choice. In contrast to the 
non-mechanized workshops, industrialization of silk reeling was capital-intensive but 
not labor-saving. After taking into account cocoon costs, wage costs, interest rates, 
and production efficiency, cost-benefit analyses shows that mechanization were not 
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much economically superior to non-mechanized workshops in saving costs and 
increasing profit.  
While there were very few primary sources on sericulture in Sichuan in the 
1910s and 1920s, Japanese researcher Uehara Shigemi had conducted a detailed 
survey on the topic in 1926. He studied at the Tōa dōbunkai in Shanghai and spent 
about five years travelling in China, including 50 days in Sichuan in the spring of 1926. 
Lillian M. Li considers Uehara’s research “the most complete and reliable of all the 
compendia dealing with sericulture in China.”2 In reality, it was the only detailed and 
reliable source on Sichuan in the 1920s. Hence, it makes possible the comparative 
study of sericulture between Sichuan and other Chinese sericulture centers.  
Various Technological Levels in Raw Silk Reeling  
Mechanized and non-mechanized modes of production coexisted in Republican 
Sichuan. There were technological differences as well among the methods and 
equipment that could be categorized in each of these two modes. Mechanized 
production featured two different filature models – the Italian Tavelle reeling system 
and the Japanese style system. Non-mechanized technologies included two major 
types of reeling equipment and a reeling technique. They were the large frame that 
produced domestic silk, the small frame (also called wooden frame, muche), and the 
method of domestic silk re-reeling (yaojing). The mechanized filatures and small 
frame both appeared in the twentieth century. Silk produced by the two techniques 
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was called improved silk in Republican China. Silk re-reeling technology had been 
known in Sichuan for long, but only became popular after the twentieth century. The 
large frame was traditional rural technology. They produced silk of relatively inferior 
quality. Mechanized production was the most advanced silk reeling technology in 
Sichuan. The process depended on the use of machines that were also called iron 
machine (tieji), because the machine was made of iron. Machine-made raw silk was 
called filature silk. The first steam filatures appeared in Sichuan in the 1900s. They 
adopted the Italian Tavelle reeling system that produced raw silk without re-reeling. 
As this technology was borrowed from Shanghai, the filatures that adopted it were 
known locally as Shanghai style filatures. The Japanese style filature emerged in 
Sichuan in the 1920s. This system separated cocoon cooking and reeling as two 
procedures in different shopfloors, and re-reeled raw silk, which yielded better 
quality silk. It was the most advanced technology adopted in the reeling industry in 
Sichuan at that time. Steam filatures were primarily concentrated in the treaty port 
of Chongqing. Leshan ranked as the second filature center after Chongqing. The 
output of filature silk was 10 to 15 percent of the total output of raw silk in Sichuan.3  
In comparison with filatures in coastal China, the filatures in Sichuan had 
distinct characteristics. First, there were few filatures in Sichuan. In the 1930s, there 
were 107 filatures in Shanghai, 81 in the lower Yangzi region except Shanghai, 121 in 
Guangdong, and only 20 in Sichuan.4 The total number of steam filatures in Sichuan 
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was less than that in Wuxi county alone, where there were 42 filatures in 1930.5 
While filature silk formed the largest share of raw silk output in Shanghai, Wuxi, and 
Shunde, it accounted for only a small portion of the total output of raw silk in 
Sichuan.  
Second, reeling technology kept developing despite the limited amount of 
filatures in Sichuan. The percentage of reels in Japanese style filatures was 40 
percent of the total number of mechanized reels in Sichuan in the mid-1920s.6 It was 
much higher than that in Shanghai, Wuxi, and Guangdong. Shanghai filatures stayed 
with the Tavelle system, which was less advantageous than the Japanese style. 
Mechanized silk reeling in Guangdong was even less advanced than that was in 
Shanghai. The Tavelle system was not introduced in Guangdong until the late 1920s.7  
Third, the ownership and management of filatures in Sichuan was not separated. 
In Shanghai and Guangdong filatures, the filature silk production popularly adopted 
factory rental system. This system was chiefly responsible for the slow technical 
change and catching up in the two regions. Filature owners established factory and 
set up equipment, and then leased out factories to the operating firms. The owners 
had no interest in profit and did not concern upgrade. The operating firms rented 
factories for saving cost and did not invest in the equipment that did not belong to 
them. The separation of ownership and management therefore prohibited the 
                                                             
5 Lillian M. Li, China’s Silk Trade, p. 167.  
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improvement of filatures in Shanghai and Guangdong.8 This certainly was not an 
obstacle to filatures to Sichuan, where the owners were also managers. Sichuan 
filature investors profited from the final products and the efficiency of equipment 
had to be an essential part of their concern.  
The large frame was the most outdated but the most widely spread reeling 
device in Sichuan. It was a treadle-operated device. Many rural household reeled raw 
silk from their own cocoons through this device at home. Some workshops also set 
up several frames together and hired workers to operate these. The large frame is a 
simple device. Its stove was made of mud and bricks. On top of the stove, a large iron 
pot with a mouth one meter in diameter was set up. A reeling frame with a simple 
structure was placed on the iron pot. A reel was placed at the right side of the stove. 
The sizes of the reels differed across regions but were all significantly large. The 
circumference of the reel was about 3.7 to 4 meters. The large reel won for the entire 
set-up the name ‘large frame’. Operators, normally men, stood in front of the frame 
and pressed the treadle with his right foot to run the reel. At the same time, their 
hand stirred the boiled cocoons in the pot with a pair of chopsticks. The loosened 
ends of silk filaments from several cocoons were twisted into a skein and passed 
through the eyelets on the reeling frame and finally onto the reels. It was easy to 
construct such reeling frames with materials that were produced locally. The large 
frames produced uneven and coarse silk that was also made rough with the addition 
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of extra filaments. The silk was called domestic silk, and accounted for over half of 
the total output of raw silk in the province in the mid-1920s.9  
Domestic silk was the raw material for the creation of re-reeled domestic silk 
(yaojingsi). In re-reeling workshops, domestic silk was first sorted according to 
fineness and color, and then re-reeled onto smaller reels. During the re-reeling, the 
worker let the silk thread pass through his or her fingers. When the worker felt a 
change in fineness, he or she cut the thread and reeled it onto another reel 
corresponding to its fineness. Re-reeling could correct some disadvantages of 
domestic silk, such as unevenness and coarseness. There were seven categories of 
fineness. The first four categories were good enough for export, but the quality was 
still not as good as the silk produced by small frames and filatures. This kind of silk 
was mainly produced in regions where domestic silk production was thriving, 
including Leshan and Hechuan.10  
The small frame or wooden frame represented a significant improvement of the 
traditional reeling technology. As its names indicate, it differed from the large frame 
in utilizing a small reel, and was distinguished from the mechanized iron machines 
due to its wooden structure. The frame was made of wood. Its reel was only about 
one meter in circumference. It resembled steam-powered machines in function. Like 
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the mechanized reeling machines, the types of small frames could also be divided 
into a non-re-reeled system that was modeled after the Italian system, and a 
re-reeling system, which was similar in the Japanese style reeling system and could 
produce better silk than the non-re-reeled one and gradually became dominant. It 
soon became common practice to reel raw silk onto small reels and then re-reel the 
thread on large reels in the early twentieth century.11 The productivity of the small 
frame was further increased with the multiple-reel frame invented by a student in 
the Sichuan Sericulture Society in 1907. The various versions of small frame were all 
upgrades of traditional devices, but did not develop into mechanization. The quality 
of silk was better than that of domestic and re-reeled domestic silk, but inferior to 
filature silk. The small frame reeling workshops operated seasonally, usually for two 
to three months after fresh cocoons came into the market. Uehara estimated the 
total annual output of these factories to be around 3,500 piculs.12 Of the 3,500 
piculs, about 2,000 were produced in Santai, the county where Chen Wanxi 
introduced and actively encouraged the adoption of the device. Another Japanese 
source estimated that the highest annual output in Santai and its nearby regions was 
over 6,000 piculs.13 
The highly diversified technological levels reveal the technological 
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transformations in modern Sichuan, but the transition was far less than complete. 
Even though the introduction of mechanization through the Italian Tavelle system 
and later the Japanese style system meant that silk reeling had become even more 
advanced than that in Shanghai in the 1920s, the dominance of non-mechanized 
reeling technology demonstrated that the overall technical level in Sichuan fell far 
behind that in Shanghai, Wuxi, and Guangdong. Sichuan factories were innovative in 
adjusting and accommodating technology that combined characteristics of both 
mechanized and non-mechanized technologies, but still lacked the dynamics of 
complete industrialization. As observed by Lillian M. Li, “silk production there 
occupied an intermediate stage between domestic handicrafts and mechanized 
factory production.”14  
Cocoon Cost 
Cocoons formed the largest cost in producing raw silk. Cocoon prices varied 
according to quality, output, and region, but were generally low in Sichuan. This was 
one essential advantage of raw silk production in Sichuan. To yield one picul of raw 
silk, four to five piculs of dried cocoons were needed. About three piculs of fresh 
cocoons yielded one picul of dried cocoons. In 1925, the price ranged from $40 to 
$60. In Leshan, a picul of yellow cocoons in 1925 cost $50, while white cocoons cost 
$40. In 1926, the average price of cocoons was about $60 to $70 per picul. The 
subsidiary character of silkworm rearing in the rural economy contributed the low 
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price of cocoons. Uehara calculated that the production cost of producing cocoons 
were nearly equal to their selling price. Because peasants planted mulberries on 
excess pieces of land, and raised silkworms with their own labor and primarily their 
own leaves, they had minimum cash input. Although the marginal profit was low 
because of the low selling price of cocoons, peasants still received some cash profit. 
Furthermore, Uehara noticed that peasants were much less inclined to adulterate 
the cocoons they sold with inferior cocoons than in Jiangsu. 15  Reeling firms 
benefited from this good practice in Sichuan.  
The good quality and low prices of cocoons largely reduced cocoon costs in silk 
production. The following table is the breakdown of expenditure on producing one 
picul of filature silk. 76.7 percent of the total production costs in filatures in Shanghai 
were spent on cocoons, 69.5 percent in Guangdong, and only 62.8 percent in Sichuan 
in 1926. In terms of the cocoon cost for producing one picul of raw silk, the disparity 
is even more striking: 986 taels in Shanghai, 858 taels in Guangdong, and only 608 
taels in Sichuan. Such low expenditure on cocoons undoubtedly made Sichuan raw 
silk competitive in the market.   
TABLE 4  Estimated cost of producing one picul of filature silk16  
Place Shanghai  Sichuan Guangdong 
Cocoons 986 taels 76.7% 608 taels 62.8% 858 taels 69.5% 
Wage 115 8.9 105 10.9 232 18.8 
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16 Ibid., pp. 31-32.  
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Fuel 56 4.4 42 4.3 63 5.1 
Interest 30 2.3 75 7.8 20 1.6 
Miscellaneous 71 5.5 125 12.9 37 3.0 
Total 1,286 100 968 100 1,234 100 
Both non-filature workshops and steam filatures shared the advantages of low 
cocoon prices, but the non-mechanized firms benefited more from the advantages. 
To produce one picul of raw silk, it required more cocoons in filatures than in 
non-mechanized firms. The criterion of fineness on steam filature silk meant that any 
uneven thread was discarded, and longer thread was needed to weigh the same 
amount of coarse silk. The filature also spent more on miscellaneous costs that 
accompanied the purchase of cocoons. Most filatures were located in Chongqing, 
which was not a cocoon producing region. Filatures had to dispatch staff to set up 
cocoon purchasing stations and drying stations in the cocoon regions. When dried 
cocoons were transported back to Chongqing, they incurred various fees and transit 
taxes imposed by the military authorities that controlled different areas. In contrast, 
non-steam filature firms were often located within the sericulture center and many 
even reeled raw silk from fresh cocoons in rural households.17 The estimated costs 
of the cocoons required to produce one picul of filature silk was 608 taels, while 500 
taels worth of cocoons could produce the same amount of raw silk in small frame 
workshops in the mid-1920s.18  
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Wage Costs 
In addition to the low cost of raw materials, the wage levels in the reeling 
industry in Sichuan were kept low. There were two types of employees – the 
apprentices and the hired skilled workers. This was different from the practice in 
coastal China where hired female workers were the major labor force of the silk 
industry.  
The apprenticeship system was popular in both filature and non-steam 
workshops in Sichuan. It is not hard to understand why the non-steam workshops 
continued the traditional apprenticeship approach. Many steam filatures did not give 
up the system either, although the factories relied on modernized systems and 
equipment. Filature owner Chen Wanxi considered that the apprentice system was a 
better approach for training skillful workers than the female workers’ recruitment 
system prevalent in Shanghai. 19  The apprenticeship system ensured a close 
relationship between factory owners and workers. It also helped to set up a stable 
workforce because the apprentices were personally attached to the factory owners.  
More importantly, the apprenticeship system allowed the workshops and 
factories to keep wages low. In one filature in Nanchong, the most skilled apprentices 
were each given only 50 wen with boarding in the factory. Filature apprentices had a 
daily salary of 100 cash in Langzhong. Apprentices’ salaries were also 100 wen daily 
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in the reeling workshops in Santai.20 Considering the enter province, the highest 
paid apprentices were in Leshan, where they received accommodation and food, plus 
200 wen. The non-boarding apprentices in Chongqing received 500 wen or 9 cents a 
day, but had to take care of their own accommodation and food themselves. In 
workshops in northern Sichuan, some apprentices were given as low as 30 wen or 
0.6 cent per day, or 10,950 wen a year.  
The apprentices’ average wage was even lower than many agriculture workers 
in the province. In Nanchong, besides food provided by his employer, an agricultural 
day-laborer was given 400 wen daily. In Langzhong, excluding food, a day-laborer’s 
cash income was 500 wen. The market price of a bowl of porridge was 100 wen, and 
a bowl of steamed rice about 200 wen. Hence, including food, an employer in these 
places had to spend 1,200 wen or more to hire an agricultural day-laborer.21 The 
agricultural year-laborers were the worst paid among the agriculture workers, 
receiving 50,000 to 80,000 wen per year.22 The apprentices were only slightly better 
off than the agricultural year-laborers.   
The skilled workers in filatures were not much better treated. Unlike the popular 
practice of daily wages in the filatures in other parts of China, silk reeling workers in 
Sichuan were paid according to their productivity. Cash penalties and rewards were 
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strictly enforced in these filatures to ensure the fineness of raw silk. However, due to 
the quality of cocoons and the condition of machines, it was hard to maintain the 
level of fineness. Punishment was common even for a skilled worker. The average 
salary of male workers in the Japanese style Yushin Filature in Chongqing in 
December 1925 was 21,486 wen per month. Divided by 28 working days, the daily 
wage of all reeling workers was 767 wen. It was only slightly higher than the 
agricultural day-laborers. The average daily wages of female workers was 752 wen in 
the Yushin Filature.23 Female workers were given 970 to 1,130 wen per day in the 
filatures using the Tavelle system at the time. Because these workers had to prepare 
their food and accommodation, the daily salary in Tavelle filatures was even lower 
than that of agricultural day-workers. In comparison with other regions in China, the 
daily wage of women workers in filatures in Shanghai was double of that of their 
Sichuan counterparts. Wages in Guangdong were even much higher during the same 
period.24  
In the non-filature silk producing firms, the wages of workers were also kept at 
the lowest level. In small frame workshops in Santai and Mianzhou, reeling workers 
were given 60 to 80 wen for every liang of silk produced, and plus food every day. 
Normally, a worker could earn 480 to 640 wen a day, which was lower than the over 
750 wen that skilled workers in filatures earned daily. In the re-reeling workshops, 
skilled workers earned 160 wen for every liang of silk re-reeled in Hechuan, 75 wen in 
                                                             
23 Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, pp. 806-809.  
24 Chen Ciyu, Jindai zhongguo de jixie saosi gongye, p. 230, 232.  
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Mianzhou, and as low as 50 wen in Leshan. Few could re-reel over 10 liang a day. 
Domestic silk reeling by large frame was normally conducted in individual peasant 
family, but there were also small scale workshops in which male workers were 
employed. Wages on a per-piece basis saw workers being paid 60 wen for one liang 
of raw silk.25  
The low labor cost was a result of overpopulation in the province. There were 
few job avenues for the large rural population in the overpopulated province. Even 
though there were some traditional industries such as salt production and mining 
that absorbed quite a few landless laborers, the majority normally found jobs as 
agricultural laborers, and domestic servants. To become long-term agricultural 
laborers or domestic servants meant to lose their freedom and to be personally 
attached to the employers, while daily based work offered little stability. For women, 
the opportunities of getting a job were much fewer. Therefore, when there was no 
opportunity cost, or when opportunity cost was equal, many people joined the 
factory workforce even though the salary was extremely low.  
All kinds of reeling firms benefited from the low wage costs, but 
non-mechanized workshops spent even less on wage costs than in filatures. It is 
worth noting that steam filatures in China were labor-intensive. According to a 
survey on filatures in Wuxi in 1940, about 2 to 3 people were required to attend to 
each steam reel. 26  This high employee-machine ratio was also prevalent in 
                                                             
25 Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, p. 836, 851-853. 
26 Mushaku kōgyō jittai chōsa hōkokusho (Survey on the industry in Wuxi) (Minami 
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Republican Sichuan. The Huaxin Filature had about 1,000 workers and 360 reeling 
basins. The ratio was as high as 2.78:1.27 In the Yushin Filature that adopted 
Japanese style production and management methods, there was also a tendency to 
hire excess personnel.28  In contrast, the small frame workshops in Republican 
Nanchong normally needed only 1 to 1.5 people to attend to each reeling device. 
Very few boasted of a ratio over 2 workers to one machine.29 At the same time, the 
wages of both apprentices and skilled workers were higher in filatures than in 
non-mechanized firms. Furthermore, more staff was required in departments in 
filatures that traditional workshops did not have, such as steam machine engineers 
and administrative staff, who were highly paid professionals.  
Investment and Interest Rate 
Mechanized filatures were expensive investments that the majority of raw silk 
production investors could not afford. Filature owners had to possess sufficient 
capital to found a factory. The investment on the equipment, infrastructure, and 
buildings of a filature was much larger than that on any other kinds of reeling 
workshops. The Japanese style Fanjiang Filature was set up with 100,000 taels and 
280 reels in 1924. Another filature with 240 reels has an initial capital outlay of 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Manshū Tetsudō Kabushiki Kaisha Chōsabu, 1940), p. 666, cited in Chen Zhen, ed. 
Zhongguo jindai gongyeshi ziliao (Historical materials of industry in modern China) 
(Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1961), p. 106. 
27  Zhongguo gongchengshi xuehui, ed. Zhongguo gongchengshi xuehui Sichuan 
kaochao baogao, vol. 7, p. 18.  
28 Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, p. 820. 
29 Nanchong cansizhi bianzhuan weiyuanhui, ed., Nanchong cansizhi, pp. 144-146.  
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80,000 taels. The investment also meant a large sum of interest. In contrast, for a 
non-mechanized reeling workshop, it cost only three dollars or a little more than two 
taels to set up a small reeling machine.30 Even for a non-mechanized workshop with 
as many as 300 reels, it requires less than 1000 taels to set up the equipment.  
At the same time, the larger the enterprise, the greater was the demand for the 
accumulation of raw materials and the need for a substantial working capital. Unlike 
in coastal China where the ownership and management of a filature was separated, 
thus reducing the financial burden of the investors, Sichuan filatures owners not only 
needed to obtain fixed assets like factory sites and machinery, but also had to 
prepare large sum of working capital to acquire cocoons. The seasonal nature of the 
cocoon market in Sichuan meant that producers had to procure cocoons once a year. 
Except for a very small amount of summer crop of cocoons in certain regions, the 
spring crop of cocoons was the dominant crop in the province. The Sichuan reeling 
firms could not obtain fresh cocoons on demand as their counterparts could in 
Guangdong, where cocoons were harvested several times every year, or purchase dry 
cocoons from cocoon hongs whenever necessary as Jiangsu and Shanghai filatures 
did. The raw materials for the entire year’s production needs had to be acquired 
within the short cocoon season. The larger firms needed more capital to procure the 
raw materials. However, the investment on raw materials would not bear returns 
until the final product was sold. It was a serious test on the financial strength of the 
reeling firms.  
                                                             
30 Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, pp. 824-825, 838. 
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For example, the Huaxin Filature in Leshan produced 300 piculs of raw silk 
annually. Given the average cocoon cost in Sichuan filatures in 1926, which was 608 
taels for producing a picul of raw silk, 132,400 taels was needed to procure enough 
cocoons for the production of 300 piculs of silk. This amount fluctuated annually 
depending on the cocoon prices. Even small frame workshops had to invest large 
sum of money on cocoons. It was estimated that there were about 8,050 small 
frames in the whole province with an annual output of 3,500 piculs of raw silk. On 
average, every frame produced 0.434 piculs of raw silk. Uehara estimates that about 
500 taels of cocoons were required to produce one picul of raw silk using the small 
reeling frame. Therefore, each reeling frame consumed 217 taels of raw materials. 
Even a small workshop with only five frames had to prepare over 1,000 taels for the 
procurement of cocoons.  
The capital spent on cocoon purchase were either saved from previous years’ 
revenue or borrowed from the credit market. During the cocoon seasons, although 
loan interests were much higher than usual, it was still hard to get the loans. For 
instance, in Santai, the usual interest rate was about 1.5 percent per month, but 
during the cocoon season, the small frame reeling firms had difficulty borrowing 
money at monthly interest rates as high as 2 to 3 percent.31 It took a long time for 
the capital invested in the cocoons to be returned as profits on the sale of raw silk, 
which ultimately led to high interest costs, the major disadvantage of operating a 
reeling business in Sichuan.  
                                                             
31 Masao Kanda, Shisen-shō sōran, p. 505.  
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Moreover, unlike non-mechanized workshops, steam filatures normally did not 
leave their expensive machines idle. Due to rational economic consideration, owners 
did not cease production unless the expenses of production exceeded the profits. As 
long as they still made money, factories continued running. In the 1910s and 1920s, 
the raw silk market was generally satisfactory and promising. Heavily equipped steam 
filatures owners certainly wanted to keep the factories running yearlong, despite the 
high interest rate. This meant that the filature investors had to prepare a huge sum of 
capital to procure sufficient cocoons to last the entire production year. The duration 
of operations in the non-mechanized workshops was more flexible, because leaving 
the reels idle and closing workshops did not bring heavy financial losses. Many only 
operated several months after the cocoon season of the year, depending on the 
availability of raw materials and market demand.   
Production Efficiency  
In the long process of world industrialization, there was a rising productivity 
through mechanization. But this was not true in the case of the mechanized 
production of raw silk in Sichuan in the 1920s. Uehara recorded the productivities of 
different filatures in Sichuan. In comparison with that in the lower Yangzi, the rate 
was low. In the filatures in Chongqing, one steam reel could produce nine liang of silk 
daily from the finest cocoons that were produced in Santai. However, if the filature 
uses cocoons produced in other regions, the daily yield was far beneath this level, 
amounting to merely 4.5 to 5 liang per reel. The filatures in Leshan used locally 
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produced cocoons that were inferior to those of Santai, but better than cocoons from 
other regions. One reel could produce seven liang of silk.32 In contrast, the normal 
output was 11 to 12 liang per reel in filatures in the lower Yangzi. The lowest yield in 
the lower Yangzi, namely 8 liang per reel, would be actually considered as quite a 
high rate if compared to the productivity of Sichuan filatures. 33  In terms of 
productivity, Sichuan filatures could not compete with their counterparts in other 
regions, and were not superior to the non-mechanized workshops. In the small frame 
workshops, one reel could produce 5 to 10 liang of raw silk daily. The large frame 
reeling device produced an even higher amount of raw silk, generally over 10 liang, 
or even as high as 30 liang.34 
Cocoon quality was largely responsible for the low efficiency of reeling machines. 
Before the silk thread was taken off the cocoons, they had to be boiled to remove the 
gum that determines the efficiency with which the thread could be extracted – the 
reelability rate. Low reelability rates increased silk waste, reduced the yield and 
quality of raw silk, and caused low labor efficiency. For example, it took five minutes 
to remove gum from cocoons in Santai and its nearby regions, but 20 minutes from 
the Leshan variety, because the latter had very low reelability. Most cocoon varieties 
that Uehara investigated in Sichuan in the 1920s had the problem of low reelability 
rates. Furthermore, low reelability had actually more effect on steam filature silk 
                                                             
32 Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, pp. 778-781.  
33 Lillian M. Li, China’s Silk Trade, p. 30.  
34 Hosie, Report by Consul-general Hosie on the Province of Ssuch'uan, p. 60; 
Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, p. 853.  
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than non-mechanized one. The higher the automation level, the lower the reelabilty 
rate required.  
Profits 
The comparison demonstrates that even in terms of profit, the filatures were 
not significantly more profitable over non-mechanized workshops in the 1920s. 
Among all the kinds of Sichuan-produced raw silk filature silk enjoyed a good 
reputation and fetched the highest prices in Shanghai. The average price for Sichuan 
filature silk from 1920 to 1926 was around 1,000 taels. In 1922 and 1923, silk from 
the Yushin filature was sold for as high as 1,214 and 1,314 taels respectively. 
Nevertheless, after deducting the expenses, the profit for filature silk was actually 
not significant. For example, the net profit per picul of raw silk from the Yushin 
Filature in 1925 was 116 taels.35  
Non-mechanized workshops received rather similar profit levels. The estimated 
production and trading cost of one picul of silk produced by the small frame in the 
mid-1920s was 650 taels. The market price in Shanghai for non-filature raw silk was 
about 750 to 800 taels per picul, generating hence a profit of 100 to 150 taels per 
picul.36  
                                                             
35 Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, p. 849. The net 
profit was 46,405 taels and divided by 400 piculs of raw silk in 1925.  
36  There was not accurate price of small frame machine-made re-reeled silk. 
According to Uehara, the price was 200 taels lower than filature one. Hence I made 
the estimation of 750-800 taels based on filature price at the same time. See 
Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, p. 838. 
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The customs report also shows a narrow margin of prices between the filature 
silk and re-reeled silk in Sichuan. For instance, filature yellow silk passing through 
Chongqing customs was worth 648, 476, and 634 taels per picul respectively during 
the three years from 1918 to 1920, while re-reeled silk was valued at 536, 411, and 
565 per picul for the same three years.37 Such narrow margins probably discouraged 
the majority of investors from investing in mechanization. 
In addition, the profit generated from the reeling business was not attractive to 
investors who expected generous returns from their capital. Only those who were 
financially strong could establish steam filatures. Investment in the silk industry 
would not have been a favored choice for the quick generation of high revenue. 
Investment in the financial market, such as through speculation on Shanghai 
exchange rate, was more attractive.  
In terms of risk, the filature industry was also more dangerous than investment 
in land. There was a trend of re-investing profit from industry and commerce on land 
in Republican Sichuan.38 The price of land increased significantly from 1916 under 
the tide of land purchases. 39  This made land investment a preferable hedge. 
Furthermore, even though the return from land investment was not as good as the 
best return rate from industry and commerce, but it was not as unstable either. 
Although the returns from constructing a filature workshop were promising during 
                                                             
37 China Maritime Customs, Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1920, pp. 863-864.  
38 Peng tonghu, Sichuan jindai jingjishi, p. 214.  
39 Lü Pingdeng, Sichuan nongcun Jingji, p. 96.  
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most of the Republican years, there was still the danger of heavy losses. One of the 
best performing filature, the Yushin Filature, for instance, lost 61,726 taels in 1920, 
which represented an over 100 percent loss of capital.40  
In contrast, the land investment was rather stable. The land rent is about 10 
percent of the land price in Sichuan in 1926, according to the study of H. D. Brown 
and Li Min Liang.41 About 15 years later, another research made by the Farmer’s 
Bank of China between 1940 and 1941 suggests that the receipt of landlord from 
land was still about 10 percent of land investment before deducting expenses, and 
8.07 percent after deducting expenses. As the investigators in the 1940s noticed, 
although 8.07 percent was not high, “it is a good rate for a safe investment like 
land.”42  
Hence, some would prefer to invest in land instead of establishing or upgrading 
a factory. When Chen Wanxi moved to Leshan, he left the Binong Filature, the 
earliest filature in Sichuan, to his brothers to run. In 1926, Chen’s brother borrowed 
from him 200,000 dollars, a sum of money enough for a new filature, under the 
pretext of expanding their factory and business. In reality, the money was used to 
purchase land, and Chen’s brother became large landlords in Santai.43 
                                                             
40 Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, p. 849.  
41 H. D. Brown and Li Min Liang, “A Survey of 50 farms in the Chengdu Plain, 
Szechwan,” p. 47.  
42 J. Lossing Buck, An Agriculture Survey of Szechwan Province, China (Chongqing: 
The Farmer’s Bank of China, 1943), p. 11. Reprinted in John Lossing Buck, Three 
Essays on Chinese Farm Economy (New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 
1980). 
43  Feng Deliang and Leshanshi zhengxie wenshizu, “Leshan huaxin sichang 
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To Mechanize or Not 
There were both advantages and disadvantages to the mechanization of the silk 
reeling industry in modern Sichuan. On the one hand, inter-woven social and 
economic problems restricted the performance of steam filatures. The large 
population compelled rural households to produce cocoons at minimum levels of 
input and accept low wages. The low cost of raw materials and wages promised 
producers significant margins of profit. Steam filatures, however, required higher 
reel-worker ratios, higher wages, and more cocoons to produce the same amount of 
raw silk than non-mechanized workshops. The fixed capital and working capital of 
filatures were much heavier than those of the non-mechanized workshops, which 
meant substantial interest burdens on the filatures. In fact, filatures saved neither 
labor nor cost, but offered lower productivity per peel than the non-mechanized 
workshops. In addition, steam filatures were more risky than land investment, and 
generated less significant and slower returns than speculation in the financial market. 
These concerns suggest mechanization were not always a choice of local investors.  
On the other hand, steam filatures did emerge and evolve, and the output of 
filature silk kept increasing in Republican Sichuan. Why did this take place? In her 
study on sericulture in the lower Yangzi, Lillian M. Li similarly noticed that the 
advantage of steam filature silk vis-à-vis non-filature silk was not that the former was 
labor or cost saving. She suggested that it was the standardized and consistent 
                                                                                                                                                                              
xingshuaiji”, p. 37.  
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quality that filature silk offered that drove the demand for such silk in the 
international market, which in turn promised higher profits for investors.44 I have 
argued that there were not remarkably higher profits for investors in Sichuan, at least 
in the mid-1920s. I agree with her explanation however that filature silk was more 
welcomed in the international market. The demand for high quality filature silk was 
increasing, and the price remained stable. 
Filatures producing filature silk of good quality could easily take advantage of 
market opportunities. In 1923, the price of steam filature silk was raised by 400 taels 
per picul because of the earthquake in Japan.45 Silk produced from the Binong 
Filature was sold at 1,600 taels per picul, which was a price that the non-filature silk 
could never achieve.46 Silk of superior quality were sold at stable and high prices in 
the market. Even during 1924, when the bearish market for silk meant that low 
quality Sichuan filature silk “did not find a satisfactory market”, or fetched lower 
prices, the best Sichuan filature silk was still sold at 960 taels per picul, a price higher 
than that paid for the best filature silk from Shandong.47  
Furthermore, it is also necessary to point out that the steam filatures achieved 
economies of scale that financially weak workshops could not. While about 1,000 
small frames produced 750 piculs of raw silk in Nanchong at a high productivity rate 
                                                             
44 Lillian M. Li, China’s Silk Trade, p. 24-30.  
45 China Maritime Customs, Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1923, p. 26.  
46 Sichuansheng difangzhi bianzhuan weiyuanhui, ed., Sichuan shengzi, renwuzhi, p. 
394.  
47 China Maritime Customs, Returns of Trade and Trade Reports, 1924, pp. 24-25.  
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of 0.75 piculs per frame, and 2,000 piculs of raw silk by 5,000 small frames in Santai 
at the rate 0.4 piculs per frame48, the Huaxing Filature in Leshan could produce 300 
piculs a year with 360 steam reels alone, and the Yushin Filatures, 400 piculs using 
the 356 reels.49 It was true that the productivity per reel in filatures was generally 
lower than that in the non-mechanized workshops, and the profit of per picul of raw 
silk was almost the same in filatures and workshops. But the economies of scale 
made up for these disadvantages. Filatures were financially strong enough to remain 
in operation throughout the whole year, and their goods were easily sold out without 
worrying about the competition in the market.  
There was a trend of gradual industrialization and continuing upgrading in 
Sichuan silk reeling business, although the pace was rather slow. The number of 
filatures and the total output of raw silk kept increasing from the 1900s to the 1920s. 
Factories investors were willing to embrace promising techniques, if they could afford 
the heavy cost and high risks.  
Conclusion 
From the beginning of the twentieth century to the early 1930s, the output of 
Sichuan raw silk, including both non-filature and filature silk, was stimulated by 
market demand and increased dramatically. The growth in the output of raw silk did 
not cover the fact that there existed a diverse range of technological levels in the 
                                                             
48 Sanshigyō Dōgyō Kumiai Chūōkai, ed., Shina sanshigyō taikan, p. 772.  
49 Xu Xinwu, ed., Zhongguo jindai saosi gongyeshi, p. 253.  
 206
reeling industry. The silk industry was neither completely pre-modern, nor totally or 
highly mechanized; it employed techniques and technologies ranging between the 
most traditional ones that were utilized in the nineteenth century to the relatively 
advanced ones that even Shanghai filatures did not adopt.  
There was an enthusiastic tide of technological development in the 1900s. 
Various institutes and individuals participated in improving the indigenous simple 
large frame reeling devices that produced coarse domestic silk. After most producers 
adopted the indigenously improved reeling devices and techniques such as the 
re-reeling of domestic silk and small frames, very few went further to establish steam 
filatures. Political instability prevented large investment in factories, but an economic 
analysis demonstrates that economic concerns were more significant in affecting the 
investors’ choices. Non-mechanized filatures were cheap and could profit well under 
the prosperous market condition, but silk quality was inconsistent and its price 
fluctuated significantly. Steam filatures provided economy of scale advantages and 
high quality fine silk that could obtain high selling prices, but they were expensive 
and risky investments.  
Complicated economic concerns influenced the individual investors’ choices to 
pursue mechanization or otherwise. Nonetheless, the idea of mechanization did not 
appeal to the majority of the participants in the reeling industry in Sichuan. When 
business was promising and economic returns was probable, very few producers 
considered further technological progress. Behind the spectacle of the prosperity of 
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silk industry, there was a rationally-motivated lack of interest in technological 
progress in Sichuan during the 1910s and 1920s.
 208
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Economic Depression and Intensified Involvement of the Provincial Government, 
1932 – 1938 
The 1930s was the watershed decade for the technological development of 
Sichuan sericulture. The interaction of two major processes saw the government 
replace the local elites in the control of expertise. First, the government expelled the 
local elites from the leadership of technological diffusion. Second, modern 
technology succeeded in the competition against indigenous technology. The 
world-wide economic depression compelled local society to reflect, for the first time, 
the weaknesses of indigenous sericulture and to seek modern remedies. The central 
concern was to replace the “backward” indigenous technology with a foreign one 
based on scientific knowledge and mechanization, which required a powerful 
centralized authority to effect. The local elites were financially and intellectually 
incapable of fulfilling the task. The involvement of the government was unavoidable 
and actually welcomed by local society. At the same time, the Sichuan provincial 
government accumulated substantial power after two decades of civil wars. It 
directly intervened in sericulture through the promotion of modern technology. The 
progress of government-initiated technological diffusion, however, alienated the 
local elites and producers using indigenous technologies. After performing leading 
roles in sericulture technological diffusion for thirty years, local elites lost their voice 
to the provincial government and sericulturists from outside Sichuan.  
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Impact of the World Economic Depression 
On 29 October 1929, the Wall Street stock market crashed and consequently 
triggered world-wide economic depression, although the waves of economic 
downturn did not impact China until 1932. China had adopted the silver standard 
system while all the Western countries and Japan were on the gold standard at the 
time of the depression. Silver was a commodity in the gold standard countries and 
therefore its price dropped alongside the other commodities in the economic 
depression. This in turn benefited exports and became a talisman for the Chinese 
economy. During the years of the falling price of silver from 1927 to 1931, all sectors 
of the Shanghai industry and commerce were prosperous.1 Only from the late 1931 
was the prosperity brought by the low price of silver reversed, after the sterling went 
off the gold standard in September 1931, subsequently the Japanese Yen in 1932, 
and the US dollars in 1933. The United States also passed the Silver Purchase Act in 
1934, which enforced the purchase of silver by the Treasury. As a result, the 
international price of silver rose nearly three times from 1932 to 1935.2  
When the protection offered by the silver standard monetary system 
disappeared, silver flowed out from China in great quantities and commodity prices 
declined significantly. Hence, China’s foreign trade suffered severely. At the same 
                                                             
1 Parks M. Coble, Jr., The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist government, 1927 
– 1937, (Cambridge and London: published by Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard 
University, Distributed by Harvard University Press, 1980).  
2 For a detailed examination on the silver price to economic depression in China, see 
Tomoko Shiroyama, China during the Great Depression, chapter 6. 
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time, the Japanese dumping policy increased the availability of Japanese raw silk in 
the international market. Japanese raw silk exports to Europe expanded over 3.4 
times from 1931 to 1934, and nearly pushed Chinese silk out of the international 
market.3 As the largest export item of China, total raw silk export dropped from 
284,000 piculs in 1931 to 147,000 in 1932, returning to its level in the 1880s, and its 
price was reduced by over half from 1931 to 1933.4  
Similarly, the Sichuan silk industry was damaged by shrinking Western demand 
and dropping international prices. Sichuan raw silk lost nearly all of its Western 
market. The export of raw silk through the Chongqing and Wanxian customs declined 
from 13,051 piculs in 1931 to 9,103 piculs in 1932, 6,776 piculs in 1933, and even 
plummeted to as low as 2,910 piculs in 1935. Raw silk had been Sichuan’s leading 
export commodity ever since the late nineteenth century. The value of export raw 
silk always accounted for over one fifth of total exports in Sichuan. It even reached 
40.7 percent of total export value in 1926. However, the importance of raw silk in 
China’s export trade was soon wiped off as a result of the Great Depression. Raw silk 
was only worth 2.3 percent of total export value in 1935.5  
As they were produced for the Western market, filature silk and large amounts 
of re-reeled raw silk were the commodities most heavily impacted by the economic 
                                                             
3 Tomoko Shiroyama, China during the Great Depression, pp. 117-118.  
4 Hsiao Liang-lin, China’s Foreign Trade Statistics, 1864 – 1949 (Cambridge: published 
by East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, Distributed by Harvard University 
Press, 1974), p. 110.  
5 Jiang qingxiang and Li shouyao, eds. Sichuan cansiye, pp. 15-19. 
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decline. There were over 20 steam filatures in the whole province in the 1920s, but 
only 12 were still partially in operation in the early 1930s. The trade of re-reeled 
domestic silk, which was inferior to filature silk, declined even more in the foreign 
market. For instance, the report of the Chongqing customs shows that the majority 
of export silk in March 1934 was made up of filature silk and waste silk, without a 
trace of re-reeled domestic silk.6 Nanchong, as a large center of non-mechanized 
raw silk oriented towards the Western market, suffered a sudden decline. In 1930, 
there were 27 small frame workshops and factories equipped with 3,530 reels in 
both urban and rural Nanchong. There were also over 20 firms producing coarse 
domestic silk using large frames and non-re-reeling small frames. Of the total output 
of 4,000 piculs of raw silk in that year, 2,800 piculs went to the Western markets at a 
price of about 1,300 dollars. In 1932, silk prices plummeted to 380 dollars a picul. 
The number of reeling firms was reduced to 16 in 1932 and 10 in 1933.7 By 1934, 
nearly all reeling firms had been closed down, except one filature and two or three 
workshops that catered to the local weaving industry.8  
In contrast to the rapid decline of the Western market, the tropical markets 
buffered the decline of Sichuan’s raw silk exports to some extent, especially in 
southern Sichuan.9 While production in the largest raw silk producing area of Santai 
and its neighboring regions in northern Sichuan dropped from an annual average 
                                                             
6 Sichuan yubao 4, 4 (April 1934), p. 70.  
7 Xie cheng and Li Renjie, “Nanchong cansi kaikuang”, p. 59.  
8 Sichuan yubao 4, 6 (June 1934), p. 60. 
9 Yin Liangying, Sichuan canye gaijinshi, p. 31.  
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output of 11,500 piculs between 1917 and 1931 to 6,000 piculs between 1932 and 
1936, annual raw silk output in southern Sichuan dropped from 11,000 piculs to 
8,000.10 When the export trade to the Western market was heavily reduced, export 
to Burma and India remained comparatively prosperous. For example, 4,306 piculs of 
Sichuan coarse silk were exported to Burma through Yunnan in 1934, and 6,390 
piculs in 1935.11 The majority was produced in southern Sichuan.  
However, we should not exaggerate the role of the tropical market. It 
constituted only a small fraction of an annual output of over 40,000 piculs of raw silk 
in Sichuan before the 1930s. After all, the tropical business did not reverse the 
decline of sericulture in southern Sichuan, or even in its center, Leshan. Mulberry 
trees were cut down in the countryside and workshop workers were laid off. Except 
for the Huaxin Filature, which was included into the provincial government’s reform 
plan, all the remaining reeling factories in Leshan were closed down in 1934. In 
nearby Jingyan, more than 2,000 workers became unemployed due to the collapse of 
silk reeling industry. Unemployment was more serious in the reeling industry than in 
other types of industry in this county.12  
The economic depression also created serious repercussions on the domestic 
market for raw silk. The silk weaving industry in Sichuan consumed the largest 
                                                             
10 Jiang qingxiang and Li shouyao, eds. Sichuan cansiye, pp. 49-51.  
11 Sichuansheng difangzhi bianzhuan weiyuanhui, ed., Sichuan shengzhi, sichouzhi, p. 
264. 
12 Zhongyang dang’an’guan and Sichuansheng dang’an’guan, eds., Sichuan geming 
lishi wenjian huiji, 12. 1927 – 1934 (Historical documents on revolution in Sichuan, 
December 1927 – 1934), pp. 545, 547.  
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amount of silk produced in the province before the depression. Unfortunately, the 
weaving industry gave no support to sericulture during the depression. The number 
of looms in Chengdu, the largest weaving center of the province, was reduced to 
1,000 from 8,000.13 It was estimated that the number of looms in Chengdu was 
reduced by two third from 1932 to 1933 alone.14 The weaving workshops produced 
about 100,000 bolts of silk pieces in Leshan in the mid-1920s, but only 20,000 to 
30,000 bolts in the mid-1930s.15  
The decreasing international demand for silk pieces did not directly destroy the 
silk industry in Sichuan. It was the plight of the domestic market that seriously 
damaged the weaving industry. It is notable that the finished silk pieces were 
primarily consumed within Sichuan and its neighboring provinces, rather than in the 
foreign market. The highest level of silk pieces export in modern Sichuan was merely 
16,300 bolts, as recorded in 1908. 16  The economic slump was a national 
phenomenon that affected both urban and agrarian economic conditions. The 
decrease in the value of agriculture caused the outflow of capital from rural area to 
cities. The increase in the price of silver led to the urban financial crisis. 17 
Subsequently, domestic purchasing power was restricted. This further contributed to 
the plights of sericulture in Sichuan. 
                                                             
13 You Shimin, ed., Sichuan jindai maoyi shiliao (Primary sources on trade in modern 
Sichuan) (Chengdu: Sichuan daxue chubanshe, 1990), p. 208.  
14 Sichuan yubao 2, 3 (March 1933), p. 95.  
15 Yin Liangying, Sichuan canye gaijinshi, p. 371. 
16 Sichuansheng difangzhi bianzhuan weiyuanhui, ed., Sichuan shengzhi, sichouzhi, p. 
255. 
17 Tomoko Shiroyama, China during the Great Depression, chapters 4 and 6.  
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The domino effect of the silk market’s slump reached the rural economy, 
triggering the decline of the prices of cocoons, mulberry leaves, and silkworm egg 
cards. Cocoon prices dropped from 30-50 cents to as low as 12 cents per catty.18 
Locally produced silkworm egg card fetched 50 to 60 cents during more prosperous 
periods, but only 3 to 5 cents during the depression.19 Peasants who were involved 
in sericulture were deprived of a market and an important source of cash income. 
Moreover, the unpromising sericulture situation exacerbated the plights of tenants 
and debtors. The land owners and money lenders decided that sericultural products 
could no longer be relied on to help tenants to pay off rental and debts and 
demanded more immediate repayment after the autumn harvest.20 Unsurprisingly, 
sericulturist Yin Liangying attributed the collapse of the rural economy in Sichuan’s 
sericulture regions to the failure of sericulture in the 1930s.21 Consequently, many 
farmers abandoned sericulture. For example, sericulture and weaving were the major 
supplementary occupations in the countryside of Changshou county near to 
Chongqing in the mid-1920s. Nevertheless, in the mid-1930s, “mulberry trees were 
cut down and sericulture tools were abandoned,” and peasants turned to cultivate 
citrus.22 Similarly, in Deyang, many peasants who used to rely on the production of 
                                                             
18 You Shimin, ed., Sichuan jindai maoyi shiliao, p. 209.  
19 Xiao Juefei, “Santai cansiye gaikuang”, p. 12.  
20 Zhongyang dang’an’guan and Sichuansheng dang’an’guan, eds. Sichuan geming 
lishi wenjian huiji, p. 547. 
21 For instance, Yin Liangying, Sichuan canye gaijinshi, p. 45. 
22 Masao Kanda, Shisen-shō sōran, p. 407. Also see Changshou xianzhi (Changshou 
county gazetteer), 1944, vol. 4.  
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textile cut down mulberries and replanted other trees.23  
The Emergence of a Powerful Provincial Government  
At the time the economic depression was wreaking its destruction, Sichuan was 
united under a single powerful warlord after a series of political transformations. In 
1926, all major Sichuan warlords declared support for the Nationalist government 
and redesignated their troops as “Nationalist revolutionary armies”. The Nationalist 
government then assigned the Sichuan warlords to official posts. Nominally, Sichuan 
was under the jurisdiction of the Nationalist government, despite the fact that the 
Nationalist government made no tangible intervention in the military in-fighting 
within Sichuan until 1935. By the early 1930s, Liu Xiang and his uncle, Liu Wenhui, 
rose up as the most powerful rivals in Sichuan. Liu Wenhui commanded the 
twenty-fourth revolutionary army and held the position of provincial governor. Liu 
Xiang was the commander of the twenty-first revolutionary army and was appointed 
as Chief of Military Rehabilitation (Sichuan shanhou duban) by the Nationalist 
government. In 1932, the last civil war in Sichuan broke out between the two Lius, 
with the defeat of Liu Wenhui coming in July 1933. Liu Wenhui and his army 
retreated to the mountainous western region of Sichuan that was later called Xikang 
Province. In August 1933, Liu Xiang finally controlled the Sichuan Basin.  
Political unity was crucial to the economic stability of Sichuan, as centralized 
                                                             
23 Minguo Deyang xianzhi (Republican Deyang county gazetteer) (1939, reprint, 
Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 1992), vol. 2  
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economic policies at the provincial level were possible for the first time in twenty 
years. From 1933, Liu Xiang and his supporters started economic reform. Liu Xiang 
led the Office of Military Rehabilitation. His office established the Chongqing 
commodity inspection office in 1933, to be in charge of the inspection of bristle, 
hides, raw silk, and Chinese herbs exported from Chongqing.24 It started stabilizing 
the Chinese currency from 1934 by uniting major local banks to establish the Local 
Bank of Sichuan. It also organized the native goods improvement committee, which 
had branches in some major commercial centers, such as Leshan. These economic 
reforms were not flawless. For instance, The Local Bank stabilized the economy at 
first, but soon caused inflation in mid-1934.25 However, it shows that the provincial 
authority was capable of intervening in the province’s economy at a broad level at 
that time.  
The Sichuan provincial structure was reorganized by the Nationalist government 
in 1935. The new provincial government was formally established in Chongqing on 2 
February 1935, and it abolished the garrison system. Jiang Jieshi introduced a special 
administrative inspectorate system into Sichuan, where the province was divided into 
eighteen inspectorates under the charge of Inspectors appointed by Jiang Jieshi.26  
                                                             
24 Xiang Yuzhang, ed., Zhongguo churujing jianyan jianyi zhi (Record of entry-exit 
inspection and quarantine of China) (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2006), 
vol. 9, p. 5492. 
25 Bai Zhaoyu, “Fanlan yishi de sichuan defang yinhang duihuanquan” (A surfeit of 
exchange certificates of the Local Bank of Sichuan), Sichuan wenshi ziliao xuanji 39 
(1991), pp. 62-79.  
26 Kapp, Szechwan and the Chinese Republic, p. 110. 
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Despite the Nationalist government’s attempt to incorporate Sichuan into the 
national political structure, the leading positions in governing Sichuan were still 
tightly controlled by the local officials. The Nationalist government appointed Liu 
Xiang as the provincial governor, and his supporters occupied other critical positions 
in the Sichuan provincial government. Liu Hangchen for example became the 
provincial treasurer. Liu Hangchen was a Sichuan native, who graduated from the 
Department of Economics at the Peking University, and had been Liu Xiang’s 
treasurer since 1927. Deng Hanxiang was appointed secretary general of the 
provincial government. An influential politician in Sichuan, Deng belonged to the 
inner circle of Liu Xiang regime. Later that year, Lu Zuofu, the most influential 
industrialist in Sichuan and owner of the Minsheng Company, was appointed Chief of 
the Department of Construction. Lu was eager to modernize industry and agriculture. 
This clique of local politicians was so powerful that the central Nationalist 
government continuously faced resistance in its attempt to control Sichuan, even 
after the powerful military leader Liu Xiang passed away in 1938.27 Undoubtedly, the 
powerful local leadership was politically capable of leading economic reforms. The 
backgrounds of these political leaders suggest that they were interested in initiating 
such reforms in a province torn by frequent wars and economic depression.  
Proposal on Modern Technologies 
The economic depression stimulated people in Sichuan to examine the 
                                                             
27 Ibid., chapter 7.  
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shortcomings of sericulture for the first time in Republican Sichuan. The filature 
owners were the first ones to react when the repercussions of the depression were 
just becoming manifest. They considered inefficient management and managerial 
practices as the root of the problem. The solution was to organize their factories into 
a silk cartel. In 1931, several filatures in Chongqing were organized into the Jiuhe 
Company. The Jiuhe Company conducted the collective purchase of raw materials 
and trade of raw silk, through which it hoped to reduce production costs sufficiently 
to achieve a competitive price for raw silk in the Shanghai market.28 However, the 
cartel offered only a temporary boost for the industrial production of raw silk 
without addressing the fundamental problems of sericulture. It was not possible to 
reduce the cost of raw silk without resolving all of the interwoven institutional, 
agricultural, industrial, and financial problems. Moreover, because of the continuing 
deterioration of the international and Chinese economies, the attempt failed within 
one year.  
Following the accelerated decline of sericulture, the intrinsic technical 
shortcomings of sericulture techniques and technologies gradually attracted more 
attention. For example, the Linshui government argued that the quality of silkworm 
eggs was crucial to the quality of silk, and in 1932, distributed to farmers free 
silkworm egg cards produced by its bureau of construction.29 Subsequently, the 
                                                             
28 You Shimin, ed., Sichuan jindai maoyi shiliao, p. 209. It claims the company was 
organized by nine filatures and called “jiuhe” (United nine). Sichuansheng difangzhi 
bianzhuan weiyuanhui, ed., Sichuan shengzhi, sichouzhi suggests the company was 
participated by seven filatures and called “jiuhe” (Long united), see pp. 270-271.  
29 Chuan bao, 3 April 1932.  
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native goods improvement committee of Leshan held a meeting in 1934 to discuss 
the improvement of the silk industry. Concentrating on technological improvement in 
silkworm rearing, silk reeling, and silk weaving, the meeting especially noted the 
importance and urgency of introducing “science” into sericulture.30  
The most thorough review of Sichuan sericulture was made by a foreign expert 
commissioned by the provincial government. In 1933, the Sichuan provincial 
government appealed to the National Economic Commission to investigate the 
problems of Sichuan sericulture. The latter sent a foreign expert to examine the state 
of sericulture in Chongqing, Leshan, Santai, and Mianyang in late 1933. According to 
the survey, the natural climate of Sichuan was advantageous to sericulture, but the 
sericulture technologies utilized were backward. It was dry in spring and mulberry 
leaves contained less moisture, which was suitable for silkworms. The land was fertile 
and the large population was industrious. However, the water used for reeling silk 
had high mineral content, which caused the silk to lose its luster. Both the indigenous 
devices and mechanized reeling machines used in Sichuan sericulture were obsolete. 
The workers lacked professional technical training and the management of the 
filatures was inefficient. Cocoons were not carefully selected before reeling. It took a 
long time to raise a crop of silkworms, and peasants did not protect silkworms 
properly, which increased the risks of silkworm diseases.31   
                                                             
30 “Leshan tugai weiyuanhui zhaokai cansi sizhi liang zhuanhui” (Leshan native goods 
improvement committee held two special meetings on sericulture and silk weaving), 
Sichuan shanhou duban gongshu tuchan gaijin jihua 1, 5 (1934), pp. 194-195.  
31 Sichuan yubao 5, 2 ( July 1934), pp. 41-50. 
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The expert proposed solutions that were based on foreign knowledge and 
techniques. Hi suggested sending technicians and managers into Shanghai filatures 
to learn foreign production and managerial techniques, inviting the graduates and 
teachers from the leading modern sericulture school, the Jiangsu Provincial Girls’ 
Sericulture School, to provide training for workers, grading cocoons according to 
standardized criteria, reducing the speed of reels and upgrading the machines, 
conducting chemical tests of the water used for water, and teaching silkworm raisers 
modern skills.32  
In addition to the government initiative, the private sector also explored the 
problems and solutions of sericulture. In 1933, Li Kui’an and Huang Mianzhan, 
representing the Chongqing Silk Guild, proposed a plan for the recovery of the 
Sichuan silk industry. They summarized the factors that led to the failure of Sichuan 
silk – Sichuan silk producers did not keep up with the development and the needs of 
the international market; factories were not well organized, financed, and equipped; 
experts and professionals were lacking in dealing with the problems in factories. 
Furthermore, the raw materials were of low quality and the machines were outdated. 
Modern management methods in the factories or direct connections with foreign 
purchasers were non-existent. Local producers competed among one another and 
local industry did not receive government support. To resolve these problems, they 
suggested studying advanced factories, sending promising students overseas to study, 
subscribing to and studying foreign sericulture journals, updating existing equipment, 
                                                             
32 Ibid. 
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setting up sericulture schools and research institutes, raising abundant capital, 
establishing cooperatives related to all stages of the sericulture industry, from 
production to sale.33 In 1936, an article titled “Personal view on reviving Sichuan 
sericulture” was published in the journal Sichuan Peasants. It similarly underscored 
that sericulture should be improved through training professionals, improving 
silkworm and mulberry varieties through scientific testing, introducing modern 
cocoon drying techniques and reeling machines, and organizing cocoon purchasing 
institutions and a centralized silk marketing system.34  
These views on Sichuan sericulture all emphasized the overall improvement of 
existing technologies. The economic crisis had exposed all the weaknesses of the 
existing technologies, regardless of whether they were indigenously originated or 
foreign imported. The proposers called for systematic reform encompassing all stages 
of sericultural production, from the mulberries seeds to the silkworm eggs, from the 
leaves for feeding silkworms to the water for boiling cocoons, and from the silkworm 
rearing rooms to the silk reeling factories. Most importantly, rather than simply 
encouraging increased output, these appeals highlighted that the reforms should be 
tied with mechanized technologies and knowledge from laboratory experiments and 
measurable empirical data.  
In fact, the improvements sought were far beyond the capability of private 
                                                             
33 Li Kui’an and Huang Mianzhan, “Jiuji sichuan siye zhi yijian” (Suggestion on 
recovering silk industry in Sichuan) Gongshang tekan 1(1933), pp. 22-53.  
34  Zhang Zhenhua, “Fuxing Sichuan cansiye zhi wojian” (Personal opinion on 
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individuals. Local non-official and semi-official elites were, despite their ardor, too 
powerless to carry out large scale technological improvement. Most of them had no 
financial strength to finance the most advanced filatures and to keep developing 
them. They were incapable of influencing large scale reform in the countryside either. 
Furthermore, the economic plight in the early 1930s had heavily weakened their 
financial might. They were not able to carry out vertically integrated technological 
reform that combined agrarian modernization and urban industrialization. Their 
strategy of grafting improved technology onto existing local conditions was unable to 
resolve the inherent problems of sericulture. Li Kui’an and Huang Mianzhan pointed 
out clearly that the private sector had exhausted its financial ability. They appealed 
resolutely to the government to support and sponsor reforms to increase 
productivity and improve the quality of raw silk.35 Similarly, an article in the 
Commercial Daily in Chongqing argues that the provincial government should be 
primarily responsible for the recovery of sericulture.36  
Provincial Government Intervention in Industrial Production  
The economic depression transformed the structure of the silk reeling industry, 
and allowed the provincial government to increase its influence in it. The filature 
owners and silk dealers welcomed the government intervention in the beginning, but 
soon found them powerless and hapless after the government’s unexpected 
takeover.  
                                                             
35 Li Kui’an and Huang Mianzhan, “Jiuji sichuan siye zhi yijian”, pp. 44-45. 
36 Chongqing shangwu ribao (Chongqing commercial daily), 5 September 1933.  
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Ever since the depression began, the silk producers had eagerly requested relief 
from the provincial authority and the Nationalist government. The Chongqing Silk 
Guild dispatched representatives to Nanjing to appeal to the Ministry of Finance to 
issue silk bonds, while the Chongqing Chamber of Commerce requested relief funds 
from the Ministry of Industry, like what was done in Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Santai silk 
merchants also sent a report on the silk industry to the Ministry of Industry to seek 
assistance. In response, the central Nationalist government exempted Sichuan raw 
silk from export duties, but delegated further relief issues to the provincial 
government. The latter only provided a meager amount of 20,000 dollars for the 
industry, and instructed the military garrisons to reduce or remove transit taxes and 
other levies on silk; these instructions were hardly obeyed by all local military 
authorities.37  
The provincial Committee for the Rehabilitation of Sichuan Silk (Chuansi zhengli 
weiyuanhui) was organized in January 1933. The committee was composed of 
government members, bankers, and silk industrialists. It maintained three sections 
that took charge of rural sericulture, industrial production, and marketing 
respectively. Liu Xiang’s followers controlled the committee in reality. The head of 
the committee, Gao Xianjian was Liu Xiang’s expert advisor. Liu Hangchen controlled 
the section of industrial production. The general manager of the Dahua Raw Silk 
Company that was formed by the committee was Ning Zhicun, a supporter of Liu 
                                                             
37 Sichuan yubao, 1, 2 (August 1932), pp. 15-17; 1, 3 (September 1932), p. 27；and 1, 
6 (December 1932), p. 26. 
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Hangchen.38  The local banking industry was another active participant in the 
committee, unsurprising since the silk industry was closely tied with the local banks. 
Local banks lent money to silk dealers and producers with high interest and expected 
to receive hefty profits. The collapse of factories and excessive supplies of raw silk 
created the financial crisis. The banks were unable to withdraw the previous loans to 
the silk producers, and the latter could not receive further financial aid from the 
former. The banking industry therefore favored the plan of merging silk reeling 
factories so that both could survive the economic depression.39 
According to the committee’s plan, eleven steam filatures in Sichuan were 
combined to form the Dahua Raw Silk Company. The Dahua represented nearly the 
total capacity of filature silk production in Sichuan at the time.40 In January 1933, 
only 12 filatures remained under operation in March that year, when the Dahua was 
established. The Dahua owned assets totaling more than 1,650,000 dollars and 4036 
reels, over 64 percent of the steam reels in the province. Of the other 36 percent of 
reels in Sichuan, only 256 were still running that year. The capital of the Dahua came 
from three sources – the investment of individual filatures, the company-issued 
bonds, and the loan provided by the banking industry. The latter two were secured 
by the Committee for the Rehabilitation of Sichuan Silk.  
The Committee conducted an integrated reform of sericultural production and 
                                                             
38 You Shimin, ed., Sichuan jindai maoyi shiliao, p. 210.  
39 Xu Xinwu, ed., Zhongguo jindai saosi gongyeshi, p. 353. 
40 Ibid., p. 354.  
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industrial managerial technology in the Dahua Raw Silk Company. It introduced to 
the peasantry the improved white silkworm variety, improved the quality of 
mechanized produced raw silk, and traded directly with foreign export companies.41 
In the spring of 1933, the Dahua accumulated the capital to purchase over 40,000 
piculs of fresh cocoons. These cocoons were distributed to the eleven filatures to 
produce, with a commission of 240 dollars per picul.42 Despite these efforts, costs 
were still higher than the international price of raw silk. The silk price was as low as 
about 300 dollars a picul in the Shanghai market in 1934.43 The Dahua stopped 
business in 1935 with a deficit of 1,200,000 dollars.44   
Despite the failure of the Dahua, the Sichuan government did not give up 
controlling silk production. The Department of Construction charged by Lu Zuofu at 
the time announced five guiding principles for the reform of filature silk industry in 
Sichuan. The central point was to integrate all existing filatures under tight 
government control. The provincial government would appraise the filatures and 
take over the filatures or assets that matched the criteria to set up a silk corporation, 
so that raw silk could be rationally produced in Sichuan, based on the level of 
demand in the Shanghai markets and the availability of cocoons locally.45 The debt 
obligations of the eleven filatures of the Dahua constituted one reason why the 
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government could so boldly take over the filatures. After the Dahua was closed down, 
the Committee for the Rehabilitation of Sichuan Silk issued company bonds to repay 
the loan of 450,500 dollars from the banking industry, which increased the 
government’s share in the steam filatures.46  
The owners of the eleven filatures rejected the proposal. They acknowledged 
the debts and agreed to turn over their properties, but were reluctant to allow their 
enterprises to be taken over by the government without any compensation. They 
asked the government to purchase the filatures and assets. The other four filatures 
that did not join in the Dahua refused to join the government-private joint enterprise 
since they had not been a part of the Dahua and was not indebted to the provincial 
government.47  
Lu Zuofu, however, argued that centralized control and reorganization of the 
industry was the only plausible solution, since financial subsidy from the government 
for the private companies had been proven inadequate in resolving the problems.48 
Hence, the government threatened not to issue business licenses to the filatures, 
and announced that the government would take over the filatures belonging to the 
Dahua. It also decreed that the filatures should not resume operations until they met 
the strict criteria it formulated.49 In the contest between the provincial government 
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and the local entrepreneurs, the former certainly gained the upper hand because of 
its political power.  
Subsequently, the provincial government ordered to set up the Raw Silk Trading 
Company based on the property of the Dahua in 1936. The government provided 
200,000 dollars to the company as a “relief” fee. Of these, 120,000 dollars was set 
aside to maintain filature production, but this objective was never realized. 20,000 
dollars was for improving silkworm varieties, and 60,000 formed the government’s 
investment on the stock of the company. At the same time, the company raised 
private shares of 60,000 dollars.50 The company yielded a considerable net profit of 
83,403.82 dollars in 1936.51 Nevertheless, the tension between the filature owners 
and the government was not relieved.  
The provincial government further reorganized the Raw Silk Trading Company as 
the Sichuan Silk Corporation (Sichuan siye gongsi) in 1937. He Beiheng became the 
new chief of the Department of Construction in 1937. He gave some concessions to 
the silk merchants and formed an agreement with them. The Raw Silk Trading 
Company, the filature owners, and share-holders became the co-owners of the 
Sichuan Silk Corporation, the largest silk company in Sichuan in the Republic. He 
Beiheng himself became the chairman of the board. Silk merchants assumed most of 
the positions in the board and management. However, the property of the 
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participating filatures was measured after deducting the debts they owed while part 
of the Dahua, which means the filature owners’ shares in the new company, and 
consequently their influence, shrunk. In reality, the Sichuan Silk Corporation was 
handled by the provincial government. According to Wen Shaohe, the leader of the 
silk merchants in Chongqing during the Republican era, the provincial government 
held 70 percent of the company’s stocks in 1937.52 
After gaining control over the major steam filatures, the provincial government 
introduced a series of restrictions on the non-mechanized reeling factories. The 
Sichuan Silk Corporation had the right to monopolize all improved cocoons, and 
controlled the production of steam filature silk, according to the sixth section of the 
“Sichuan Provincial Government’s Management Guidelines on the Silk Industry” 
(Sichuansheng zhengfu guanli cansiye banfa dagang) in 1937. 53  Non-filature 
factories were not allowed to purchase improved cocoons, nor be upgraded to steam 
filatures without joining the Sichuan Silk Corporation. 54  In other words, the 
provincial government prohibited all private ownership of industrialized silk reeling. 
Through the Sichuan Silk Corporation, the provincial government realized 
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centralized management and tight control over filature silk production, which 
facilitated official diffusion of sericulture technology. The company widely employed 
sericulture experts who were trained in top Chinese modern sericulture schools or 
overseas, especially after a lot of experts migrated into Sichuan following the 
outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. It carried out technological education to 
train skilled workers and technical personnel.55 It began to introduce advanced 
multi-ends reeling machines that could produce raw silk of consistently high quality 
and productivity. By the end of the Republic, the number of multi-ends reeling 
machines accounted for one eighth of the total mechanized reels. Nearly all 
multi-ends reeling machines belonged to the Sichuan Silk Corporation. It also 
invested in cocoon drying machines, and invented the dual cocoon drying technique 
that could produce high quality dry cocoons.56  
Nevertheless, government intervention actually demonstrates governmental 
monopoly over the technology of industrial raw silk production and the decline of 
local elites’ control of knowledge. It is notable that above-mentioned innovations 
and technological diffusions were conducted and limited within the Sichuan Silk 
Corporation. From the Dahua Raw Silk Company to the Raw Silk Trading Company, to 
the final formation of the Sichuan Silk Corporation, the provincial government 
accelerated its influence vis-à-vis the declining autonomy of filature owners. In 
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addition to the ban on establishing private filatures, the private sector was prevented 
from controlling and utilizing expert knowledge. The civil society that had 
collaborated with the government and been the leading force in knowledge diffusion 
for thirty years was now powerless in confronting the government. Excluded from 
the leadership and severed from access to the new technology, both steam filature 
owners, and non-steam filature owners became the victims of government 
intervention. The government’s monopoly on the industrial production of raw silk 
was ultimately detrimental to the diffusion of reeling technology.  
Provincial Government Intervention in Rural Sericulture  
The decline of the raw silk market reminded local society of the issue of 
reforming the agrarian stage of sericulture. It was eventually decided that the growth 
of economic efficiency in raw silk production required solutions beyond the 
improvement of mechanized machines and the reorganization of filatures. The 
performance of mechanized reeling machines was deemed to be connected to the 
quality of cocoons. While controlling filature production, the provincial government 
also intervened through sericulture reform in the countryside. Similar to what had 
happened in the industrial sector, the agrarian sector demonstrated the diminishing 
influence of local elites.  
Rural sericulture reform began from the introduction of new varieties of 
silkworms. From the beginning, the reform was carried out by official reformers from 
outside of Sichuan. The new silkworm varieties were produced through laboratory 
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tests and scientific breeding. These varieties were crossbred for high disease 
resistance and silk productivity. Sericulturists examined eggs under microscopes to 
check if they were disease contaminated before distributing them to the silkworm 
raisers. These new varieties called improved silkworms (gailiangzhong), to 
distinguish them from the domestically bred varieties that were generally called 
native silkworms (tuzhong). Before the 1930s, there were no improved silkworm 
varieties in Sichuan, but in the lower Yangzi, improved varieties had been bred and 
spread for a few years. The International Committee for the Improvement of 
Sericulture was the leading improved silkworm supplier in China in the 1930s.57 
Established in Shanghai in 1917 by the cooperation between the French, British, and 
American merchants, and the Jiangsu-Zhejiang-Anhui Silk and Cocoon Guild, it 
gradually set up quite a few breeding stations in Jiangsu and Zhejiang in the following 
years.58 Through the International Committee for the Improvement of Sericulture, 
the Committee of Rehabilitation of Sichuan Silk purchased over 4,000 silkworm cards 
of improved variety in 1934. This was the first time that improved silkworm varieties 
were introduced into Sichuan. These cards were distributed to peasants of several 
counties including Jiangbei, Baxian, Nanchong, Leshan, Yanting, Santai, and Mianyang. 
At the same time, the National Economic Council dispatched sericulture experts into 
Sichuan to supervise peasants in raising the improved varieties. Three instruction 
stations (zhidaosuo) were set up in Baxian, Santai, and Mianyang. They were the first 
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modern sericulture technological diffusion stations in Sichuan. The trial of improved 
silkworms was successful in producing a healthy high yield crop of cocoons that year. 
The market price of improved cocoons was about 50 percent higher than that of 
native cocoons.59  
In 1936, the provincial government set up the provincial Sericulture Reform 
Base (Cansi gailiangchang) to facilitate the experimentation and spread of modern 
sericulture technology. The Sericulture Reform Base was located in Nanchong, and 
set up offices in major sericulture producing regions. Despite the frequent changes of 
its name, its supervising offices and the organizations under its charge, the Reform 
Base specialized in sericulture laboratory research, mulberry sapling cultivation, 
silkworm egg breeding, and the promotion of sericulture technology. The 
establishment of the reform base made possible the diffusion of modern sericulture 
in the Sichuan countryside. 
Due to the underdeveloped conditions of modern sericulture in Sichuan, the 
Sericulture Reform Base sought help from the Nationalist government in Nanjing, 
which had resources in terms of professionals and expertise. Sichuan at the time was 
no longer separated from the national government. This political integration 
facilitated Sichuan’s application for technological help. In 1937, the Sichuan 
provincial sericulture reform base signed a contract with the National Agricultural 
Research Bureau in Nanjing. The research bureau was given the rights to supervise 
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and examine the reform base’s research plans, and to dispatch personnel to provide 
advice in Sichuan. In return, the provincial sericulture reform base could have their 
personnel trained and their research findings tested in Nanjing.60 
Yin Liangying presided over the Reform Base from 1936 to 1945. Yin was born in 
Anhui in 1913. He studied in the department of sericulture in the Fifth Provincial 
Agricultural School of Anhui, then subsequently studied in and received the degree 
of Bachelor in Agriculture from the National Central University in Nanjing. After 
graduation, he worked as a teaching assistant in the National Central University, and 
then became a technician in the Ministry of Industry’s Bureau for the Inspection and 
Testing of Commercial Commodities, in charge of the inspection of imported 
silkworm eggs, at the same time supervising the breeding stations in Nanjing. Later 
he was appointed as the Head of the department of sericulture in the Huaiyin 
Provincial Advanced Agricultural School in Jiangsu. Between 1932 and 1935, he 
received a Nationalist government scholarship to study in the Tokyo Imperial 
University.  
Nearly all sericulture professionals in the Reform Base were strangers to Sichuan, 
or received sericulture education outside of Sichuan. They possessed the latest 
sericulture knowledge. From the onset of the Reform Base’s establishment, they took 
charge of the introduction and implementation of modern reform. Yin Liangying was 
representative of these external professional change agents in Sichuan in the 1930s 
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and 1940s. Even Xiong Jiguang, a Sichuan native, had little involvement in sericulture 
in Sichuan before he joined the Reform Base. Xiong had received sericulture 
education in Nanjing and Japan. Before he became the technician of the Reform Base 
in Nanchong, he spent his whole career as a sericulturist in the lower Yangzi.61 In 
fact, the large number of external sericulture experts faced serious language barriers 
and terminological problems at the beginning of the reform effort.62  
Another significant characteristic of these reformers was they belonged to the 
generation strongly influenced by the cultural transformations ignited by the May 
Fourth Movement. The May Fourth intelligentsia placed great emphasis on science. 
Intellectuals as Hu Shi, Cheng Duxiu, and Wu Zhihui attacked the traditional Chinese 
order by calling for a scientific revolution. They infected a generation of students 
with the commitment to create a new civilized society of civilization, based on 
foreign science, by rejecting Chinese tradition.63 Influenced by the New Thought tide 
of the May Fourth Movement, a generation of sericulture reformers distinguished 
them from the previous sericulture reformers in Sichuan such as Zhang Senkai, Chen 
Wanxi, and Zhang Lan. The previous generation of sericulture promoting elites, such 
as Chen Wanxi, integrated Confucian moral teaching and sericulture deity worship 
with sericulture. This new generation, in contrast, completely abandoned the 
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sericulture gods. Female sericulturist Fei Dasheng, who I will discuss with more 
details in the next chapter, belonged to this new group. She once commented on the 
achievements of sericultural reform in rural Sichuan in 1939, “In the past, peasants 
went to temples, burnt incense, and prayed to the gods, now they know that they 
need to trust knowledge and science.”64    
The Sericulture Reform Base was both a research institute for technological 
innovation and an agency for technological diffusion. For Yin Liangying, the reform 
base was an endeavor to realize the goals of “from countryside to research 
laboratory” and “promoting knowledge through practice.”65 The reform base carried 
out research on the local silkworm and mulberry varieties, as well as tested and 
improved indigenous practices of silkworm rearing. These research accumulated 
Chinese sericulture knowledge and also helped to adapt non-native varieties and 
technologies to local conditions.  
Other than laboratory research, the Sericulture Reform Base made more 
significant achievements in spreading modern sericulture technology. It specially 
focused on silkworm egg production and distribution ever since it was established. 
Improved silkworm eggs were the foundation of the improved quality and output of 
raw silk. However, the inland location of Sichuan did not favor the ideal of shipping 
silkworm eggs from the breeding stations in the coastal China. Long-distance 
transportation was costly and could damage the silkworm eggs. The high silkworm 
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egg demand in Sichuan also far exceeded the production capability of coastal 
breeding stations. In 1936, the Reform Base produced silkworm eggs from the 
original breeds that were sent from the lower Yangzi. In 1937, it started breeding 
original breeds to enable the self-sustainability and development of modern 
sericulture in Sichuan. In the same year, the Reform Base succeeded in producing an 
autumn crop of silkworm eggs. It made possible the large-scale diffusion of the 
techniques of producing two crops of silkworms annually in Sichuan. Thus, the 
silkworm egg production capability of the reform base increased significantly. By the 
late 1937, the reform base had supervised six breeding stations and produced 
279,916 improved silkworm egg cards in total.66 From 1938, the Sichuan Silk 
Corporation handled improved egg production and distribution. It distributed 
480,000 cards in 1938, 620,000 cards in 1939. The highest output and distribution of 
the Sichuan Silk Corporation was in 1940 when it produced 710,000 cards. Due to the 
economic difficulty and declined financial support from the provincial government, 
the output of improved silkworm cards was reduced from 1941, but still accounting 
for over 300,000 cards annually.67  
At the same time, the Sericulture Reform Base cultivated and distributed 
mulberry saplings of fine varieties. Mulberry trees were widely destroyed during the 
economic depression. The recovery of sericulture required the abundant supply of 
mulberry leaves. The availability of fine mulberry leaves could reduce the production 
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costs of cocoons significantly. The first mulberry nursery was set up in Nanchong in 
1936, with only 5,530 saplings in that year. The number increased significantly and 
peaked in 1940, when the nurseries in ten counties, taking up a total of 2616.17 mu 
of land, grew a total amount of 43,710,635 mulberry saplings.68  
The Reform Base’s department for the encouragement of sericulture handled 
the task of spreading modern sericultural knowledge and skill to the rural 
communities. It set up instruction stations as promotional branches in the major 
sericulture counties. In 1936, it controlled ten instruction stations in Nanchong, 
Xichong, Langzhong, and Santai.69 The department developed quickly and it was 
reorganized as the sericulture encouragement committee in 1938, under the 
supervision of the Bureau of Sichuan Agricultural Reform. Its capacity was increased 
to 84 instruction stations and 325 staff in 1940. The scale of the encouragement 
committee was reduced after 1941, and it was taken over by the Sichuan Silk 
Corporation in 1943.70  
These instruction stations were the close link between peasants and the 
Sericulture Reform Base. They administered the applications for silkworm egg cards, 
registered peasants who wanted technological supervision, and taught peasants 
mulberry cultivation from January to March. After distributing silkworm egg cards in 
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April, they organized collective hatching and rearing, and guided silkworm rearing 
and mounting. In June, they helped with the cocoon harvest. From July to September, 
they led rearing of autumn crops. They investigated the output of cocoons in October. 
November and December were for mulberry cultivation instruction and peasant 
training. Chen Ciyu estimated that 61 percent of silkworm raisers in northern Sichuan 
had accepted instruction.71  
The provincial government adopted a direct method of technological transfer to 
develop productivity in rural sericulture. The provincial Sericulture Reform Base as a 
government institute had become both the source and the channel of sericulture 
technology diffusion since 1936. It was an innovator and introducer, from which 
modern sericulture knowledge, practice, and products were propagated. It was also a 
channel in itself. Through its integrated organizations, the knowledge, practice, and 
products were distributed to the rural silkworm raisers.  
Collectively, the provincial government and their employees replaced the local 
elites in technological diffusion in rural sericulture. The provincial government 
stopped being as aloof from agrarian reform as it had been in the 1910s and 1920s, 
but actively promoted modern technology in the countryside. In addition, the staff of 
the Sericulture Reform Base became a new group of technological change agents. 
They were primarily outsiders to the province, and had received high education in 
modern schools and governmental salaries as governmental employees.  
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Conclusion  
Following the economic depression and the unification of the province, Sichuan 
sericulture technological diffusion started a new era. First, the period between 1931 
and 1938 witnessed the rising leadership of the provincial government, and the 
diminishing influence of the local elites. The provincial government controlled 
filatures, which were traditionally the domain of local elites as innovators in 
sericulture technology. Through its economic policies, the government further 
abolished the role of non-filature producers as receivers of modern reeling 
technology. At the agrarian stage of sericulture, there was also a tendency of 
expelling local elites from technological diffusion. The provincial government 
depended on external sericulture experts to evaluate the situation, to design the 
reform plans, and to carry out the rural reform.  
Second, this phase reveals a demarcation between indigenous and modern 
technologies in sericulture. The government’s intervention in the filatures drew a 
clear line between the mechanized and non-mechanized production of raw silk. It 
considered that only mechanized manufacturing could increase economic efficiency. 
The non-mechanized workshops were incurably backward and should not receive any 
special treatment. The provincial Sericulture Reform Base, similarly, spread new 
varieties and technologies that were never introduced into rural Sichuan. Even 
though its staff, many of whom had received the latest sericulture education in Japan, 
agreed the native technologies were not completely bad, they believed that these 
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native means had to be tested and improved through scientific methodologies. The 
provincial government and its reformers reached a consensus that Sichuan should 
adopt a set of modern sericulture techniques, including the industrialization of 
reeling processes and the modernization of agrarian production.  
Third, this phase of technological reform precipitated rapid deskilling and 
re-skilling of rural sericulture. Following the public emphasis on modern technologies, 
farmers gradually lost their skills in many stages of sericulture. In the production 
chain of cocoons, farmers only needed to handle a small fraction of skills now. 
Farmers did not have to know how to produce improved silkworm eggs and mulberry 
seedlings. They did not need to process fresh cocoons by themselves, because 
improved cocoons required specific treatment. To some extent, farmers were 
deskilled as a result of the government’s intervention.  
While the peasants were rapidly deskilled of their traditional knowledge, they 
were also infused with modern skills. The sericulture instruction stations and 
reformers actively distributed various skills related to the procedure of rearing 
silkworm and cultivating mulberries. Peasants learned to disinfect rearing equipment 
and rooms, to hatch silkworms under the appropriate temperature, to feed 
silkworms with suitable sizes and quantities of leaves, to trim and fertilize mulberries, 
and to harvest cocoons efficiently, etc.   
The economic depression had stimulated government participation in Sichuan 
sericulture. The financial, institutional, and administrative ability of the provincial 
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government resolved some previous problems that previous technological diffusion 
encountered, such as the lack of professional expertise, knowledge, and skills. 
However, these centralized means of diffusion were not flawless. Rather, government 
intervention caused some new problems and even prohibited further development, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Chinese Communist Party, the Nationalist Government, and Reformist 
Intellectuals, 1938 – 1945 
The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War eventually transformed Sichuan 
into the very core of Free China. In late 1937, the Nationalist government announced 
the shift of the capital from Nanjing to Chongqing. A great number of educational 
and research institutions, factories, and professionals were relocated to Sichuan from 
the more developed coastal regions. Technological transfer was more intensive in this 
phase than previous years, affecting every single production enterprise, including the 
silk industry. This chapter first examines how the wartime situation offered Sichuan 
an opportunity for sericulture technological development. I will pay particular 
attention to a sericulture reform project in the southern Sichuan sponsored by the 
Nationalist government between 1938 and 1945, the Leshan Sericulture 
Experimental Area (LSEA).  
In the previous phases, sericulture technological improvement primarily served 
economic purposes. However, during the wartime era, it became interwoven with 
national politics to an unprecedented degree. At the time, there was a national 
consensus towards production for the sake of the anti-Japanese war. The major 
leaders, namely the Nationalist government, the CCP, and reformist intellectuals, 
however, embraced different strategies towards sericulture reform. They cooperated 
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with one another, but also clashed over ideas and practices most of the time. Their 
divergent activities received different responses from the affected producers, 
particularly the rural silkworm raisers. 
The sericulture reform of the LSEA, in fact, represented an economic United 
Front among three groups of distinct political identities. Research on the wartime 
relationship between the CCP and the Nationalist government concentrates mostly 
on their political and military cooperation and confrontation.1 Earlier scholarship has 
also contributed to the understanding of the economic activities organized by these 
individual political groups. 2  However, little research has been done on their 
economic cooperation in promoting production in the countryside in the 
Nationalist-held areas during the war, in spite of the importance of the economy to 
the war.  
This chapter therefore studies how different ideas and practices interacted 
within sericulture reform in wartime Sichuan, and argues their interaction shared the 
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same pattern to that of the military United Front. As result of the conflicting ideas 
and practices, the effectiveness of sericulture reform was highly limited. 
The Arrival of the Nationalist Government  
After years of tension between Japan and China, full scale war broke out after 
the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937. Japanese military training maneuvers 
near to the Marco Polo Bridge on the outskirts of Beiping (Beijing) on the night of 7 
July 1937 had led to an exchange of fire between the Chinese and Japanese armies in 
the early morning of the next day. Both the CCP and the Nationalist government 
adopted an unyielding attitude towards the incident. The CCP immediately 
responded to the incident by calling for nation-wide resistance on 8 July. Jiang Jieshi 
too made an announcement on 17 July, declaring that China would prepare for 
self-defense and fight to the end. Nevertheless, a large area of territory was soon 
occupied by Japanese troops. Beiping (Beijing) and Tianjin, the largest cities in North 
China fell in August. Then Shanghai, the economic center of China came under attack 
from 13 August. The Nationalist government issued the “Proclamation of 
Self-Defense” on 14 August. The battle of Shanghai lasted three months. During this 
stage, the Nationalist government officially acknowledged the legal status of the CCP 
and formally announced cooperation between the CCP and the Nationalist 
government on 23 September. This marked the beginning of the Second United Front. 
After the fall of Shanghai, Japanese troops moved towards Nanjing, the political 
center of China at the time, forcing the Nationalist government to move the capital 
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to Chongqing in November, 1937.  
When Chongqing was elevated as the temporary national capital, Sichuan 
immediately became the core of national politics, economy, and culture. Following 
the retreat of the Nationalist government, a huge number of educational and 
research institutes, factories, technicians, professionals, and students eventually 
migrated into Sichuan. By the end of 1940, 448 factories were relocated into interior 
China, of which 254 were in Sichuan.3 Sichuan developed a complete industrial 
structure with ordnance, heavy, light, and chemical industries. Higher educational 
institutions, including national and private universities, independent colleges, 
technical schools, private independent colleges, were relocated into Sichuan. By the 
end of the war, there were 50 higher educational institutions in Sichuan, including 
many leading universities in China.4 These educational institutions represented the 
most advanced knowledge and technology China possessed at the time.  
For the first time, large scale diffusion of modern technologies was possible for 
all types of productions in Sichuan. Before the war, Sichuan was less developed than 
the coastal regions. In the eyes of the “downriver” people from the lower Yangzi 
River, even Chongqing, the leading treaty port and most commercialized city of 
Sichuan, was backward and under-modernized.5 The arrival of the various political, 
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economic, educational, and cultural organizations and institutes, together with the 
immigrants, brought modern knowledge and practices into Sichuan. Although the 
wartime circumstances created several serious obstacles to technological diffusion 
such as the shortage of funding and materials, it also precipitated urgent demands 
on the adoption of technology to increase the output and quality of products.  
In comparison to the desolate prewar state of sericulture education, there was 
an emergence of sericulture educational institutions in wartime Sichuan. The Jiangsu 
Provincial Girls’ Sericulture School was relocated to Leshan and renamed as the 
Jiangsu Provincial School of Sericulture (Jiangsu shengli cansi zhuanke xuexiao). This 
school was the leading sericulture school in China and had accomplished significant 
achievements in sericulture research and reform before the war. The National 
Sichuan University established the department of sericulture in 1938. The Sichuan 
provincial Sericulture Reform Base and the Nanchong government worked together 
to transform the Nanchong Vocational School into the Provincial Nanchong High 
School of Sericulture (Sichuan shengli nanchong gaoji cansike zhiye xuexiao) in 1939.6 
The students of the Girls’ School of the International Committee for the 
Improvement of Sericulture finished their education in the Nanchong High School of 
Sericulture during the war. In 1939, the National Central School of Technology (Guoli 
zhongyang jiyi zhuanke xuexiao) was established in Leshan, with a department of 
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sericulture. In addition, a large number of leading Chinese sericulturists, such as 
Wang Tianyu, Ge Jingzhong, Wang Ganzhi, Zhao Hongji, Sun Benzhong, Jiang 
Tongqing, Zheng Pijiang, and Duan Youyun, immigrated into Sichuan. They worked in 
the schools, research institutions, and the silk industry.  
The high commercial and military value of silk encouraged the demand for the 
improvement of sericulture technology. By 1938, the Japanese troops had occupied 
the major sericulture regions in China. Sichuan was the only large raw silk supplier 
that was completely controlled by the Chinese government. Despite the decline of 
exports amidst the economic depression, the potential value of raw silk as a 
commodity of exchange for foreign currency was again highlighted in the war. Light 
and valuable, raw silk was an ideal product for export even amidst the increased 
difficulty of wartime transportation. The Chinese government signed three barter 
trade contracts with the U.S.S.R between 1938 and 1939. Raw silk was one of the 
goods that China supplied to the U.S.S.R in exchange for loans and other forms 
assistance. During the war, the importance of raw silk was further underscored by its 
military use. It was the raw material used to manufacture parachutes and powder 
bags. In 1938, the state-owned parachute factory migrated from Changsha, Hunan, 
into Leshan, to rely on the established silk industry in the region.  
Civil demands on silk goods expanded with the population increase. Many 
immigrants from the lower Yangzi had to substitute Sichuan silk goods for those 
produced in Suzhou, Huzhou, Hangzhou, and Nanjing, the famous silk centers 
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occupied by the enemies. In Leshan alone, the output of silk pieces increased from 
about 30,000 bolts in 1937 to 60,000 to 70,000 bolts in 1941, and even reached 
100,000 bolts in 1942.7 Another report even suggests that a more reliable estimate 
of the output of silk in Leshan in 1942 was 150,000 bolts.8 Nevertheless, the highest 
recorded prewar output of silk pieces in Leshan was only around 100,000 bolts, as 
reported by the local silk guild.9 The outbreak of war actually reversed the decline of 
the silk weaving industry in Leshan. 
Raw silk was of such importance in the wartime economy that the Sichuan 
Production Planning Commission formulated an ambitious plan, with technological 
improvement as its central focus. It calls for the improvement of the output and 
quality of raw silk between 1941 and 1943. It aimed to distribute 210,000,000 
mulberry saplings and 6,200,000 improved silkworm egg cards, to train 7,000 
sericulture experts, and to produce 78,250 piculs of raw silk of high quality by 
gradually increasing the availability of reeling equipment.10  
The Nationalist government immediately involved itself in the Sichuan Silk 
Corporation once it relocated to Chongqing. The Central Bank of China, the Bank of 
China, the Bank of Communications, and the Farmers’ Bank of China, the Central 
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Trust of China, the Postal Remittance and Saving Bank all invested in the Sichuan Silk 
Corporation.11  The shares the Nationalist government held in the Corporation 
reached 30 percent in the autumn 1938, and 51 percent in 1941.12 Song Ziwen (T. V. 
Soong), chairman of the board of the Bank of China, Xu Guangzhi, manager of the 
Chongqing Branch of the Bank of China, and Qian Xinzhi, chairman of the board of 
the Bank of Communications, and some Nationalist government officials such as He 
Lian (Franklin Ho) and Xu Kan joined its board.13  
The Ministry of Finance increasingly intensified state control over exportable 
Chinese products including silk, as the war progressed. Kong Xiangxi (H. H. Kung) 
headed the ministry. He had replaced Song Ziwen as the minister in 1933, and 
occupied the position for 11 years. Kong differed from Song in the conduct of 
economic policy. Song was inclined to support the Chinese private industrialists and 
merchants.14  Kong on the other hand was more interested in enforcing state 
intervention in the economy at the expense of private enterprise and industry.  
The Ministry of Finance controlled China’s foreign trade through the Foreign 
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shiye”, p. 58.  
14 Marie-Claire Bergere, The Golden Age of the Chinese Bourgeoisie, 1911-1937, 
trans. Janet Lloyd (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press; Paris : Editions 
de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, 1989), p. 285; and Margherita Zanasi, Saving 
the Nation, p. 83. 
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Trade Commission and the companies supervised by the latter, primarily the Fuxing 
Trading Corporation (Foo shing Trading Corporation), Fuhua Trading Company (Fu 
Hua Trading Company), and the China National Tea Corporation. The Foreign Trade 
Commission was first named as the Trade Readjustment Commission under the 
National Military Council in 1937, and renamed and transferred to the Ministry of 
Finance in 1938. The Fuxing Trading Corporation was set up in 1939 to deal with the 
export of wood oil in payment of the Wood Oil Loan that China had negotiated with 
the United States in 1938. The Fuhua Trading Company was set up by the Military 
Council in 1937 and was incorporated into the Fuxing Trading Corporation in 
February 1942. Following this incorporation, the Fuxing Corporation had exclusive 
rights over the purchase of principal agriculture exports, with the exception of tea, 
which was handled by the China National Tea Corporation.15 These companies were 
organized to function like commercial enterprises, even though they were actually 
state-owned companies. The Nationalist government appointed government officials 
as members of the board of trustees, and distributed to them shares corresponding 
to their government positions and social statuses.16  
The Foreign Trade Commission started purchasing raw silk for export at the 
beginning of the war, and gradually monopolized the export of raw silk from 1942 
                                                             
15  The Chinese Ministry of Information, ed., China Handbook, 1937-1943, A 
Comprehensive Survey of Major Developments in China in Six Years of War (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1943), pp. 530-531.  
16 Zheng Huixin, “Fuxing shangye gongsi de chengli yu chuqi jingying huodong” (The 
establishment and early operation of the Fuxing Trading Corporation), Jindai 
zhongguo 139 (October, 2000), pp. 180, 187-189, 199.  
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onwards. In that year, the Fuxing Trading Corporation monopolized all the raw silk 
that the Foreign Trade Commission considered exportable. The free trade of quality 
raw silk was forbidden, which technically closed the domestic market to the Sichuan 
Silk Corporation.17 The policy was legalized as the “Temporary Regulation on the 
Centralized Purchase and Sale of Raw Silk” (Quanguo shengsi tonggou tongxiao 
zhanxing banfa) in February 1943. The Ministry of Finance authorized the Fuxing 
Trading Corporation to handle the purchase, transportation, and sale of all improved 
raw silk and native silk. The purchase price of the raw silk was however decided by 
the Foreign Trade Commission.18 The Sichuan Silk Corporation provided the largest 
portion of improved raw silk to the Foreign Trade Commission from 1937 to 1945. For 
example, it sold the bulk of its output of over 4,000 piculs of raw silk to the Fuhua 
Company in 1941, 70 percent of its output in 1942 and 60 percent of its output in 
1943 to the Fuxing Trading Corporation.19  
The Leshan Sericulture Experimental Area of the Women’s Advisory Board of the 
New Life Movement  
Other than being involved in sericulture through its investment in the Sichuan 
Silk Corporation and promulgating various policies on the trade of raw silk and 
cocoons, the Nationalist government directly participated in the technological 
transformation of sericulture in Sichuan during the war. Between 1938 and 1945, the 
                                                             
17 Xu Xinwu, ed., Zhongguo jindai saosi gongyeshi, p. 403.  
18 Cheng bao, 4 April 1943.  
19 Jiang qingxiang and Li shouyao, eds. Sichuan cansiye, pp. 80-82.  
 252
Women’s Advisory Board of the New Life Movement realized the Leshan Sericulture 
Experimental Area project in southern Sichuan. The Nationalist government was the 
chief sponsor of this reform. It is estimated that the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestation funded about 47 percent of the costs, while the Ministry of Finance 
provided 43 percent.20  
However, it is too simple to say that the Nationalist government was the only 
force behind the establishment of the LSEA. The LSEA was the outcome of the 
cooperation between the CCP, the Nationalist government, and reformist 
intellectuals. They all played roles in the shaping and evolution of the LSEA.  
Reorganization of the Women’s Advisory Board of the New Life Movement, 1938 
The Women’s Advisory Board of the New Life Movement was the platform on 
which the LSEA was shaped and developed. The prewar Women’s Advisory Board 
was anti-Communist, and did not encourage production or women’s mobilization, 
and discouraged women’s activity in society. The national crisis, however, stimulated 
the Women’s Advisory Board to open its doors to females from various political, 
economic, social, and religious backgrounds. These females cooperatively shaped a 
wartime policy that encouraged women to participate in economic production and 
reconstruction.   
The Women’s Advisory Board was an essential part of the New Life Movement 
                                                             
20 Chen Ciyu, Jindai zhongguo de jixie saosi gongye, p. 260. 
 253
that Jiang Jieshi launched in Nanchang, Jiangxi, in February 1934. Song Meiling 
became director-general of the “Women’s New Life” movement in late 193521, and 
consequently the New Life Movement established the Women’s Advisory Board in 
February 1936. 22  With the establishment of the Board, Song took over the 
administrative leadership of the New Life Movement.23 The Board epitomized many 
characteristics of the New Life Movement. First, it was anti-Communist. The 
movement was designed to reconstruct the socio-political order to fight against the 
influence of the Jiangxi Soviet. The Chinese fascist Blue Shirts were the strong 
supporters, and probably the “creators”, of the movement. They were deadly 
enemies of the Communists. Song Meiling was not a sympathizer of the Communists 
either. War correspondent Freda Utley once recounted that, “in conversation with 
her (Song) one felt an emotional bitterness on her part towards the Communists and 
an unwillingness to recognize their merits. Her hatred of those who not only fought 
against Chiang Kai-shek so long, but who to-day still challenge her own religious and 
social concepts, obscures her political judgment, which in other respects is so 
penetrating.”24  
At the same time, the Women’s Advisory Board had no significant impact on 
production. In fact, the New Life Movement on a whole was an ideological campaign 
                                                             
21 Tan Sheying, ed., Zhongguo funü yundong tongshi (General history of women’s 
movement in China) (Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian, 1990 [1936]), p. 280. 
22 Zhonghua quanguo funü lianhehui, ed., Zhongguo funü yundong bainian dashiji 
(Chronology of Chinese women’s movement in one hundred years, 1901 - 2000) 
(Beijing: Zhongguo funü chubanshe, 2003), p, 87.  
23 James C. Thomson Jr., While China Faced West, American Reformers in Nationalist 
China, 1928-1937 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 180.  
24 Freda Utley, China at War (London: Faber and Faber, 1939), p. 198. 
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that did not affect people’s lives tangibly. In 1937, shortly before the outbreak of the 
war, Song Qingling (Madame Sun Yat-sen) made a comment on the New Life 
Movement,  
“When I consider the New Life Movement I think it unfortunate that, well 
meaning as the author doubtless meant to be, he has not yet realized that 
the most fundamental need of the Chinese masses is economic 
development. In other words, to improve the people’s livelihood as Doctor 
Sun taught. In the New Life Movement there is nothing new to be found, it 
gives nothing to the people.”25 
In addition, the movement promoted the idea of “women retuning home,” 
instead of encouraging women’s independence and emancipation. It argued that 
women should start reform within their households before they played roles in the 
public domain. Song Meiling claimed that activities such as “keeping a clean home, 
and supporting social reform, etc., are women’s responsibilities.” However, the 
reform only encouraged women’s domestic role as virtuous wives and good 
mothers.26 Women’s political activity was even more strictly prohibited.27  
                                                             
25 Ibid., p. 15. The Chinese version of this comment is slightly different, but contains 
the same meaning. See Song Qingling, “Rujiao yu xiandai zhongguo” (Confucianism 
and modern China), Song Qingling xuanji (Selected works of Song Qingling), Song 
Qingling (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1992), p. 179. 
26 Xu Huiqi, “1930 niandai funühuijia lunzhan de shidai beijing jiqi neirong – jianlun 
nala xingxiang zai qizhong banyan de jiaose” (Context and content of the debate on 
women’s returning home in the 1930s, with a discussion on the role of Nora Helmer 
in the debate), Donghua renwen xubao 4 (July 2002), pp. 112-115.  
27 Elisabeth Croll, Feminism and Socialism in China (London; Boston: Routledge & K. 
Paul, 1978), p. 164.  
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Such narrow concerns held little water with the public with the looming of the 
Sino-Japanese War. The antagonism between the Nationalist government and the 
CCP had to be put aside. Economic productivity was the material base of the war. 
Women’s participation in the national salvation movement was inescapable. The 
New Life Movement was “rapidly transformed into a war relief agency,” after the 
outbreak of war. Madame Chiang dispatched her religious fellow George W.  
Shepherd to the United States and Britain to seek assistance in 1937.28 Women 
stood out as active participants of national salvation work. Numerous salvation and 
relief groups overshadowed the New Life Movement and the Women’s Advisory 
Board. While the United Front publicly favored a united women’s mobilization 
movement, most of these women’s organizations lacked a united leadership for the 
efficient allocation of resources and distribution of work.  
Consequently, the Women’s Advisory Board held a meeting of female leaders in 
Lushan, Jiangxi, in May 1938. The meeting was chaired by Song Meiling, and 
vice-chaired by Wu Yifang, the President of the Jinling Women’s College in Nanjing 
and the first female Chair of the National Christian Council of China. Song Meiling 
gave an opening speech encouraging cooperation between women and the 
consolidation of their efforts, and inviting active discussion over the agendas of 
women’s wartime work, mobilization, participation in production, and 
communication between women’s organizations. She also suggested that the 
                                                             
28 James C. Thomson Jr., While China Faced West, p. 194.  
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Women’s Advisory Board serve as the platform for a united women’s movement.29 
She had set her mind on transforming the Board. 
Fifty-one female leaders were present at the meeting. They were the most 
influential and best educated Chinese women at the time. For instance, Zhang 
Weizhen was the wife of Luo Jialun, the President of the Central University of China. 
Zheng Yuxiu was the wife of Wei Daoming, secretary-general of the Executive Yuan. Li 
Dequan was the wife of General Feng Yuxiang. Zhang Suwo was the daughter of 
General Zhang Zhizhong who had supervised the defense of Shanghai in 1937. Zeng 
Baosun was the great-granddaughter of Zeng Guofan. There were also female 
professionals, such as economist Zhang Xiaomei, pediatrician Chen Cuizheng, and 
educator Yu Qingtang.30  
More striking was the presence of distinguished leftists and Communists, such 
as Shi Liang, Deng Yingchao, and Meng Qingshu. Shi had been jailed by the 
Nationalist government in the late 1936 because of her anti-Japanese and nationalist 
activities in Shanghai. Despite seething public indignation and protest, she was not 
released until end July 1937. Deng was the wife of Zhou Enlai, and Meng was the 
wife of Wang Ming. Their husbands were top-ranking Communist leaders, and they 
themselves supervised women’s affairs in the CCP.  
                                                             
29 Xinhua ribao, May 25 and 26, 1938.  
30 Xia Rong, “Song Meiling yu kangzhan chuqi lushan funü tanhuahui” (Song Meiling 
and the women’s Lushan meeting at the beginning of the War of Resistance against 
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The CCP was the designer of and champion for the United Front. At the time, 
the chief theoretician of the United Front, Wang Ming, reached the apogee of his 
prestige in the CCP, and controlled the CCP.31 He believed that national cooperation 
was a task of the highest priority. His slogans “‘Resisting Japan takes precedence over 
everything’ and ‘everything must be subordinated to resistance to Japan’ became the 
CCP’s ubiquitous motto”.32 Before the female communist representatives went to 
the Lushan meeting, the CCP instructed them, “to utilize the context of the New Life 
Movement, and to add new contents, to serve the purpose of war mobilization.”33 
This mobilization was meant to unite women from all walks of life.  
To fulfill this goal, the Communist representatives supported Song Meiling’s plan 
to reorganize the Women’s Advisory Board into the central institution of Chinese 
women’s organizations, while some other representatives dissented.34 During the 
meeting, they also gave the delegates present an introduction to the women’s 
movement in the CCP controlled border region of Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia 
provinces.35 Based on the experience of the Communist women’s movement, they 
submitted a proposal titled “Our Opinion on Women’s Mobilization in the War”.36 
                                                             
31 Shum Kui-Kwong, The Chinese Communists’ Road to Power, chapters 1 and 3. 
32 Ibid., p. 129.  
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Both documents played down class struggle and their contents could appeal to all 
participants. There were great similarities between this proposal and the finalized 
guiding principles of the Board, encapsulated in the “Scheme to Mobilize Women to 
Participate in Anti-Japanese and Nation-Building Work”.37 They envisaged that the 
realization of the scheme could herald the establishment of a United Front of women. 
In fact, the scheme was drafted by Sheng Zijiu, who was close to the Communists and 
had joined the CCP in 1939. Deng helped finalize the scheme.38  The scheme 
discussed the preconditions and methods for the mobilization of women, and 
formulated practical guidelines on women’s participation in propaganda work, 
education, relief work, field service, production, etc.  
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the changed agenda and ideology of the 
Women’s Advisory Board than the “Announcement to Fellow Chinese Women” made 
during the Lushan meeting. It contrasted sharply with the prewar slogans of the New 
Life Movement. It now called for all women’s participation in production and 
construction. Women were not only to be good mothers and wives, but also citizens 
who could participate in the wartime work both at the front and in the rear. It 
announces that,  
“Women in all social circles, at this time, must contribute, whether much or 
little. Whether in the countryside or in the city, whether housewives or career 
women, in the war zones or the Rear Area, all should bear the responsibility 
                                                             
37 Zhongyang ribao, 26 and 27 July 1938. 
38 Xia Rong, “Song Meiling yu kangzhan chuqi lushan funü tanhuahui”, p. 127.  
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for the war of resistance and national reconstruction. We should be engaged 
in medical aid, consolation, donation, relief, child care, propaganda, 
organization training, and other wartime work, for serving the immediate 
needs of the war of resistance. In addition, to consolidate the Rear Area, all 
should also motivate local society, enlighten the masses, publicize the great 
meaning of patriotism, encourage other women to take up their 
responsibilities, eradiate traitors, and root out spies. Most of all, to secure the 
economic basis of the nation, and to strengthen its capacity for long-term 
resistance, we should in particular engage in production and 
reconstruction.”39 
This idea of economic production and reconstruction was widely shared, not 
only by the CCP and their leftist supporters who were interested in economic affairs, 
but also by the Nationalist government. High government officials, such as Kong 
Xiangxi and Wang Jingwei, enthusiastically called for higher productivity. Kong 
highlighted the “productive mode of life”, a goal of the New Life Movement that was 
never pursued before the war. He suggested promoting and improving the handicraft 
industry and agriculture. Wang Jingwei argued that the New Life Movement, as a 
spiritual reform movement, and the National Economic Reconstruction Movement, 
as an economic plan, were two sides of a single project that reinforced each other.40  
                                                             
39 Zhongyang ribao, 8 and 9 June 1938.  
40 Kong Xiangxi, “Kangzhan qijian xinyun ying zhuyi zhi dian” (What the New Life 
needs to focus during the War of Resistance against Japan); and Wang Jingwei, 
“Kangzhan qijian de xinshenghuo yundong” (the New Life Movement during the War 
of Resistance against Japan), Xinyun daobao, 13(1938), pp. 11-17.  
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However, it is notable that anti-Japanese production and reconstruction was 
actually a rather vague idea that involved different strategies and was oriented to 
different ultimate goals for each of the participating groups. For Wang Ming, who 
controlled the CCP at the time, democracy and the improvement of people’s 
livelihood were not necessary preconditions for national resistance against Japan.41 
For Mao Zedong, who eventually asserted his tight grip on the CCP from 1939, the 
United Front supplied not only power to fight against Japan, but also helped to win 
over supporters against the Nationalists. At the same time, as their wartime policy in 
Yan’an reflected, the CCP had little technological bases or economic power to aspire 
beyond their reliance on social and political activities to resolve China’s problem.42  
For the reformist intellectuals such as Yu Qingtang, increased productivity 
should be directed at improving people’s livelihood.43 These intellectuals possessed 
technology and skills that was necessary for production. Most of them have 
accumulated experience through their prewar reform practices. They were the ones 
who directly guided rural production in the field. However, they had neither political 
influence nor financial strength, and had to work in certain organizations that could 
support their activities. 
The Nationalist government officials had little interest in women’s emancipation 
                                                             
41 Shum Kui-Kwong, The Chinese Communists’ Road to Power, p. 123.  
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or the material improvement of people’s lives, but paid great attention towards 
consolidating the material and economic foundations for the resistance against the 
Japanese invasion. They financed the activities of the Women’s Advisory Board. Their 
economic mobilization was aimed at extracting all possible resources to cover 
government expenditure and relieve financial difficulty. 
Thus, through the Lushan meeting, the Women’s Advisory Board was 
reorganized into a platform where various groups of social, political, and religious 
backgrounds worked together. It called for nationalistic production that could be 
identified with all Chinese people. Nevertheless, beneath this superficial consensus, 
there were distinct divergences that would eventually affect the performance of the 
subsequent programs of the Board.  
For the purpose of working for the nation, the Women’s Advisory Board initially 
set up eight teams and one committee – general affairs, cultural affairs, cadre 
training, life advisory, production affairs, consolation, childcare, field service teams, 
and the communication committee. The countryside service team was set up in late 
1939, and the field service team was merged with the consolation team in 1941.44  
The team of production was the center of economic cooperation among the CCP, 
the Nationalist government, and the non-party intellectuals. During the war, four 
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exemplary projects were put into practice, the LSEA, the Songgai Textile Experimental 
Area, the New Life Women Handicrafts Society, and the Baisha New Life Cotton Mill. 
The LSEA was the largest among all the production programs of the Women’s 
Advisory Board.  
Mass mobilization, 1938 – 1940 
Between 1938 and 1941, the overall appeal to national resistance and 
cooperation overshadowed the differences of the participants of the Women’s 
Advisory Board. This created a rather favorable situation for the shaping and 
development of the LSEA. The reformist intellectuals in the fields were autonomous 
in deciding to emphasis on productivity. 
Yu Qingtang supervised the production affairs team and established the 
people-oriented non-profit principle of promoting production. She was an influential 
Chinese educator trained at Columbia University. She was the chief advocate of mass 
education, and set up the Jiangsu Provincial School of Education to educate the 
masses. She was the editor of the “rural life” column of the Shengbao (Shanghai 
daily) in 1935, and had strong sympathy for the peasants and their suffering. 
According to Yu, the production affairs team should help the nation through 
benefiting the people materially. The enterprises that the team promoted should 
involve the large population of rural women, contribute to civil and military needs, 
and bring in foreign currency. At the same time, she emphasized that these 
enterprises were aiming at improving women’s skills and their lives, and “should not 
 263
be for government profit.”45  
Sericulture matched Yu’s criteria and consequently southern Sichuan was 
chosen as the location of sericulture experimentation. Southern Sichuan was chosen 
not only because of the fine natural conditions, but also the depressed state of 
sericulture then. Reformers considered that the peasants in the region “really need 
our guidance for improvement. It is imperative.”46 
The LSEA was established in October 1938. It initially included seven counties – 
Leshan, Jingyan, Qingshen, Jiajiang, Emei, Meishan, and Qianwei – and was enlarged 
to cover about 22 counties in southern Sichuan in 1940.47 It consisted of a general 
office, a farm affairs department, and an instruction department. The farm affairs 
department specialized in nursing mulberry saplings, breeding silkworm eggs, and 
conducted experiments. The instruction department managed the diffusion of 
sericulture technology and distribution of improved varieties. It set up instruction 
stations in counties and towns. There were six instruction stations in four counties in 
1939, and the number rapidly increased to 17 in 1941.48  
Modern sericulturist Fei Dasheng and Zheng Pijiang were the leaders of the 
LSEA. Fei Dasheng was the director. She was born in a well-educated family. Her 
parents were in the education business, and her brother was Fei Xiaotong, who was 
                                                             
45 Yu Qingtang, “Xinyun yu zhanshi funü shengchan”, pp. 31-34.  
46 Funü xinyun 1(December 1938), p. 62. 
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to later become a renowned sociologist. At the age of 14, she entered the Jiangsu 
Provincial Girls’ Sericulture School to study sericulture. Later, she was sent by the 
school to pursue further education in Japan between 1920 and 1923. After returning 
from Japan, she joined her alma mater. Her task was to spread modern sericulture 
techniques into the countryside. By the outbreak of the war, she had made 
remarkable achievements in sericulture reform in Kaixiangong village and other 
factories. Like Yu Qingtang, she was specifically concerned with rural technological 
and economic improvement.   
Zheng Pijiang was the school principal of the Jiangsu Provincial Girls’ Sericulture 
School. He believed in serving national interests through technological education. 
The education was not for the students in the schools, but also for peasants in the 
countryside. Therefore, his school set up the department of technological promotion 
in which Fei Dasheng worked from 1923. After migrating to Sichuan, Yu Qingtang 
hired him as an advisor to the production affairs team.49 More importantly, he 
reopened the Jiangsu Provincial Girls’ Sericulture School as the Jiangsu Provincial 
Sericulture College in Leshan. The school and the LSEA worked together closely. The 
LSEA offered scholarships to the students, and was the practice ground of the 
school.50 Zheng also worked as the advisor of the silkworm egg breeding station, 
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whose technicians were all graduates of the school.51  
The LSEA was also staffed by specially trained women cadres. The Women’s 
Advisory Board considered the existence of qualified cadres as a precondition for 
women’s mobilization.52 Liu Qingyang, who joined in the CCP in 1921, was in charge 
of cadre training. She clearly stated that “I want to train the cadres into ones who can 
serve people and die for the country.” During the early stage of the war, the 
Communists played an important role in steering the training programs. Deng 
Yingchao and Zhou Enlai participated as lecturers, while underground CCP members 
such as Xia Yingzhe and Feng Guangguan facilitated the CCP’s activities as secretaries 
in the team.53 At least eight students from the training programs were assigned to 
the LSEA.54  
This leadership carried out a series of activities for the purposes of technological 
transfer and nationalistic mobilization immediately after it was established. It started 
with work-study programs. For example, from October 1938 to January 1939, Fei 
Dasheng taught 21 housewives how to make silk wadding. Later, the reeling training 
program began in December 1938. A total of 160 women entered the two programs 
and 132 graduated in 1938 and 1939.55 The LSEA reported this initial enrolment as 
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proof that “women in Leshan have woken up!”56 
From 16 October 1939 onwards, the project carried out more ambitious 
sericulture training programs, which combined nationalistic and sericulture 
education. A centralized program in Leshan was designed to train leaders in the rural 
sericulture cooperatives. The curriculum included modern sericulture knowledge, 
Chinese literature, math, accounting, as well as a special course called “citizenship”. 
Decentralized trainings were conducted by individual instruction stations from the 
late October 1939 onwards. Besides studying elementary sericulture knowledge, 
women had to learn “Elementary Knowledge of the War of Resistance against 
Japan”.57 A total of 1655 women received the decentralized training between 1939 
and 1940.58  
Its grandest contribution was to push substantive sericulture reform into the 
countryside. In actual practice, the reformers significantly downplayed propaganda 
dissemination in the countryside, but primarily focused on rural development. The 
reformers considered that increasing productivity was a more practical way of 
enhancing the strength of China’s resistance effort, as opposed to relying on empty 
rhetoric. Thee instruction stations adhered to elaborate annual programs for 
technological diffusion, none of which deliberately stressed on masses’ 
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mobilization.59  
In fact, there was hardly any time for the instructors to spread nationalistic 
propaganda in the countryside. Already, they complained that they had not enough 
time to spread technology and techniques in rural southern Sichuan. The residential 
pattern in Sichuan frustrated their work. Unlike the nucleated village in other parts of 
China, Sichuan villages are unique in their dispersed village community.60 This 
aggravated the difficulty of introducing sericulture knowledge into the rural society. 
“Although we travel as much as thirty to forty li a day, the households that can 
receive instruction are no more than only forty to fifty.”61  
In addition, the LSEA distributed sericulture manuals and organized sericulture 
exhibitions to spread modern technology. Thousands of copies of manuals were 
distributed to farmers. After silkworm seasons, the LSEA arranged for travelling 
exhibitions. These exhibitions introduced modern mulberry cultivation, disinfection 
practices, silkworm rearing, mulberry experiments, silkworm mounting, reeling and 
wadding making. The exhibitions travelled to eight places in seven counties and 
attracted 27,000 visitors in 10 days in 1940.62  
In light of the short history of improved silkworm rearing in the region, the 
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growth was significant. Large-scale promotion of improved silkworm varieties had 
not been conducted in southern Sichuan before 1939. According to estimates, less 
than 3,000 improved egg cards had been distributed in the region by 1939.63 
Another source calculates that only 546 households raised improved silkworm 
varieties in spring 1937 and 155 households raised autumn crops in 1936 and 1937.64 
By contrast, 20,000 egg cards were distributed to 6,757 households free of charge in 
spring 1939 and 18,458 autumn silkworm egg cards to 3,838 households the same 
year. The total output of improved cocoons reached 316,370 kilograms.65 
Despite the efforts to integrate nationalistic ideas into production, economic 
gain was the only motivation behind the peasants’ acceptance of the reforms. Wild 
claims that the “women in Leshan have woken up” as proposed by the Funü xinyun, 
an organ of the Women’s Advisory Board, at the end 1938, were unsubstantiated. In 
reality, the peasants, including women in Leshan, were suspicious of the reforms and 
possessed even less respect for slogans such as “serving the nation” or “saving the 
nation”. The peasants thought the government were only interested in coercing them 
to sell the improved cocoons at low prices. They only took the new varieties when 
the LSEA guaranteed the free trade of improved cocoons.66 Ironically, they did not 
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trust the new varieties either. They were afraid the new variety did not yield well and 
would reduce their income. Even when they received the free improved silkworm 
eggs, many raised improved silkworms alongside native silkworms in case the new 
varieties did not work. 
It was the subsequent good yields that won over the peasants. In 1939, the 
improved silkworm variety was exceptionally profitable for the silkworm raisers. In 
the spring of that year, native silkworm raisers suffered heavily because of 
widespread silkworm diseases. The average output from native egg cards was only 4 
kilograms. In contrast, led by the LSEA, improved silkworm raisers managed to garner 
a fair harvest. On average one card of improved silkworm eggs yielded 6.51 kilograms 
of cocoons worth $6.51. In autumn, one improved card yielded 9.370 kilograms 
worth $18.74. On average, every household received $19.07 from the spring crop 
and $45.26 from the autumn crop, a large sum of money. In the market of Chengdu, 
the provincial capital, in October 1939, a picul of rice cost $15.94, and a picul of 
wheat, $10.50. The price was even lower in Chongqing at $12.58 and $9.73 
respectively.67  
The responses of the local society and people prove how much they were 
impressed by the advantages brought by the LSEA. County governments, agricultural 
societies, as well as peasants sent letters to the LSEA. They appealed to the LSEA to 
set up more instruction stations, to dispatch instructors, to teach skills, and to 
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distribute more improved varieties.68 Reformists were welcomed in the countryside. 
Fei once told the Zhongyang ribao (Central daily news) that instructors were 
welcomed and treated as “living Buddhas” in villages after the reforms had proved 
beneficial. The villagers even asked the instructors to mediate domestic disputes, to 
provide medical treatment to the sickness, and to resolve other domestic issues.69 
Nevertheless, there is no trace of nationalism in their acceptance of the new 
techniques and technology. 
An Extraction-based economy, 1941 – 1945 
The cooperation between the CCP and the Nationalist government broke down 
in 1941. Between 1941 and 1945, the LSEA continued operating under the broad 
auspices of the New Life Movement. But the Nationalist government adopted a 
strategy of extraction towards sericulture, which was very different from the previous 
people-oriented non-profiteering guidelines set up by Yu Qingtang. At this stage, the 
Communists’ influence shrunk to insignificant levels, and the reformist intellectuals 
struggled to strike a balance between their own economic ideas and ever-increasing 
governmental economic demand.  
The United Front between the Nationalist government and Communists was not 
stable from the beginning. Their cooperation was induced by the fervor of national 
salvation and anti-Japanese sentiments at the onset of the war. The Nationalist 
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government had been suspicious of the Communists’ mobilization of the masses 
from the beginning, believing that it was leading to the creation of hotbeds of 
Communism.70 The hostilities accumulated and climaxed with the military conflict 
between the Communists and the Nationalists during the New Fourth Army Incident 
in southern Anhui in January 1941. The military United Front was destroyed, and the 
uneasy truce between the two parties ended.  
At the same time, the Nationalist government gradually restored its prewar 
policies concerning women’s mobilization. There were cases of women being 
removed and expelled from government positions in Fujian and Hunan in 1939.71 In 
November 1940, the Guomindang Women’s Commission circulated a manual, 
produced by its Zhejiang executive council, on preventing “illegal women’s 
movement”. This manual categorized a number of illegal activities, such as female 
cadre training, countryside service, as well as activities against “women returning 
home”. Five months later, the director of the Department of the Organizational 
Affairs of the Guomindang gave a speech to a national meeting of women cadres. 
The speech encouraged women to stay home. 72  Hence, the Guomindang 
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government officially disapproved of the women’s movement.  
Inside the Women’s Advisory Board, the pressure on radical leaders and 
women’s activities increased. The Guomindang tried to recruit Yu Qingtang several 
times. Yu was stressed by the great pressure of managing governmental relations 
within the Board, and left the position of chief of the production affairs team as early 
as March 1939. 73  Liu Qingyang’s training of cadres similarly faced political 
intervention and obstruction from 1939 onwards. She managed however to continue 
working in the Women’s Advisory Board till May 1941.74 Shi Liang on the other hand 
left the Board in 1942.75 Female activists were regarded with suspicion and their 
identities were frequently checked.76 The CCP had to withdraw its members whose 
identities had probably been exposed from the Board after the New Fourth Army 
Incident. The anti-Communist shadow of the Nationalist government extended to the 
LSEA too. The Ministry of Education required the school president Zheng Pijiang to 
join the Guomindang.77 A radical student of the sericulture school was arrested. 
Apparently, the Communist and their leftist supporters faced strong suppression in 
the LSEA at the time. 
However, as observed by historian Chen Ciyu, the LSEA became the focus of the 
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sericultural promotion of the Nationalist government after 1941. It demonstrated 
sustained development in mulberry cultivation, silkworm egg production, cocoon 
output, and silk goods production. Chen concludes, “In contrast to the decline of the 
provincial Sericulture Reform Base [that was studied in chapter 7 and supervised 
reform in northern and eastern Sichuan during the war], the LSEA was like the axis of 
Sichuan sericulture at the late period of the War. Its development is critical to 
sericulture in Sichuan and even contemporary China.”78  
First, the LSEA became capable of producing fine mulberry and silkworm 
varieties between 1941 and 1945. The farm affairs department set up silkworm egg 
breeding stations in 1940 and started producing improved egg cards in 1941. The 
LSEA’s Suqi and Jiayang silkworm breeding stations were the largest providers of 
improved egg cards in the region. Mulberry sapling cultivation was conducted along 
with silkworm egg production. By 1942, the mulberry saplings produced in the LSEA 
had accounted for about half of the total output in the whole province.79  
Second, the LSEA started reeling raw silk after 1941 through directly controlled 
factories and rural cooperatives. It took over the Huaxin Filature, the largest and 
earliest steam filature in the region. Later, it also supervised the Fengxiang Filature in 
Leshan and the Tengchuan Maoji Filature in Junlian county.80 These filatures were 
the only steam filatures in operation in the region at the time. The government 
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assigned to the three filatures the tasks of reeling export silk. From 1942 to 1945, 
they produced 77.5 tons of raw silk in total. It also had two factories producing silk 
wadding from wasted cocoons. They produced only 1,017.93 catties of wadding and 
48 wadding quilts in 1941, but by 1944, their productivity reached 16,784.76 catties 
of wadding and 275 wadding quilts.81  
Rural silk production and marketing cooperatives were established in the 
countryside from 1941. Fei Dasheng was the strong supporter of rural production 
cooperatives. When she spread modern sericulture techniques in Kaixiangong, 
Jiangsu, she organized peasants to set up a rural sericultural cooperative, the first of 
its type in Chinese history.82 In 1932, she published an article to advocate “rural 
small-scale silk reeling cooperatives”.83 The Nationalist government, at the time, was 
also interested in and actively encouraged the establishment of cooperatives. The 
LSEA led by Fei Dasheng took this opportunity and eagerly promoted sericulture 
cooperatives. The first two cooperatives were set up in Qingshen in 1941, with 360 
members. By 1943, there had been 18 cooperatives with 3,776 members in seven 
counties in the LSEA. The silk production and marketing cooperatives in the LSEA 
were similar to that in Kaixiangong. They combined mulberry cultivation, silkworm 
raising, cocoon drying, silk reeling, and the shipping of goods.84 As with the silk 
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cooperative in Kaixiangong, members benefited from joining the cooperatives. They 
received quite high financial returns by selling cocoons to the cooperatives and 
drawing profit dividends from raw silk.85  
Despite all the efforts Fei Dasheng and her staff made in improving technology 
by utilizing governmental policy, a close scrutiny of these significant achievements 
shows that the project benefited the Nationalist government more than it did the 
majority of petty producers. In many ways, the reformers of the LSEA became the 
employees of the Nationalist government and had to adhere to government policies 
with scarce autonomy to conduct reform that could benefit a larger rural population. 
Their vision of rural development was subordinated to the government’s direction of 
the extraction of resources from the economy without being concerned with how it 
was achieved. The interests of the peasants were neglected in the pursuit of 
governmental profit, which put the reformers in a great quandary.  
The Foreign Trade Commission of the Ministry of Finance adopted a 
monopolization policy towards the trade in raw silk.86 This policy had strong impact 
on the productivity of the Sichuan Silk Corporation, since the latter was the major 
supplier of filature silk. The LSEA was less affected by the compulsory sale of raw silk 
because its output was already produced under the commission of the Foreign Trade 
Commission under commission.87 However, the 1942 and 1943 centralized trading 
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policy still bore strong impact on the local reeling industry. To secure raw materials, 
the LSEA monopolized the right to purchase all improved cocoons. Even the right to 
purchase native-bred cocoons was restricted to the LSEA and the silk reeling firms 
that were issued native cocoon purchase licenses. Peasants were furthermore 
banned from using large frames to reel domestic silk.88 This policy did not increase 
the technological level of local production, but added more impediments to the 
productivity of the silk reeling factories, as well as the peasants who wanted to 
generate more profit from domestic reeling.  
The cooperatives were not perfectly efficacious either. As in other regions, the 
Nationalist government-led cooperatives hardly assisted the common peasantry.89 
Over 80 percent of the loans provided by the Peasant Bank in Leshan in 1943 went to 
the transportation sector rather than the production sector. The loans benefited 
primarily the richer classes, due to the limited amount of loans available, the 
complicated application procedure, the peasants’ illiteracy, and strict requirements 
on guarantors. Cooperatives were partly organized under the sponsorship of the 
country government. The powerful and influential local leaders took the important 
positions, with the result that the common members “could not and dared not” 
participate in the management of the cooperatives. 90  A local contemporary 
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cooperative leader, Feng Qiunong, testified that the membership of the cooperatives 
was mainly composed of middle class peasants, as well as quite a few rich peasants 
and landlords. He even argues that the cooperatives did not benefit the poor 
peasants at all.91  
Meanwhile, non-members of cooperatives possessed less advantage in 
producing improved cocoons than cooperative members. The cooperative members 
dominated the rearing of improved silkworm. For instance, they raised 69 percent of 
the improved silkworm crop in spring 1943. 92  But the cooperative members 
constituted only a small fraction of the large rural population, and not all peasants 
were qualified or able to join cooperatives. The dominance of cooperative members 
in raising improved varieties indicates that the non-members were reluctant to do so. 
Cost was the critical factor that determined the peasants’ choice. The LSEA withdrew 
the guarantee of a free market for improved cocoons in the 1940s. 93  The 
government controlled the market of improved cocoons and purchased cocoons 
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from peasants at a fixed price much lower than the market price and the cost price of 
production. For example, the official price of improved cocoons differed over five 
grades in 1943, ranging from $60 to $80 per kilogram respectively. In contrast, the 
black market price in Leshan was about 180 dollars per kilogram. 94  For the 
non-cooperative members, they could only gain profit by selling cocoons in the black 
market, which might be dangerous. Compounded with the inflation, many peasants 
either stopped raising silkworms or returned to raising native varieties.  
The native varieties were still in predominance during the War. According to 
Chen Ciyu, the average annual output in the region of improved cocoons was 
404.364 tons, in sharp contrast to 3,414.553 tons of native cocoons.95 And the 
annual output of both kinds of cocoons was far less than that in the prewar years. 
The LSEA’s endeavor to improve productivity actually achieved limited impact.  
Conclusion 
The anti-Japanese war was the most radical phase of sericulture technological 
transformation in pre-1949 Sichuan. While the Sericulture Reform Base continued to 
operate in northern and eastern Sichuan under the aegis of the Sichuan provincial 
government, the Women’s Advisory Board of the New Life Movement set up the 
LSEA to conduct sericulture reform in the southern Sichuan. The two projects 
covered almost all the counties where sericulture was important to the local 
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economy.  
The LSEA represented an unusual case where different groups cooperated in 
economic production. In spite of the consensus of production for the national 
resistance, these groups further defined their approaches in light of their own 
identities and agendas. The female leaders of different backgrounds were united 
under the consensus in the Lushan meeting in May, 1938. Their approaches and 
ultimate goals imposed by their background, however, often conflicted among each 
other. Sericulture reform was actually the site of a tussle between political power, 
economic power and intellectual power. Between 1938 and 1941, their cooperation 
went relatively smoothly despite an undercurrent of competitions and suspicion. The 
change of political climate following the military collision in early 1941, however, 
dissolved the cooperation. It not only pushed the CCP out of the reform movement, 
but also subordinated the rural reformers to the extraction-based economy.  
In terms of the acceptance of producers on the sericulture reform, these groups’ 
individual interpretation on production and productivity stimulated different 
responses. The peasants produced for themselves. Their activity did not answer to 
the CCP’s call for national resistance and mass mobilization, nor helped to expand 
the CCP’s influence. The extraction-based economic policy of the Nationalist 
government largely harmed the interests of the peasants and other petty producers 
in production. The reformist intellectuals’ prioritization of the improvement of 
people’s livelihoods through reforming technology, by contrast, was the most 
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appealing to the producers. But these intellectuals were also the ones who held the 
least political and economic power. Their performance depended greatly on the 
relationship between, and the policies of the other two groups.  
As a result of the ideological and political conflicts, the outcome of sericulture 
reform was not as desirable as originally anticipated. Modern technologies did not 
supersede indigenous technology in southern Sichuan. Although there was not 
significant involvement of the CCP in the provincial Sericulture Reform Base, the 
conflicting ideas and practices between the government and the reformist 
intellectuals were not less intensive than in the LSEA. The economic extraction policy 
of the Nationalist government and the provincial government counteracted the 
reformative efforts of the reformers. Despite the general enthusiasm and consensus 
behind utilizing sericulture to serve anti-Japanese goals, the reform attempt to 
transform traditional and indigenous sericulture practice into a modern one achieved 
only limited success in wartime Sichuan. 
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EPILOGUE 
Paths of Technological Development 
Japanese Emperor Hirohito broadcasted surrender in Japan on 15 August 1945, 
and the formal Japanese surrender in China took place on 9 September, ending the 
Second Sino-Japanese War. However, the end of the war was more of a catastrophe 
than a boon to sericulture in Sichuan. It was only after 1949, when the CCP took over 
Sichuan, that sericulture in the province began to experience another round of rapid 
reform. This Communist government-led reform followed the strategy shaped in the 
1930s that stressed on governmental intervention in diffusing foreign modern 
technology, played down the role of local elites, and denigrated indigenous 
traditional technology as backward.  
After the end of the war, immigrants, refugees, relocated factories, institutes, 
and the central Nationalist government returned to their original locations from 
interior China. The central government returned its focus on sericulture to the lower 
Yangzi delta. In 1945, the central government established the Raw Silk Company of 
China to take over the management of sericulture institutions in Japanese-occupied 
areas. Policies on rehabilitating sericulture in these regions were made. The 
management of sericulture and sericulture technology was returned to the hands of 
local government and society of Sichuan.  
The state of sericulture in Sichuan was unpromising, having suffered neglect 
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from the central government, strong competition in international and domestic 
markets, the unstable economy, and inflation. According to the records of the 
Sichuan Silk Corporation, the output of filature silk in Sichuan was 1142 piculs in 
1946, 1391 in 1947, 1217 in 1948, and only 51 in 1949.1 The export of Sichuan raw 
silk was even lower. Between 1945 and 1949, the highest volume of export was in 
1947, totaling a mere amount of 980 piculs.2 Domestic consumption of raw silk was 
constrained by shrinking demand from the weaving industry. The largest silk weaving 
factory in Sichuan during the war, the Meiya Silk Goods Manufactory, suddenly 
decreased its output from 1000 bolts per month to 500 bolts per month immediately 
after the victory.3 The number of looms in Leshan decreased from over 2,000 to a 
little over 500 in 1947.4  
Under such dire circumstances, the development and diffusion of sericulture 
technology was greatly impeded in Sichuan between 1945 and 1949. This is 
notwithstanding the knowledge and experts in modern sericulture that Sichuan had 
indeed accumulated by the mid-1940s. The local communities could continue 
producing improved silkworm eggs. For example, the LSEA was transferred to the 
Leshan local government after the war. The local elites bought over the silkworm 
breeding stations of the LSEA and planned to produce improved varieties by 
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themselves.5 The Sichuan Silk Corporation also continued producing improved egg 
cards. However, the output of improved egg cards shrunk rapidly. Only 260,382 
improved egg cards were produced in total in Sichuan in 1949, while 488,792 cards 
were produced in 1945.6 Although the advantages of multi-ends reeling machines 
were recognized, and their use gradually adopted in both private filatures and the 
Sichuan Silk Corporation, the overall impact should not be over-estimated. The 
Minjiang Raw Silk Company established 120 simplified multi-ends reeling machines in 
Leshan 1948. It was probably the most advanced filature in the region at the time, 
but the machines were only a simplified version of advanced and efficient multi-ends 
machines.7 Similarly, the multi-ends reeling machines possessed by the Southern 
Sichuan Raw Silk Company in 1947 was only coarse wooden machines that could not 
perform as well as authentic multi-ends machine.8 Ultimately, the rural diffusion of 
sericulture technology suffered from the lack of funding and staff. There were only 20 
technicians in the Sichuan provincial Sericulture Reform Base after 1946.9  
The Communist government reversed the decline of sericulture in Sichuan after 
1950. It nationalized the marketing and distribution of cocoons and raw silk, and 
carried out sericulture technological innovation and diffusion through various 
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agencies. The Southwest Military and Administrative Commission was set up in the 
late 1949. Its jurisdiction included Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Xikang, and Tibet. The 
Bureau of the Sericulture of Southwest China was established in 1951, under the 
supervision of the Trade Department of Southwest China. The Bureau controlled 
sericulture in southwestern China. It immediately set up 77 sericulture instruction 
stations in southwestern China, primarily in Sichuan. The provincial and local 
governments carried out educational programs to train sericulture leaders. An 
estimated 100,000 people received training between 1952 and 1955. By 1956, the 
Sichuan Silk Corporation alone had the ability to produce 729,800 improved silkworm 
egg cards. From 1953, silkworm of the late autumn crop variety were distributed and 
promoted. Hence three crops of cocoons became possible. The percentage of 
multi-ends reeling machines used in filatures soon increased from 20 percent to 80 
percent in 1952, backed by large amounts of government investment. Automatic silk 
reeling machines were further introduced into Sichuan in 1954 and 1955.10 There 
was direct government intervention along a clear direction of modernizing traditional 
sericulture technology.  
The strategies the Communist authorities adopted were not much different 
from the Nationalist government’s approach, but were more thorough and grander 
than any other reform effort in the past half a century. The CCP government carried 
out the diffusion of sericulture technology with careful plans. The new and advanced 
technologies relentlessly replaced indigenous methods of sericulture production that 
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was regarded as backward. That is not to assert that the natives were not responsible 
for any technological improvement. However, these improvements were based on 
rational and scientific principles, which were very different from the traditional 
practices and customs.  
 
This work is primarily a case study of technological development in the 
production of a single type of commodity in a Chinese region. The regional and 
technological characteristics of sericulture in Sichuan render it unique as a case study. 
Sericulture activities were carried out within special regional, historical, economic, 
social, and cultural settings that could not be replicated in any other part of China or 
the world. Rather than recording and edifying an exhilarating course towards 
modernization, the work introduces an unsuccessful case of modern technological 
diffusion. Modern technology never became dominant in Sichuan during the first half 
of the twentieth century, which was dwarfed by wider and more rapid adoption of 
improved varieties and mechanized production of sericulture in the coastal China.  
However, the implication of this case study resides not in the documentation 
and demonstration of the experience of a particular region or specific industry, but in 
the reflections it entails for broader trends within the history of China or even the 
world. How are the various efforts to reform sericulture in a single region relevant to 
broad trends in China’s modern experience? How does the record of technological 
diffusion in Sichuan sericulture reflect the transformation of traditional handicraft 
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industry in the rest of China, or the world?  
In Sichuan, sericulture development involved the interaction of the local elites, 
the imperial and Republican local, provincial and central governments, reformist 
intellectuals, foreign investors, the Communists, as well as the peasants. These 
participants were common actors in any landscape of modern China.  
The local elites were often active participants in social, cultural, economic, and 
political realms. Their involvement in local society often implicated the theme of 
“civil society”. Although there are still debates on the existence of civil society as 
defined by Thomas Hobbes in China, the essential characteristic of civil society is the 
functioning of private agencies and agents in society. In this sense, the involvement 
of non-government actors in sericulture technological reform in the late Qing and 
early Republican Sichuan could be characterized as the autonomous actions of civil 
society. These civil society groups were quite active at that time, but also rather weak 
in confronting the civil or military authorities. They were not as much the 
government’s challengers as its collaborators. Their leaders, such as Zhang Senkai 
and Chen Wanxi at the end of the Qing dynasty, and Cheng Timing and Zhang Lan 
during the warlord era, were all semi-gentry holding certain government titles or 
positions and tightly connected with the government. When competition between 
civil society and the government appeared in the 1930s, the civil society soon lost its 
voice. As a matter of fact, the elites who demonstrated in Sichuan sericulture shared 
some similarities with the salt merchants of Tianjin, who “were motivated less by a 
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desire to compete against the state than a complex of economic, culture, social, and 
psychological reason.”11  
Studying the course of sericulture reform in Sichuan contributed some new 
perspectives to the discussion of the state involution and devolution. Like the case of 
the Huang-yun region studied by Kenneth Pomeranz, both the devolution and 
involution of the Chinese state bore impact on the core-periphery status of Sichuan. 
More significantly, no other region in China has experienced the same frequency of 
shifts in its status as core or as periphery within the national political system as 
Sichuan had. The state must extend its influence and control over local society 
through its local agencies and agents. Its involvement in reform at the local level 
depended on how much its power could be extended to the locality. Just as it had 
caused ignorance and decline in the Huang-yun region, state devolution also 
contributed to the lag in the technological transformation of Sichuan sericulture 
during the early republic, and the decline of its sericulture between 1945 and 1949. 
At the same time, state involution was not always detrimental to the local economy 
and conditions. State involution stimulated the first wave of technological 
improvement in the last decade of the Qing, and significant modern technological 
diffusion during the Second Sino-Japanese War.  
Chinese reformers had been obsessed with the question of how to reform 
China’s countryside since the early twentieth century. James Yen and Liang Shuming 
                                                             
11 Kwan Man Bun, The Salt Merchants of Tianjin: State-making and Civil Society in 
Late Imperial China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), p 154.  
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advocated rural education to enlighten peasants for a better countryside. The prewar 
New Life Movement hoped to improve the moral values of landlords to achieve a fair 
distribution of resources and profits between the cultivators and owners of the land. 
The CCP promoted radical land reform to cure the fundamental disease of poverty of 
villages, with little impact on technological reform before 1949. Fei Xiaotong and 
many intellectual reformers considered technology to be the mean of saving the 
Chinese countryside. The case of the LSEA during the war contributes to the study on 
China’s rural reform with a unique case of the participation of various reform groups 
within a reform in a single locality. It reveals that the constraints on rural reform 
could also be created by the conflicting ideas and practices of reform agencies and 
agents.  
Western and Japanese involvement in sericulture trade and production 
connects this case study of modern Sichuan sericulture with the debate over 
imperialism in China. Marxist perspectives on Chinese history assert that imperialism 
was one of the important causes of the backwardness of modern China, but Philip C. 
C. Huang argues that the arrival of imperialism only accelerated the path the Chinese 
rural society had already taken. In the study of the Chinese silk industry, while Lillian 
M. Li considers that imperialism was benign to the Chinese silk industry, Robert Y. 
Eng suggests imperialism was Janus-faced.12 Sericulture in Sichuan represents a case 
of foreign impact on an inland economy. Direct foreign influence in Sichuan was 
                                                             
12 Lillian M. Li, China’s Silk Trade; and Robert Y. Eng, Economic Imperialism in China, 
Silk Production and Exports, 1861 – 1932 (Berkeley: University of California, Center 
for Chinese Studies, 1986). 
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generally weak. Foreign demand for raw silk helped secure the cash income of rural 
households, but rendered the remote region vulnerable to international economic 
fluctuations. The limited scale of direct foreign involvement did not disadvantage the 
Chinese producers, but introduced them to technological innovation.  
Sericulture was tightly tied with the peasant economy. The peasants in Sichuan 
sericulture demonstrated the same rationality of the peasants in other part of China 
as described by Philip C. C. Huang and Lynda S. Bell. They were rational economic 
actors who measured the costs and benefits of their investments carefully. Their 
technological choice resulted from a confluence of socioeconomic, cultural, 
demographical, and ecological factors, and also became an essential part of the rural 
Chinese economy.  
Fundamentally, this study of sericulture technological transformation in Sichuan 
contributes to not only these above-mentioned themes in modern Chinese history, 
but sheds light on the pluralistic paths and efforts taken to attempt to create a 
wealthy and strong China during the first half of the twentieth century. Various 
groups from divergent social, economic, political, and ideological backgrounds 
proposed and practiced different methods in the hope of improving quality and 
increasing output. There was no unified path in achieving this goal at the beginning. 
For improving sericulture technology, individual groups invested in, introduced, and 
adopted different technologies, which took the form of imported modern scientific 
knowledge, or indigenous techniques developed from traditional Chinese skills. The 
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paths were not narrowed down until the 1930s, when the provincial government of 
the Liu Xiang regime and later the Nationalist government pursued their interest in 
sericulture in Sichuan. They envisaged only one way of improving sericulture in 
Sichuan – the government supervised and controlled replacement of traditional skills 
by modern foreign sericulture techniques. The CCP government followed this 
strategy and finally realized it.  
This trajectory of developing sericulture resembles China’s modern experience 
of struggling to become a wealthy and strong state in the early twentieth century. 
The various approaches were narrowed down to reveal the one and only one way of 
creating a wealthy and strong China after 1949, through the socialist planned 
economy that completely expelled traditional values and idea.  
Beyond the context of China, the evolution of sericulture in modern Sichuan 
echoes the transformation of underdeveloped countries through industrialization 
and agricultural modernization. First, traditional techniques were appropriate to the 
institutional, social, and economic conditions of the local society at the time. They 
could survive the intensive competition of foreign techniques. The displacement of 
traditional technology and techniques by foreign ones took place over a very slow 
process, rather than through disruptive substitution. Similarly, in India, despite 
economic competition, a variety of traditional handicraft productions found their 
ways of adjusting to commercialization to survive, and only became industrialized 
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gradually.13  
Second, traditional production was the source of innovation. Sericulture in 
Japan for instance reveals binary approaches to development. Japanese society had 
generated a strong dynamic in inventing, research, and improving sericulture 
technology indigenously since the Tokugawa era. They embraced a set of techniques 
of improving sericulture that was distinct from the West. The technology was 
adapted to the social and economic system in contemporary Japan. The interest and 
approach in improving sericulture technologies during the Tokugawa era had long 
last effect on Japan’s industrialization. Japan’s success in industrialization was not 
only based on the indefatigable adoption of Western knowledge and technology, but 
also on a long lasting tradition of simultaneous research on the improvement of 
existing techniques.14  
Modern technological development in the previously non-industrialized regions 
was not a simple process of borrowing and imitation from the West. Instead, the 
process ensued alongside the continued development of indigenous technology, 
which became another source of resistance to Westernization locally. During this 
process, the common producers experienced both deskilling through the 
obsolescence of their existing techniques, and re-skilling that endowed them with 
new types of knowledge to keep up with the changing world.   
                                                             
13 Tirthankar Roy, Traditional Industry in the Economy of Colonial India.  
14 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Sericulture and the Origins of Japanese Industrialization”, 
Technology and Culture 33, 1 (January 1992), pp. 101-121.  
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GLOSSARY 
Advanced Sericulture Educational Institute 高等蚕业讲习所  Gaodeng canye 
jiangxisuo  
Awakening of Insects 惊蛰 Jingzhe 
Baisha New Life Cotton Mill 白沙新运纺织厂 Baisha xinyun fangzhechang 
benevolent仁 ren 
Cen chunxuan 岑春萱 
Chen Cuizhen 陈翠贞 
Chen Wanxi 陈宛溪 
Chen Yaozhang 陈瑶章 
Cheng Timing 程体明 
Chief of Military Rehabilitation 四川善后督办 Sichuan shanhou duban 
cocoon hong 茧行 jianhang 
cocoon purchasing station 茧庄 jianzhuang  
Committee for the Rehabilitation of Sichuan Silk 川丝整理委员会 Chuansi zhengli 
weiyuanhui 
copper cash 文 wen 
country of treasures 天府之国 tianfu zhiguo  
Cudrania triloba 柘 zhe 
Dark Green Attired God 青衣神 Qingyishen 
Deng Yingchao 邓颖超 
domestic silk re-reeling 摇经 yaojing 
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domestic silk 土丝 tusi 
Duan Youyun 段佑云 
Fei Dasheng 费达生 
Feng Guangguan 冯光灌  
gailiangzhong 改良种 improved silkworm variety 
Gao Xianjian 高显鉴 
Ge Jingzhong 葛敬中 
gong 恭 respectful 
Great Han Sichuan Military Government 大汉四川军政府  Dahan Sichuan 
junzhengfu  
Guangdong Silk Research Institute 广东省丝业研究所  Guangdongsheng siye 
yanjiusuo 
hand-operated multiple-reel frame 人力连动制丝车 renli liandong zhisi che 
He Lian 何廉 Franklin Ho 
honest 信 xin 
hu mulberry 湖桑 
improved silk 改良丝 gailiangsi 
improved silkworm 改良种 gailiangzhong 
instruction stations 指导所 zhidaosuo 
intelligent敏 min 
Intendant for the Encouragement of Enterprise 劝业道 Quanyedao  
International Committee for the Improvement of Sericulture 中国合众蚕桑改良会
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Zhongguo hezhong cansang gailianghui 
iron machine 铁机 tieji 
Jiang Shengjin 江生金 
Jiang Tongqing 蒋同庆 
Jiangsu-Zhejiang-Anhui Silk Producers’ Guild 江浙皖丝茧总公会 Jiangzhewan sijian 
zonggonghui 
Jiangsu Provincial Girls’ Sericulture School 江苏省女子蚕业学校 Jiangsusheng nüzi 
canye xuexiao 
Jiangsu Provincial School of Sericulture 江苏省立蚕丝专科学校 Jiangsu shengli 
cansi zhuanke xuexiao 
kind 惠 hui 
large frame 大车 dache 
Leizu 嫘祖 
lenient宽 kuan 
Leshan Sericulture Experimental Area 乐山蚕丝实验区 Leshan cansi shiyanqu 
Li Dequan 李德全 
liang 两 
Liu Qingyang 刘清扬  
Liu Xiang 刘湘 
lu mulberry 鲁桑 
Lu Zuofu 卢作孚 
Materials of literature and history 文史资料 Wenshi ziliao  
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Meng Qingshu 孟庆树 
Miyasaka Kurō 宮坂九郎 
National Central School of Technology 国立中央技艺专科学校 Guoli zhongyang jiyi 
zhuanke xuexiao 
National Supervising Team of Gazetteer Compiling 中国地方志指导小组 Zhongguo 
difangzhi zhidao xiaozu 
native silkworm土种 tuzhong 
New Life Women Handicrafts Society 新运妇女工艺社 Xinyun funü gongyishe 
New Policy新政 Xinzheng 
Ning Zhicun 宁芷邨 
Nongsang Jiyao 农桑辑要 Essentials of agriculture and sericulture 
overcrowding population 人满 renman 
Private Vocational Middle School 民立实业学堂 Minli sheye xuetang  
Provincial Advanced Agricultural School省立高等农业学校 Shengli gaodeng nongye 
xuexiao 
Provincial Nanchong High School of Sericulture 四川省立南充高级蚕丝科职业学校
Sichuan shengli nanchong gaoji cansike zhiye xuexiao 
raw silk 生丝 shengsi 
recover the loss 翻本 fanben  
re-reeled domestic silk 摇经丝 yaojingsi 
Sannongji 三农记 Records of three aspects of agriculture 
Sericulture Goddess 蚕姑 Cangu 
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Sericulture Reform Base 蚕丝改良场 Cansi gailiangchang 
Sheng Keqin 盛克勤 
Sheng Zijiu 沈兹九 
Shi Liang 史良 
Shi Qingyang 石青阳  
Shi Xie 施燮 
Shinri Trading Company 新利洋行 Shinri Yōkō 
Sichuan Provincial Agricultural School 四川通省农政学堂  Sichuan tongsheng 
nongzheng xuetang 
Sichuan Provincial Government’s Management Guidelines on the Silk Industry 四川
省政府管理蚕丝业办法大纲 Sichuansheng zhengfu guanli cansiye banfa dagang 
Sichuan Sericulture Society 四川蚕桑公社 Sichuan cansang gongshe 
Sichuan Silk Corporation 四川丝业公司 Sichuan siye gongsi 
small frame 小车 xiaoche 
Songgai Textile Experimental Area 松溉纺织实验区 Songgai fangzhi shiyanqu 
Sun Benzhong 孙本忠 
Suqi 苏稽 
Temporary Regulation on the Centralized Purchase and Sale of Raw Silk 全国生丝统
购统销暂行办法 Quanguo shengsi tonggou tongxiao zhanxing banfa 
Three joint memorials for reform by the Huguang and Liangjiang Governor-Generals 
江楚会奏三折 Jiangchu huizhou sanzhe 
Three Sericulture Maidens 三娘 Sanniang 
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vernal equinox 春分 chunfen 
Wang Tianyu 王天予 
Wang Xingxian 王行先 
wen 文 
Wen Yousong 温友松 
wooden frame木车 muche 
Wu Yifang 吴贻芳 
Xia Yingzhe 夏英喆 
Xiliang 锡良 
Xiong Jiguang 熊季光 
Xu Kan 徐堪 
You Shibo 游仕勃 
Yu Qingtang 俞庆棠 
Zeng Baosun 曾宝荪 
Zhang Lan 张澜 
Zhang Senkai 张森楷 
Zhang Suwo 张素我 
Zhang Weizhen 张维桢 
Zhang Xiaomei 张肖梅 
Zhao Erfeng 赵尔丰 
Zhao Erxun 赵尔巽 
Zhao Hongji赵鸿基  
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Zhejiang Sericulture School 浙江蚕学馆 Zhejiang canxueguan  
Zheng Kai 郑恺 
Zheng Pijiang 郑辟疆 
Zheng Yuxiu 郑毓秀 




Archival materials  
Sichuan Sheng Dang’an’guan 四川省档案馆 (Sichuan Provincial Archives) 
Document: Qingdai Baxian dang’an 清代巴县档案 (Documents from Baxian in the 
Qing Dynasty) 
File no. 6 – 7 – 01364. Sichuan quanyedao zhachi Baxian ju Chongqing siye baoshang 
gongsuo bingqing zhuojian gongfei chi huitong zhenzhuo banli bing chao 
chengdu siye gongsuo zhangcheng dengqing juan 四川劝业道札饬巴县据重庆
丝业保商公所禀请酌减公费饬会同斟酌办理并抄成都丝业公所章程等情卷 
(Replying the appeal of reducing cost from the Chongqing Silk Guild, the 
Intendant for the Encouragement of Enterprise requires all related entities to 
discuss the issue jointly, and sends a copy of the memorandum of Chengdu Silk 
Guild for their reference), May – November 1910.  
File no. 6 – 54 – 01341. Sichuan jingzheng zongju quanyedao zhafa Baxian “chuansi 
chukou mianli zhangcheng ji gailiang chuansi chukou dijie zhangcheng”, bing chi 
zunzhang banli juan 四川经征总局劝业道札发巴县 “川丝出口免厘章程及改
良川丝出口抵借章程 ” 并饬遵章办理卷  (The Intendant for the 
Encouragement of Enterprise implements the regulation of exempting lijin on 
the export of improved raw silk and the regulation of pledging improved raw Silk 
to export, and requires subordinates to carry on according to the regulations), 
March – May 1910.  
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File no. 6 – 54 – 01348. Sichuan tongsheng quanyedao zhachi Chongqing siye 
baoshang fensuo chengyan guang’an mingguanghe sichang gailiang chukou xinsi 
mianshui bingfu dengqing juan 四川通省劝业道札饬重庆丝业保商分所呈验
广安明广合丝厂改良出口新丝免税禀覆等情卷  (The Intendant for the 
Encouragement of Enterprise requires the Chongqing Silk Guild to examine the 
qualification of the improved raw silk exported by the Mingguanghe silk 
workshop in Guang’an, for the purpose of lijin exemption), November – 
December 1910.  
File no. 6 – 54 – 01353. Sichuan quanyedao zhafa Baxian “Sichuan buzhengsi 
quanyedao huitong zengting geshu quanye fensuo chaoyan gailiang chupin xisi 
guize ji huiding yansiweiyuan guize” 四川劝业道札发巴县 “四川布政司劝业
道会同增厅各属劝业分所查验改良出品细丝规则及会订验丝委员规则” (The 
Intendant for the Encouragement of Enterprise implements regulations of 
criterion of improved silk examination and silk examiner selection), May, 1911.  
File no. 6 – 54 – 01358. Sichuan quanyedao xiangding gailiang chuansi chukou dijie 
zhangcheng 四川劝业道详订改良川丝出口抵借章程 (The Intendant for the 
Encouragement of Enterprise details the regulation of pledging improved raw 
silk to export), Xuantong reign (1909 – 1911).  
File no. 6 – 54 – 01373. Sichuan quanyedao zha Chongqing siye baoshang gongsuo 
jieyun you Yichang yun Leshan zhi jiqi qingxingwen 四川劝业道札重庆丝业保
商公所接运由宜昌运乐山之机器情形文  (Letter of the Intendant for the 
Encouragement of Enterprise to the Chongqing Silk Guild on the issue of 
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transporting machines from Yichang to Leshan), July 1910.  
File no. 6 – 54 – 01374. Sichuan quanyedao zha Chongqing quanye fensuo tongchuan 
yongjingxiang sichang chuoye you yushang Zhao Zisheng deng jigu chengban 
juan 四川劝业道札重庆劝业分所潼川永靖祥丝厂辍业由渝商赵资生等集股
承办卷 (Letter of the Intendant for the Encouragement of Enterprise to the 
Chongqing sub-bureau for encouragement of enterprise, on the issue that the 
Yongjingxiang Reeling Factory in Tongchuan was taken over by Chongqing 
merchants Zhao Zisheng and others), January – October 1909.  
File no. 6 – 54 – 01555. Chuandu tongchi gedi sihou fanyou wei zhongsang suojia 
dianzu deng kongzheng zhi’an defangguan jie zhaozhang xunduan yibao 
zhongzhi zhili er du diaonan zhiduan 川督通饬各地嗣后凡有为种桑索加佃租
等控争之案地方官皆照章讯断以保种植之利而杜刁难之端  (The Sichuan 
Governor-General requires the local magistrates to follow the rules to settle the 
lawsuits on increasing rental of mulberry plantations, for safeguarding the 
interest of and forestalling harassments on agricultural production), January – 
February 1909.  
File no. 6 – 54 – 01557. Liuri biyesheng Peng Zuxian deng hezi sheli yichuanyushuxi 
cansangshe liju zhangcheng kenqing li’an dengqing juan 留日毕业生彭祖贤等
合资设立衣川裕蜀西蚕桑社拟具章程恳请立案等情卷  (Peng Zuxian and 
other returned students from Japan set up joint venture the Yichuanyushuxi 
Sericulture Society, and submits memorandum to apply for registration and 
acknowledgement), December 1909 – November 1910.  
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File no. 6 – 54 – 01559. Pengjiachang dexin cansangshe shezhang Jiang Yuting deng 
pingcheng zhangcheng kenqing li’an juan 彭家场德新蚕桑社社长江玉廷等禀
呈章程恳请立案卷 (The president of the Dexin Sericulture Society Jiang Yuting 
submits memorandum to apply for registration and acknowledgement), May 
1910.  
File no. 6 – 54 – 01560. Bixianfuhua cansangshe jianzhang juan 璧贤阜华蚕桑社简
章卷 (Memorandum of the Bixianfuhua Sericulture Society), 1910.  
File no. 6 – 54 – 01561. Baxian Nanchengping guanli cansang chuanxisuo banli 
qingxing juan 巴县南城坪官立蚕桑传习所办理情形卷  (Materials on the 
situation of the public sericulture promotion center in Nanchengping, Baxian), 
October 1909 – September 1911.  
File no. 6 – 54 – 01562. Baxian zunzhao sheng quanyedao zhachi xuansong miaoseng 
fusheng xuexi cansang juan 巴县遵照省劝业道札饬选送庙僧赴省学习蚕桑卷 
(Following the requirement from the Intendant for the Encouragement of 
Enterprise, Baxian selects and sends Buddhist monks to Chengdu to study 
sericulture), February 1910 – September 1911. 
File no. 6 – 54 – 01566. Baxian Xichengli ge siyuan jizi chengli cansangshe qing 
quanyedao li’an chushi baohu 巴县西城里各寺院集资成立蚕桑社请劝业道立
案出示保护 (Monasteries in Xichengli, Baxian, pooled to set up sericulture 
society and apply government for acknowledgement and protection), July – 
August 1911.  
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Leshanshi Dang’an’guan 乐山市档案馆 The Archives of Leshan  
File no. 6 – 2 – 159. Minguo Leshan xian shanghui, Sichuan diwuqu zhuanyuan 
gongshu, Leshan xianzhengfu, youguan wuzi jingzai he shougou yan, la, 
zhuancha, yangmao, caiyou deng de daidian, cheng, xunling, zhiling, huidan, 
biao 民国乐山县商会、四川省第五区专员公署、乐山县政府有关物资竞赛
和收购盐、蜡、砖茶、羊毛、菜油等的代电、呈、训令、指令、回单、表 (Items 
related to the Chamber of Commerce of Leshan County, the Fifth Special 
Administrative Inspectorate, and the Leshan county government, on the issues 
of products contests, and purchase of salt, white wax, brick tea, fleece, and 
rapeseed oil), February – December 1943.  
File no. 6 – 1 – 193. Minguo Leshan xianzhengfu guanyu chuannan cansi jianshe 
gongsi yewu baogao, caichan qingce, gudong mingce, shouju, zhongyang 
yizhuanxiao yueshu 民国乐山县政府关于川南蚕丝建设公司业务报告、财产
清册、股东名册、收据、中央艺专校约书 (Materials from the Leshan county 
government on the Chuannan Raw Silk Reconstruction Co., Ltd., including the 
business report, inventory of property, stockholder’s list, receipts, and contracts 
with staff in the National Central School of Technology), 1947 – 1949.  
File no. 6 – 1 – 270. Minguo Leshan xianzhengfu guanyu nonglin cansi wenjian 
youguan banxiao peiyang rencai, goujian zongzhuang, canzhong tiaoli 民国乐
山县政府关于农林蚕丝文件有关办校培养人材、购茧总状、蚕种条例 
(Materials from Leshan county government on the agricultural, forestation, and 
sericulture, including training specialists by setting up schools, cocoon purchase 
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licenses, and regulations on silkworm egg quality), 1945 – 1946.  
 
Primary materials  
“Chongqing siye gonghui kuaiyou daidian” 重庆丝业公会快邮代电 (Telegraph from 
the Chongqing Silk Guild). Shuping zazhi 蜀评杂志 (Sichuan review) 7 (June 
1925). 
“Gailiang Sichuan cansiye jihua” 改良四川蚕丝业计划  (Plan of improving 
sericulture in Sichuan). Sichuan shanhou duban gongshu tuchan gaijin jihua 四
川善后督办公署土产改进计划 (Journal of native products improvement of 
the Sichuan Rehabilitation Bureau) 1, 1 (1934).  
“Hechuanxian nongcun shehui diaocha” 合川县农村社会调查 (Survey on rural 
society of Hechuan county). Jianshe zhouxun 建设周讯 (Reconstruction weekly) 
1, 5 (April 1937): 5-16.  
“Langzhong siye gaikuang” 阆中丝业概况 (General description of silk industry in 
Langzhong). Sichuan yuebao 四川月报 (Sichuan monthly) 9, 4 (October 1936): 
98-99.  
“Leshan tugai weiyuanhui zhaokai cansi sizhi liang zhuanhui” 乐山土改会召开蚕丝
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APPENDIX 
Major sericulture counties of Sichuan identified by Ying Liangying in the Republic era1 
Three leading regions 
1. Southern Sichuan 
Leshan 乐山, Qingshen 青神, Jingyan 井研, Jiajiang 夹江, Qianwei 犍为, Meishan 
眉山, Emei 峨眉, Hongya 洪雅, Danleng 丹棱 
2. Northern Sichuan 
Nanchong 南充, Xichong 西充, Nanbu 南部, Yanting 盐亭, Shehong 射洪, Santai 
三台, Zhongjiang 中江, Mianyang 绵阳, Zitong 梓潼, Jian’ge 剑阁, Langzhong 阆
中, Yilong 仪陇, Bazhong 巴中, Yingshan 营山, Peng’an 蓬安, Yuechi 岳池 
3. Eastern Sichuan 
Baxian 巴县, Jiangbei 江北, Hechuan 合川, Tongliang 铜梁, Dazu 大足, Tongnan 
潼南, Anyue 安岳, Yongchuan 永川, Jiangjin 江津, Qijiang 綦江 
Two minor regions 
1. Far southern Sichuan 
Yibin 宜宾, Junlian 筠连, Gaoxian 高县, Gongxian 珙县, Changning 长宁, Xingwen 
兴文, Qingfu 庆符2  
2. Far eastern Sichuan  
Wanxian 万县 , Kaijiang 开江 , Kaixian 开县 , Liangshan 梁山 , Daxian 达县 , 
Zhongxian 忠县  
                                                             
1 Yin Liangying, Sichuan canye gaijinshi, p. 25 
2 Qingfu county merged into Gaoxian county in 1960.  
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This map is based on Chiao-min Hsieh and Jean Kan Hsieh, China, a Provincial Atlas, 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1995), p. 126.  
Major sericulture counties in the Republican China are highlighted as red dots in the 
map.  
 
